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This thesis examines the impact of the Estates Action (EA) programme in the UK. 
and Developpment Social des Quartiers (DSQ) programme in France, on run down. 
post war, marginalised estates. Its focus is the housing management aspects of the 
problems on the estates. It examines the methodological problems associated with 
comparative studies of housing estates, then sets out a comparative analysis of the 
origins, development, and nature of the estates under consideration. The origins and 
structure of the DSQ/EA programmes are explained, and a descriptive evaluation is 
given of their impact, based partly 12 detailed case studies. 
There is considerable use of primary documentary sources, and interviews with both 
local and national government officials, including with over 100 housing and other 
agents on the estates. It also draws on published reports and other material. 
I argue that there are a number of factors, shared in both counties, which create the 
problems: 
- the physical state of the estate itself 
- poor management of the estate 
- failure to carry out the necessary infrastructural works to accompany 
construction 
- the encouragement of low cost home ownership as the natural and desired 
tenure 
- the need to fill the empty properties with anyone who would pay rent, allied 
with social and racial "dumping" 
The provision of EA/DSQ resources to the estates was due to wider imperatives than 
simply housing problems of voids or disrepair -rather it was the problems of high 
pockets of unemployment, rising crime rates, and the notion of "social exclusion". 
Successful aspects of the programme include physical rehabilitation, new devolved 
management, and better infrastructural provision, although these were often quickly 
subject to vandalism. Less successful were the attempts to reduce residualisation by 
tenure mix or social engineering of allocations. Voids were tackled by a variety of 
imaginative solutions, and the programmes increasingly included measures to tackle 
the underlying problems of crime and economic marginalisation. 
The most effective remedies were those which involved wholesale remodelling of 
estates, with demolitions and the introduction of new homes, including new tenures. 
This type of solution is most likely to be effective in the worst estates; though the 
less radical measures will be effective in the less problematic areas. 
Note: Throughout this thesis French expressions are generally translated, and where 
appropriate the original is given between square brackets; for example: APL Housing 
Benefit [Aide Personalise a Logement] 
In addition, any price comparisons made at an assumed exchange rate of £1 =F10, 
irrespective of the year of comparison. 
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Chapter One: Introduction and Methodology 
Structure of Thesis 
This thesis sets out to examine the impact of the Estates Action (EA) programme 
in the UK, and Developpment Social des Quartiers (DSQ) programme in France, on 
run down, post war, marginalised estates. Its focus is the housing management 
aspects of the problems on the estates. Chapter by chapter it: 
- examines the background to the construction of these estates in the housing 
and planning policies of the post war period 
- outlines the types of problem which they exhibited and sets out the origins 
of the governmental programmes to combat these problems 
- describes the DSQ and Estate Action programmes 
- describes and analyses the specific problems with reference to a total of 12 
case study estates (6 in each country). The annex sets out full narrative 
details of six of these case studies, with the full details of the other six 
provided in more truncated note form. 
- looks at what conclusions can be drawn about the effectiveness of the 
programmes in combatting the problems, and the international comparative 
issues raised. 
Introductory Chapter 
This first chapter briefly locates the problem in the wider context of inner city 
research studies. It then goes on to consider the general methodological issues raised 
by international comparative social research studies of this type. A second set of 
methodological problems arise because of the housing management and estate basis 
of the work, which are also explored. Finally it outlines the structure and 
methodology of the case studies and overall thesis in more detail, in the light of the 
earlier methodological issues raised. 
Background to the Problems 
Problem Estates 
The problem of difficult estates is one manifestation of the general problem of 
urban disfunction. It is an important aspect, as the problems of high levels of 
12 
unemployment, crime, and social isolation seen on the estates in this thesis 
exemplify some of the serious urban problems which have been increasingly affecting 
France and the UK since the mid 70s; and although concentrated on hard to let 
estates at present, there is clearly government concern that these problems could 
spread beyond the estates where they are presently concentrated. 
Dunleavy (1981) provides a comprehensive overview of the overlapping theoretical 
perspectives on explaining such disfunctions since 1890. The more specific idea of 
the "difficult to let estate" or "problem estate" has a history predating the 
construction of post war high rise social housing. Reynolds (1986) dates the interest 
from the Chicago school of urban ecology in the 1940s, who saw a 
"natural habitat of deviant lifestyles in the transitional zones of deteriorating 
property ringing the city commercial centre; the correlates were low rents 
and overcrowded dwellings, presence of immigrant minorities, a changing 
population, all of which contributed to what they believed to be the causal 
factor, social disorganisation leading to lack of community cohesion. "(pl). 
Reynolds charts the development of approaches to the problem: British observers in 
the 1950s and 1960s were keen to attribute the problems to learned subcultural 
norms; the idea of "settled" communities was also seen as important, with remedial 
action aimed at "promoting the forging of bonds and relationships to replace the lost 
family network" (p3). The possible importance of allocations to estates was 
considered in Wilson's (1963) analysis of moving to a new housing estate and the 
problems involved. By the 70s it became evident that poor allocation strategies were 
not an adequate explanation, as despite settled populations the problems of these 
estates had not gone away. Then came the development of explanations from an 
urban geographer's viewpoint (e. g. Herbert 1982, Evans 1980), which were in terms 
of the allocation of resources in a competitive social and economic system which 
expresses itself in a spatial dimension to account for the continuing existence of 
areas of delinquency, deprivation, and other indicators of social malaise. 
There was less interest in the problem estate in France, until the emergence of the 
HVS and DSQ programmes, although there was an extensive neo Marxist interest in 
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"the urban question" (e. g Castells 1977). This may be because in the UK considerably 
greater urbanisation provided a much greater impetus for public concern with the 
problem of slums, and for local government involvement in the problem, from a far 
earlier stage in the UK - by 1850 half of the UK population lived in towns, a degree 
of urbanisation not attained in France until 1931 (Toubon 1992). In France there was 
some interest in the US Model cities programme at the start of the DSQ. Toubon 
(1983) provides, for example, a comparison between the French inner cities 
programmes and the Model Cities programme. 
The "Inner City" Problem 
The main current UK approach to problem estates is to locate it as part of the wider 
"inner city" problem. Hall (1981) provides an account of the work of the Social 
Science Research Council's Inner Cities Working Party, who met between October 
1977 and November 1980 to study the problems of the inner city in its temporal, 
spatial, socioeconomic, and policy context, and from that to develop a review of 
possible policy responses and a possible research programme; Middleton (1991) 
provides an updated, though less thorough, account of the programmes; PSI (1992) 
provides the most up to date assessment of the impact of this general approach. 
The approach can be traced back to the slum clearance areas of the 1930s and the 
Comprehensive Development Areas designated under the 1947 Town and Planning 
Act, both of which were aimed at tackling concentrations of urban problems 
localised in small areas. This had been developed following the Milner Holland report 
on London rented housing, which in 1965 had lead to the creation of General 
Improvement Areas. These approaches were targeted on areas of older housing. The 
development of the Model Cities programme and the Commuinty Development 
Programmes in the USA in the second half of the 60s also provided a model for the 
UK (see Lees and Smith 1975), although they generally failed to produce results. Hall 
suggests that several factors lead to the burst of policy activity in the late 60s in 
the UK in addition to Milner Holland: concern about immigration; the Plowden report 
in 1967 on primary schools; the Seebohm report in 1968 on the coordination of social 
services for deprived individuals and families; and the "rediscovery of poverty" 
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following the work of Richard Titmusss, which challenged the belief that economic 
growth and improved benefits would cure the problems of poverty. 
Hall also suggests that the inner city problem should be identified in its spatial 
context of the rapidly changing economic and urban geography of Britain; in the 
context of the debate about poverty and deprivation; in its political and 
governmental context; and in its historical context. Understanding the problem 
requires a description of the decline in population and collapse of manufacturing 
employment; and of the nature and incidence of poverty and deprivation. 
This general analysis is widely accepted by policy makers, although some writers 
(e. g. Rees &Lambert (1985))have criticised Hall for failing to provide the dimension 
of political struggle which they assert underlies the processes. 
Social Exclusion 
The contrasting approach which underlies the French programme is the more recent 
concentration on problems of "social exclusion". This is a term which, together with 
its opposite "integration", ["insertion"] was central to the DSQ programme. It is, 
however, generally viewed with suspicion by many UK policy makers. The first 
annual report of the European Community Observatory on National Policies to 
combat Social Exclusion (Room (1991)) admits that 
"the notion of "social exclusion" is neither clear nor unambiguous..... Here we 
define social exclusion first and foremost in relation to the social rights of 
citizens. Within the countries of the EC it is generally taken for granted that 
each citizen has the right to a certain basic standard of living.... Social 
exclusion can be analyzed in terms of the denial - or non realisation - of 
social rights. ... However citizenship consists of more than social rights. it 
also includes civil and political rights... - the right to participate fully and 
effectively in the political process" (p5-6) 
The observatory is concerned to study 
"the evidence that where citizens are unable to secure their social rights, 
they will tend to suffer generalised and persisting disadvantage and their 
social and occupational participation will be undermined... We refer to 
patterns of disadvantage in terms of education, training, employment, 
housing, financial resources, etc.. "(p6) 
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In fact, as the observatory go on to point out, much UK literature, for example the 
work of Townsend (e. g Townsend (1979), Atkinson (1969)) has been concerned with 
exactly these issues. 
In the context of the EC, there is currently a move by the Commission (opposed 
vigorously by the UK government, in line with their opposition to any "social 
charter" aspects of EC activity) to produce a political statement on social exclusion. 
This follows the establishment at the end of 1989 of an Interservice Group, 
coordinated by DG V, to encourage greater consideration of poverty and social 
exclusion in all Community programmes. The working paper produced at the 
beginning of 1992 on progress made by the Interservice group notes the need for 
investigation of "the analysis of the role of housing in the social integration of the 
most deprived", and amongst its recommendations includes the creation of teams of 
qualified development agents capable of organising partnerships amongst the local 
agents, and acting to integrate peripheral or segregated districts into the urban 
areas. 
Methodological Issues in International Comparative Research 
This study compares different governmental programmes, and individual case studies, 
within and between France and England. Prior to setting out my own methodology 
for the study, there are several general methodological issues which must be 
considered. 
The Purpose of Comparative Research 
Oxley (1991) provides a review of a wide range of comparative literature, by way of 
illustration of his thesis that earlier and older works seem to provide simply 
descriptions of activities in different countries, rather than provide any genuinely 
comparative analysis. Looking specifically at the purposes of comparative research 
Oxley suggests nine: 
1. generally extending knowledge 
2. getting ideas for new policies 
3. getting material that can be used to reject arguments based on narrow 
perceptions 
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4. examining theoretical techniques used by housing researchers in other 
countries 
5. investigating the operation of a professional activity in other countries to 
judge the potential for transfer of personnel 
6. examining the operation of some sort of system in a wide context to simply 
understand the system better or make it work better 
7. postulating a housing system and examine the interrelationships of housing 
system variables to other variables 
8. accumulating knowledge and ideas to formulate hypotheses 
9. testing well defined postulates 
As this thesis develops I will illustrate how it attempts to do 1,2,3,6, and 8, and 
not to do 4,5,7, & 9. Oxley concludes that there is a need for many types of 
comparative work: exploring, to draw maps of unknown systems; fact finding, and 
collating and organising the facts (what I am mainly doing); theorising, by building 
models and hypotheses; and finally more scientific testing of hypotheses with 
statistical testing. 
Another list of purposes of comparative research, not totally dissimilar, is proposed 
by Berting (1982), who includes specifically an area which reasonably describes this 
thesis, which is 
"descriptive-policy-oriented research: collection of data that are primarily 
useful for policy makers" (p 14) 
This makes my study similar to other small scale studies of specific areas, such as 
Willmott and Murie's study of polarisation in social housing in France and the UK 
(Willmott & Murie (1988)), or other studies of, for example, housing allowances (such 
as Kemp (1990)). 
Functional Equivalence 
One persistent problem with international comparisons is that of identifying similar 
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data, within dissimilar contexts. This is explored by Neissen (1982) who describes it 
in terms of "functional equivalence", defined as 
"a concept describing relationships. On the basis of this concept 
comparability cannot be assumed or not; the context is as important as the 
elements themselves" (p86) 
Armer (1973) notes that this notion of functional or conceptual equivalence has 
received considerable attention in the comparative sociological literature. He 
suggests that it 
"refers to whether the instruments used in separate societies in fact measure 
the same concept regardless of whether the manifest content and procedures 
are identical or not... literally translated questions, identical sampling 
procedures, and carefully copied methods. . . are 
justified gnly when they lead 
to conceptual equivalence across societies for the particular research 
objectives" (p52) 
Warwick and Osherson (1973) note that the 
"most basic theoretical question in comparative analysis is whether the 
concepts under study have any meaning or equivalent meaning in the social 
units studied" (p 11) 
They go on to explore in detail the problems of not only conceptual equivalence but 
also equivalence of measurement, linguistic equivalence, and sampling problems, 
stressing that "researchability" may vary widely from one country to another: - in 
some countries the citizens may not be accustomed to the type of questioning and 
approach adopted; and indeed may be unwilling or afraid to reveal the answers to 
questions posed for religious or political reasons. 
Finally Oxley (1991) suggests that the most illuminating analyses can come when the 
questions asked are few and restricted to a narrow area, pointing out the difficulties 
of terminology, citing the very different uses of the term "privatisation" in different 
countries. He advocates, however, that attempts should be made to collect reliable 
and similarly based data with which to conduct robust statistical analyses. 
These extremes of comparative problems are not major problems in this study, where 
the basically similar cultural norms in France and the UK are applied in relation to 
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the questions posed. The purpose of the introductory chapters is set out the different 
national contexts for the programmes and problems on the estates, charting the 
history of the estates, the background to the programmes, and the different 
administrative structures of the landlord organisations. I also avoided many of the 
translation and linguistic problems by virtue of conducting the in depth interviews 
myself in the interviewee's native language (English or French) and going direct to 
all primary documentary sources without the intermediary of a translator. 
The Nature and Use of Data 
This is a mainly qualitative study, with trends and detailed descriptions provided 
with the aid of extensive quantitative information, and general policy conclusions 
drawn. These conclusions are not, however, formally justified by reference to 
statistically valid testing of a set of hypotheses. 
At the most general methodological level, and in a rather rhetorical manner, Bremer 
(1986), in considering the problems of the attempts to establish causal laws in the 
explanation of social phenomena, notes that: 
"while engaged in apparently rigorous scientific activity, social scientists 
have successfully failed to accomplish the ultimate goal of social research - 
valid knowledge" (p147) 
Ragin (1987) compares what he calls "case oriented" methods with the more 
statistical, "variable oriented" methods. He considers that the case oriented method 
is interested in the totality of phenomena, and all relevant instances of the 
phenomena in question, rather than in statistical criteria. Amongst the difficulties 
of the variable oriented or statistical method are that it makes it difficult to 
address the impact of several different combinations of conditions at the same time, 
that is to consider a situation as a whole: - it requires the drawing of specific 
arbitrary boundaries to permit tests of statistical significance; and to disaggregate 
cases into variables then examine only the relation between these variables. By 
contrast the "case oriented" approach is forced to account for all relevant instances 
of a phenomenon, and to explain variations and differences; and to make meaning 
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comparisons between cases as wholes, forcing the researcher to become familiar 
with the details of the cases. Raglin concludes 
"the comparative method is not a bastard cousin of the statistical method. 
It is qualitatively different from the statistical method, and it is uniquely, 
suited to the kinds of questions that many comparativists ask. (p16) 
Duncan (1991) considers the "paradox of comparative research -the enthusiasm it 
generates followed by the disappointment at its results", due to unrealistic 
expectations. One key problem is that, in her view, as positivist empiricist methods 
are inadequate to explain social phenomena, comparative studies are seen as a way 
out: - experimental situations where certain variables remain constant and others 
change. This is not a panacea, but has advantages if used properly, with a theoretical 
as well as an empirical dimension. 
For Duncan, comparative studies have two roles. The first is a "shock value role", 
which forces researchers to ask new or refined questions about previously accepted 
conclusions. The second is an "explanatory role", whereby causal significance is 
attributed to critical factors by observing comparative situations where there are 
sufficient similarities and differences in the critical variables to permit the isolation 
of the variables under study. 
A critical approach to data is also advocated by Harlowe (1991), who notes that 
attention to theoretical and methodological issues is overdue in housing research of 
all types, including comparative research, 
"to transcend the limitations of that simple minded empiricism which has 
characterised much of this work to date" (p129) 
He goes on to elaborate: 
"the task is not to set out in all its empirical detail descriptive accounts of 
differing national housing regimes with no further end in view. It is to provide 
adequate answers to particular questions about why these regimes, or parts 
of them, take the form that they do, evolve in certain ways, exhibit certain 
cross-national similarities, together with national specific differences, and 
so on. This task, unlike simple description, is a critical one, challenging the 
everyday accounts of what determines housing provision, getting behind the 
public facade of politics or the market, dispelling mythology which.... may 
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frequently motivate the actions of housing agencies but should never be taken 
at face value by analysts" (p129) 
For my own part, I consider that certain of the conclusions drawn throughout this 
study would be amenable to more statistically oriented testing, with attempts to 
quantify the elusive variables which I discuss. One important aim of this study has 
been to enable some of the possible candidates for such examination to be identified. 
Methodology of This Study 
In this study I have set out to provide detailed, in depth descriptions of the 
programmes under investigation, and a range of evaluative material on their 
outcomes, from primary sources. The points are explored in detail through the 
twelve case studies, which draw on both original documentation (local reports and 
so on), the extensive collection of specific items of data (such as estate size and 
structure, voids levels, and so on), and in depth interviews with the key local agents 
who were responsible for managing or implementing the programmes. 
The research seeks to extend knowledge, with a view to examining the problems of 
housing management of difficult estates in a wider, international, context; and 
through this process to challenge narrow conceptions and explanations in relation to 
policy options, providing new ideas. It also begins to formulate certain hypotheses 
to explain the processes involved. It avoids certain of the problems of comparative 
research by being based on detailed first hand gathering of information: it does not, 
for example, rely primarily on statistics provided by separate national statistical 
bodies and which may suffer from problems of different definitions. On the contrary 
all the data were collected directly; the explanations of their definition explored on 
site with the authors of any figures provided, where appropriate, and the wider 
context of the data are explored in the opening chapters. 
Methodological Issues in Housing Estate Research 
Further methodological aspects of the study support the choice of a primarily 
qualitative approach. The research carried out in this thesis concerns the impact of 
social and renovation programmes on housing estates. There are few established 
methodological rules about how these types of housing investigations can be carried 
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out, and the type of conclusions which can be reached. There has been some 
considerable debate in both France and the UK about this problem, both mainly 
based on attempts to evaluate their respective programmes. 
France: Resident Involvement in the Research and Evaluation 
Clatin (1990) provides a critique of the methods frequently chosen to evaluate the 
DSQ in France, and provides a number of important caveats about the method I have 
pursued and its limitations. He starts from the basis of a meeting organised by the 
DIV on 15 September 1989, to look at various evaluation studies on aspects of the 
DSQ. 
The need to assess projects from the point of view of the residents was a frequent 
issue raised. He quotes one of the contributors who states: 
"I cannot conceive of an evaluation without ethnographic observation of the 
population, without which one is left with the reflections of the decision 
makers" (p57) 
The idea of including residents in evaluation raises a number of difficult questions, 
set out in Gaulejac (1990) : 
- how to devise the terms and frameworks which will permit all the different 
agents to understand each other and communicate. 
- how to design means to permit residents to enter into a detailed debate 
about the policy 
In fact there is not any representative of residents as a whole, but rather there are 
groups of residents with different interests and concerns, some of which are 
mutually antagonistic. Any resident consulted as spokesperson has problems of 
legitimacy and representativeness - and the groups of most residualised and excluded 
tenants whom the programme is really designed to assist are seldom able to make 
their voice heard in this way, so their interests are not represented. 
The additional problem is that residents find it particularly difficult to take a point 
of view which is "objective" on the programme, which is part of their daily lives - 
22 
to expect them to make an evaluative judgement from a point of view of distancing 
themselves from the programme is not reasonable. This does not make their 
comments worthless, just less not objective. 
A more systematic way to canvas resident attitudes is via a survey. I have not 
carried out any such exercise. Resident surveys are a useful and legitimate way to 
gather a considerable amount of detailed information on a wide range of measures 
of satisfaction and general attitudes, as well as basic information on the structure 
and characteristics of residents. To do such a survey on each estate would have been 
more work than could reasonably have been undertaken in the context of this thesis. 
Nor did I attempt to interview any "tenants leaders" or officers of local residents 
associations. My own experience of housing management work leads me to have a 
total agreement with those commentators, including the ones cited above, who 
indicate that such self appointed commentators represent, generally, sectional 
interests, rather than any overall perspective. Where I had discussions with tenants 
or residents, these have been reflected in my descriptions of the estates, where 
appropriate, however. 
There is a small literature which presents a picture of life on hard to let estates 
from an ethnographic, or participant observer approach (for example Pej u (1985)). 
France: Control Comparisons 
Cletin (1990) considers a theme by another contributor to the evaluation meeting: 
"What has been done is the analysis of the operation of a policy, but without 
any before/after comparison, or objective/outcome comparison. " (p58) 
Joel (1990) discusses the difficulties of this: the object of evaluation must be 
identified; indicators must be constructed; then the comparisons must be done. These 
comparisons involve the residents, the policy makers and decision makers 
administering the programme overall, and the officers running the programme on the 
ground. Comparisons are possible on a before/ after basis; or between one site and 
a control site, either before and after or simply after works. These are well 
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established methods, each with its own advantages and problems (and set out in some 
detail in Deleau (1986)). Applying these to the DSQ is difficult, however: 
"everyone agrees on the information gaps (.... the nomenclatures are often 
incompatible). This does not mean that there has been no production of data 
..... But the minimum level of statistical "visibility" (that is to say good 
quality statistical information, specially created, produced regularly, 
presented in an informative manner and easily accessible to all) is rarely 
attained" (Joel (1990) p116). 
This is examined further in Gaulejac (1990). It is never possible have stable 
comparable variables on estates, as they are always in movement and 
transformation; there tends to be a concentration on variables which can be 
measured, at the expense of other variables which cannot be so measured. There is 
also the temptation to lose sight of the fact that the DSQ programme is intended 
to have effects which develop over a period of years - whereas many simple 
indicators (for example the rate of delinquency on an estate) are produced monthly, 
and the temptation to make constant comparisons is often not resisted. 
He further maintains it is important to take into account the points of view of the 
different agents, in the knowledge that they are jostling for power and influence in 
their own self interest. In fact the control of the evaluation process is one means 
to maintain the existing values, and authority, in an organisation. The evaluation is 
therefore often not so much in terms of the changes on the ground, and in the living 
conditions, but rather in terms of the changes in the management of the estate, the 
practices and approaches of the institutions involved (Rosenberg & Behar (1990) 
p. 14). Gaulejac (1990) quotes as an example the HLM (French housing organisation) 
which is concerned only with the rate of rent arrears as a measure of good 
management; and which uses changes in allocations policy to ensure that the arrears 
stay low. In fact it achieves its objective by denying housing to those who are most 
in need of it, but this is hidden by the evaluation framework; it also means that 
other HLMs who pick up these more difficult tenants are branded as worse 
managers. There is also a tendency in an organisation for the promotion, 
recruitment, and management of staff to be based around certain measured 
indicators, and their achievement. The evaluative process can often to work towards 
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reinforcing the importance of these indicators, and thus the importance of the 
individuals in positions of authority. 
He concludes that: 
"evaluation in the DSQ field forces us to renounce illusions of neutrality, of 
objectivity. Evaluation is an element of action. " (pl2l) 
and that the validity of the methods chosen to evaluate programmes like the DSQ 
must be measured against: 
"their ability to analyze what is actually happening: to produce an 
understanding of the strategies, the resistances, the contradictions and the 
transformations linked to action taken; and to take into account the concrete 
effects of the implementation of a development programme" (p122) 
In contrast Deleau (1986), in his investigation into methods of evaluation of public 
policy in France, maintains that despite the presence of a large number of 
evaluation agencies, their methodologies often are less than adequate. This leads on 
to the comparison with the problems revealed in the UK literature on housing 
research. 
UK: Performance Measurement 
There is a much greater UK literature on specifically housing management issues, 
mainly based on attempting to measure the quality of performance of housing 
management organisations. Generally they are based on comparisons of estates, or 
studies of estates over time, and involve monitoring both costs and specified and 
defined performance measures ranging from voids to tenant satisfaction. 
The Audit Commission studies of housing management and maintenance (Audit 
Commission (1984), (1986a), (1986b)) proceed on the basis of identifying good 
"performers", judged in terms of simple indicators of "efficiency, effectiveness, and 
economy", then proposing that other authorities adopt the practices which seem to 
"work". 
A wider assessment of problems and options in housing management is provided by 
the DOE's study of the nature and effectiveness of housing management (Maclennan 
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(1989)). This study looks at some of the organisational attributes of housing 
associations and local authorities which are likely to influence the costs and 
effectiveness of housing management. The key methodological problems identified 
by Maclennan are similar to those set out above in the French literature: data may 
be incomplete, and will be on a large range of services; different groups may place 
different values on the relations of resources to services; and there is no clear 
measure of the value of the output, which has a service quality aspect rather than 
being a unitary product with a definite price. The report stresses the need to 
identify the context in which the activities take place, but notes that 
"only like for like comparisons have any real meaning... all social landlords 
do perform certain key functions such as letting houses, organising repairs, 
collecting rents, etc.. It is these activities which are the key elements of our 
cross-landlord comparison" (p5) 
My own methodology adopts this view in relation to the France UK comparison. The 
jobs of void control, collecting arrears, allocating homes, and so on, are sufficiently 
similar in both countries to be compared like for like, with the caveat that the 
success or failure of strategies to improve performance must be seen in the context 
of the national, regional, and programme frameworks. 
More focused attention on difficult estates is provided by Coleman (1985), and here 
important disputes about methodology do emerge. The study considers the alleged 
relationship between design variables, such as the numbers of dwellings per entrance 
or the presence of overhead walkways, and certain other indicators of social malaise 
such as litter, graffiti, vandalism, or involvement of social services with children. 
The aim of the study is to establish direct correlations which will form the basis for 
certain prescriptive design improvements; these will in turn inevitably lead to a 
higher quality of life on estates -a form of "design determinism". The publication 
of the study gave rise to an immediate storm in the architectural press (e. g. Anson 
(1986), Hillier (1986)). Power (1987), while siting aspects of the study in relation to 
certain design features, notes that in her view 
"design can be improved. But rented housing requires good landlords, 
regardless of design.. . So whatever 
is done to enhance design, or remedy past 
mistakes, there must be a full housing management service if rented housing 
is to work" (p15f). 
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More long term evaluation of the thesis of the alleged direct relation of design and 
quality of life has been commissioned, the study being initiated by the then Prime 
Minister Margret Thatcher. 
Power (1987) also discusses evaluation and measurement models in relation to the 
Priority Estates Programme (PEP): 
"many of the factors influencing an unpopular estate are social and relate to 
very wide issues which are difficult to quantify... if one of the main benefits 
of PEP is greater tenant satisfaction and reduced hostility or complaints to 
the landlord, these gains are impossible to cost or measure 
precisely.. Therefore any attempt to `measure' PEP is not wholly satisfactory" 
(Vol2 p28). 
Finally, the general difficulties of this type of approach are set out in a Department 
of the Environment report on policy evaluation. The problems are summarised as: 
"The mass of data from different sources poses problems for producing clear 
and focused conclusions and policy recommendations. It is recognised that 
pure laboratory conditions can never exist and that many other features of 
the estate are changing at the same time as the PEP interventions. While 
these general features affect both the experimental and control estates used, 
there is always a risk of "contamination", particularly on the control estates 
where the very existence of a research study may itself influence 
outcomes..... Performance indicators are often difficult and time consuming 
to collect because of the poor standards of recording, poor communications 
between local authority departments, the lack of storage of information not 
intended for long term monitoring, and no cross checking of information kept. 
Excessive vigilance and checking of original sources would be required to test 
the reliability of the data and re-analysis often needed to put the records into 
a usable form. " (Doig and Littlewood 1992, p80) 
Detailed Case Study Methodology 
The intention in my case studies is to seek a high level overview of the nature and 
impact of a wide range of possible policy options on similar estates. The alternative 
of examining a much smaller number of estates in detail (perhaps two or at the most 
four), using exactly comparable empirical measures, was rejected in favour of 
seeking an overview which might permit a better understanding of areas where this 
type of detailed work might be likely to be useful. I seek to compare the problems 
which lead to the programme being initiated, with the outcomes after the 
programme had been running for several years - though in many cases it was still 
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continuing. This before-after comparison is the basis for the main concluding 
discussion. 
Several items of data on the main facts about the estate, and state of the main 
indicators (voids, arrears, allocations, and so on) have been obtained. I have also 
included the views of the agents involved in the process. These views provide the 
essential background to understanding what actually went on during the improvement 
process. For example, the fact that in one case study estate there was constant 
disagreement and antagonism between the various partners to the programme is vital 
to assessing why it was not successful. Agents views also provide a unique 
perspective on what the problems actually are on the estate, and whether the 
measures proposed are actually likely to achieve the desired result - this is 
particularly so in the case of caretakers, who usually have an opinionated, but 
insightful, assessment of what is actually happening on an estate. Agents are 
themselves a key part of the improvement process, as they are implementing the 
management changes. Where they staff are apathetic or untrained, for example, the 
estate will suffer; and it is essential to speak to the staff to gain an assessment of 
this. Finally, agents views are major determinants of the likely continuation and 
direction of future programmes. 
I am aware that the views expressed were subjective. They represented the partial 
opinions of agents who may have had an axe to grind. However this bias is also 
clearly present in the selection of data, and evaluation narratives for reports made 
on the progress of the programme. My approach to this material is set out below. 
Types and Sources of Information 
Different types and sources of information have been used to construct the case 
study profiles of estates. 
- background details: each estate has been described in terms of its location, 
size, construction date, type of dwellings, and so on. I have provided basic 
details of the population size and structure. This information has been 
obtained mainly from background reports on the estates, and from 
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observation and counting on the estate. Some of the details, particularly 
population structure, are not always of equal reliability, nor are they always 
complete, but they are sufficiently reliable to indicate the overall nature of 
the problems on the estates. 
- details of the programme proposals: these are normally set out in reports 
prepared for committees or evaluation reports, as well as descriptions 
provided by agents. 
- details of works executed: again these are frequently available in reports 
which summarise or evaluate the programmes; and this information has been 
supplemented by open questions put to the agents, particularly about the 
extent to which the programme was effectively carried out, and the process 
followed during its execution. 
- key housing management indicators: these are the basic indicators of voids, 
arrears, turnover, tenure and ownership changes, and so on. As noted above, 
these indicator are often not available on strictly comparable terms between 
estates. I have therefore sometimes given a mix of quantitative values and 
qualitative indicators. More importantly, in relation to changes on the estate 
I have often indicated the direction of the change (better/ worse/ much 
better), rather than providing spuriously quantified figures. This information 
has been obtained from both reports produced on the estates, and from the 
posing of specific closed questions (e. g. on the current levels of voids or of 
arrears). 
- secondary indicators: by this I mean issues such as the change in image or 
popularity of the estate, the level of crime and vandalism, the state of 
degradation or maintenance of the improvements, and the levels and type of 
participation in the estate by tenants. This information has been partly 
gathered from reports on the estate; but mainly from the posing of open 
questions to the main agents on the estate who have been interviewed. 
Certain conclusions which are drawn in the case studies are therefore based 
on these assessments by the agents interviewed. 
- management arrangements: this includes information on whether there is 
a local office, the type and nature of training offered to staff, and the 
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approaches to management which are promoted by the organisation. It 
includes approaches to allocations policy. This information has been gathered 
both from reports on the estate and from mainly closed questioning of agents. 
- "comments and assessment": one main objective in investigating the estates 
was to gain an impression of the main problems affecting the estates, the 
processes which were followed in the implementation of the programmes, and 
the impact of the programmes. This can be gleaned to an extent by the 
amassing of physical data, such as the type and extent of building works 
carried out. However I was interested as much or more in the comments of 
the people who had been involved in the process of managing the estate 
during the improvement process. My strategy here was to proceed by way of 
a series of open questions, aimed at allowing them to express opinions on 
their personal views on what had happened, its effectiveness, and its 
appropriateness. This approach is examined in more detail next. 
Interviews the Main Agents 
In all 114 full interviews were conducted with agents on the estates (as well as 
fourteen additional short conversations on estates in France, mainly with 
shopkeepers or residents). Agents were selected to cover the main housing 
management areas of the estate, as well as the managers of the housing 
organisation; in the UK I also always saw the district manager, as well as the 
relevant assistant director in a number of cases, where this person oversaw the 
general work of the estate. Interviews were also held with the DSQ project 
managers, and in many cases some of the DSQ staff as well. A summary list of these 
interviews is over. 
In addition I interviewed officials at the regional and national level on the origins 
and structure of the programmes. A list of the main people interviewed is in the box 
below - although this does not reflect the additional people with whom I had many 
short conversations at the various offices. The purpose of these interviews was 
varied: with certain of the regional officials, I specifically sought views on the 
choice of sites for the case studies; at the same time I explored how the programme 
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was funded, the choice of schemes, monitoring arrangements, the successes and 
failures of the programme, and their explanation and understanding of what was 
going on. In certain other cases, particularly with the national officials, I was 
seeking views on the background to the programmes, the way they had evolved, 
reasons for their developing as they did, and any insights that they were able and 
willing to impart about what was actually behind the thinking in setting up the 
programmes. 
France: 
-M. Rault, Prefecture de Nord-Pas de Calais 
- Nicole Smadja, Ile de France Prefecture 
- Jean Claude Toubon, Social Affairs Manager, National 
Union of HLMs [UNFOHLM] Paris 
- Attended the 50th Annual congress of the National Union 
of HLMs [UNFOHLM] Paris in June 1990, and made numerous 
contacts. 
- Patrick Kamoun, President of the Association of Paris 
HLMs 
- M. Grass, DIV HQ, Paris 
-: Marie Christine LeRoi, DSQ HQ Paris 
- Several very helpful Librarians at the UNFOHLM Library, 
andDIV library, in Paris 
UK: 
Peter Emms, DOE HQ, London 
- Mike Brubridge, DOE Research Division 
Steven Dunsmore, DOE HQ London 
- John Harvey, ex. DOE HQ London 
-- Sue Duncan, ex. DOE Research Division 
- Brian Leonard, DOE Regional Controller London 
- Peter Handley, DOE Regional Office, London 
- Alan Cavil, DOE Regional Office, Manchester 
- Trevor Butterworth, DOE Regional Office, Manchester 
- Anne Power, PEP Director 
- Roger Saunders, PEP Training Assistant 
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Choice of Case Study Sites 
The sites were chosen from the two sets of regions in each country. The London and 
Paris regions were chosen as the main population centres around the respective 
capital cities. The North West and Nord Pas de Calais regions were chosen to 
represent provincial areas where there were major population centres, as well as 
agricultural and semi rural areas; they have a tradition of heavy industry, but also 
of decline in these traditional industries. 
The estates were selected to be, as far as was possible, reasonable similar. This was 
difficult since, as I will show, the average size of UK estate is much smaller than 
in France, and the UK estate tends to be inner city and not peripheral. The Estate 
Action programme is also often focused on interwar cottage estates, of a type which 
does not exist in France. I considered it important, however, that the estates should 
resemble each other in significant respects, in the hope that a reasonable proportion 
of the physical problems might be similar. This included physical characteristics and 
problems of population sizes and densities. I aimed to reduce as far as possible the 
differences; but at the same time recognising that to pick only exactly similar 
estates would produce a comparison unrepresentative of the national patterns. 
The criteria were therefore that the estates should be of post war construction, with 
a significant element of non traditional construction. They were chosen in the UK 
to be (with one exception) over 400 units (larger than the average, but not untypical 
for Estate Action projects). They should all have had a significant expenditure of EA 
or DSQ funds - at least £1 million. 
The actual selection was achieved by using a complete list of all schemes in all four 
of the regions. This was supplemented by meetings in each of the regional offices 
(of the DOE or the Prefecture, except in Paris where it was the DSQ) to discuss the 
list. In France I chose only Office Public HLMS, that is those which were linked to 
providing public housing in a local area, rather than the more commercial private 
HLMs. 
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From these details (including, for example, the size of the programme and the size 
and age of the estate) certain estates could be ruled out as unsuitable, and others 
as promising. Thereafter I visited all the remaining candidates (over 60 in all). These 
visits, in my camper van, involved a physical inspection of the estates, and in most 
cases a visit to the local office (or similar facility) to have preliminary 
conversations with anyone who seemed to have some idea about the estate and the 
programme. These were often very fruitful "cold calls", in many cases providing easy 
access later to the management structure to arrange the eventual case studies. 
Other sites were also reasonable candidates for inclusion. The choice, however, 
presents a cross section of sites with reasonably comparable basic characteristics 
in the two pairs of similar regions. Final decisions between estates were influenced 
by the likely availability of good information. 
Estate Interviews 
Interviews on estates were conducted using a mix of closed and open questions. The 
specific, closed, questions concerned factual matters - such as the location of report 
on the estate, the levels of voids or arrears, the staffing structures, and so on. These 
questions would be asked of whoever in the organisation was responsible for the 
retention of the specific information which I was seeking. Second each category of 
agent was also asked a series of in depth open questions using a semi structured 
interview framework. The general interview framework is produced at the end of 
this chapter. 
I have already noted that agents views may be partial, and therefore careful 
attention must be paid to the general approach in the interview: 
"it must not bias the accounting process, and it must ensure that a social 
effective interaction that helps the informant to report adequately, that is 
within the frame of reference within which the intensive interviewing is 
conducted" (Bremer (1986) p152) 
The accounts given cannot be taken literally or uncritically. They are blurred and 
distorted by the informants own selection of information and their own perspectives 
and biases. Therefore 
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"the investigator, before proceeding to the account analysis stage, must 
attempt to detect any such influences, to become able to answer questions 
related to the reliability and validity of the material gathered, that is its 
scientific utility for the purposes of description and explanation" (Bremer 
(1986), p 155) 
I am also aware that: 
"informants have to select from their past experience those aspects that 
seem significant and, hence, worth reporting, within the frame of reference 
provided by the investigator" (Bremmer (1986), p149) 
I accordingly tried to follow these strictures in my approach to both interviewing 
and analysis. Each of the interviews was reviewed shortly after its occurrence, and 
the main themes highlighted and correlated for inclusion in the eventual discussion. 
I then organised the responses into general categories where either there was 
consensus, or there were clear differences of opinion which could be coherently set 
out. I then used the interview material mainly to supplement and explain the more 
objective data collected and presented in the tables in the case study summary 
chapters. For example where I make assertions such as "the repairs tended to 
become degraded after about 2 years", this is based on a combination of my own 
observation of variable patterns of degradation in different of the estate improved 
at different times, and a reasonably uniform view expressed by agents that this is 
the case. 
I should note that I have not devoted much attention to issues concerning the 
development of local political structures. These are important topics, and a study 
of the DSQ/EA would provide material to illustrate the developments (see e. g. Clatin 
(1990) for a description of the this issue in relation to the DSQ programme in 
France). There is an important set of questions about the impact on the programmes 
of the changing local/central relations in the UK and the impact of the 
decentralisation of the central state in France. This fascinating issue is not explored, 
however, except for certain references at some specific points. 
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Documentation: 
The main initial source of information has been the primary documentation 
underpinning the programmes. This includes committee papers, reports on the 
estates, external and internal evaluations, and file documents which were made 
available to me. These documents were collected form a variety of sources such as 
the town halls, the local offices, from the bottom of filing cabinets of local agents, 
from interested external observers, and so on. The aim was to provide some 
background material of a contemporary nature to the initial and subsequent stages 
of the project. This permitted the preparation of detailed questions for agents during 
the interviews, and the checking of agents statements against contemporary 
accounts. 
UK Material 
It should be noted that throughout the background chapters I have provided 
considerably more details on the French context, compared to the UK. This is a 
deliberate choice, and reflects the easy availability of literature in English on the 
UK housing context which would not be enhanced by reiterating it here. I have 
attempted instead to draw out the comparative issues in relation to the UK context. 
Drawing Conclusions 
The methodology has allowed me to gather a considerable range of information from 
a wide variety of sources about the estates and the programmes which took place 
on them. These bits of data have been carefully put together in the writing up of 
the case studies to construct a coherent picture of what actually happened during 
the programme, and why. This detail is reported in the case study annexes. Because 
of the constraints of length, six of the case studies have been grammatically 
compressed into semi-note form, in an attempt to present coherently the full details 
without to simply tables of data and remarks. The other six case studies are fully 
expressed. 
I have then in Chapter 6 drawn together all the material from the case studies, and 
related it to the discussion of the wider national objectives and origins of the 
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programmes which had been already set out in the previous chapters. This has 
permitted me to draw comparisons between different estates, analyze reasons for 
different outcomes, and provide suggested explanations of what happened. The 
important and unique aspect of this work is that it is based not only on the 
assembling of first hand accounts of the operation of the national programmes, 
drawn from the agents involved at local and national government level and 
associated documentation, but is also based on entirely original investigation in 
depth into the impact of the programmes on the 12 case study estates, also involving 
first hand discussion with the agents directly involved, and direct consultation of the 
primary literature and sources on the estates. In the final chapter I move on to 
present some fairly general conclusions about the effectiveness of the programmes. 
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General Interview Structure 
Factual details for all estates: (These details obtained in the course of interviews 
with the various agents, requests being made of the most relevant official) 
Physical Characteristics 
total dwellings 
plan and layout of estate 
bedsize breakdown 
construction date and type 
main design problems 
main repair problems 
main environmental and other problems 
graffiti and vandalism 
Social Characteristics 
household size and type (incl. children, aged, single parent etc. ) 
racial characteristics 
employment details 
training and qualifications 
benefits and incomes 
main social problems 
crime rates or problems 
drug and alcohol abuse 
Housing Management Indicators 
arrears 
voids 
transfers & turnover 




job specifications and tasks 
training programmes 
relationships to other local organisations 
management arrangements 
relationship to other parts of organisation 
allocations procedures and policy 
Programme Details 
original statements of problems 
costed proposals (including EA Forms A& B) 
management changes proposed 
full programme plans 
review documents and reports 
final expenditure details 
consultation proposals 
reports on achievements and other reviews 
Interview Structures 
Varying for different agents, but covering the topic areas set out below. The initial 
set questions were followed by probing of the replies given, the direction of the 
probing being dependent on the type of answer given. 
Introductory warm up about their job, and how long they have been doing it, to 
establish their role on the estate/in the programme. This would include discussion 
with, for example, caretakers on their role, and with allocations officers on the 
allocations policies and procedures. 
What main problems lead the estate to be part of the improvement programme? 
What do you think were the most important problems? 
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What were the housing management problems? 
What gave rise to these problems? 
What were the main objectives of the intervention (/in your area)? 
The intervention programme: 
what happened, in your area (and generally)? 
what changes to your job/role? 
outcomes, as you see them? 
What are the main changes that you see? 
- improvements/ successes? 
- failures? 
- remaining problems? 
What was the role of residents/your relations with residents? 
Roles of DSQ/HLM, and your relation to each? 
What has been the main impact of the programme, as you see it? 
What other aspects of the programme strike you as important? 
40 
Chapter Two: The Structure of HLMs 
This chapter outlines the structure and organisation of the French social housing 
organisations (HLMs), also considering their political control, financing, allocations 
structures, and aspects of day to day management. It also notes briefly some aspects 
of the UK local authority housing management arrangements which are contrasting. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide sufficient background details on the French 
HLM organisations to permit me to move on to the subsequent description of the 
origins of the problem estates. 
Contemporary French Social Housing 
Organisations 
Social housing in France is provided 
by the HLM organisations. 
They are also responsible for a large 
low cost home ownership programme, 
through which over 1.3 million homes 
have been provided. Added to the 
social renting programme, this brings 
the total contribution of HLMs to the 
provision of housing generally to 
about one quarter of the total. Their 
general role, and the importance of 
their position in the development of 
French housing policy, is therefore 
much wider than simply in the social 
renting arena. Emms (1991), Power 
(1992) and Willmott and Murie (1988) 
all provide English language 
descriptions of the structure and 
financing of HLMs. A definitive account of the status and organisation of HLMs is 
in AFPOLS (1987). 
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Box 12: HLM Organisations 
Source: UNFOHLM 1989 
Structure and Organisation 
There are in all four main types of HLM, divided roughly between the public HLMIs, 
which are the main providers of the type of rented social housing which is the 
subject of this thesis, and the private HLM companies. These companies comprise 
the Societes Anonymes, catering for build for sale and higher income renting, and 
of which there are about 360, managing over 1 million homes; the Societes 
Cooperatives de Production HLM, which are based on the seven principle of 
cooperation set out by the "equitable pioneers of Rochdale" in 1844 (Afpols 1987), 
and of which there are 190, managing 140,000 homes and responsible for the 
construction of a further 150,000 homes since 1971; and the Societes de Credit 
Immobilier, responsible only for the financing and construction of low cost homes, 
and of which there are about 190. 
The public HLMs used all to be "Office Publics", but since 1971 some 41 of them 
have taken advantage of new legislation enabling them to extend their spheres of 
activity into non housing areas (concerning industrial and commercial aspects of area 
development) by becoming "OPACs" [Offices Publics d' Amenagement et 
Construction]. Each of these public Offices operates within a clear geographical 
area, either Municipal or Departemental. The Departmental offices cover the many 
small towns which could not support their own office. Unlike the UK, the local 
government structure in France is much more fragmented. There are 36,400 comunes 
(each with its own Mayor), of which some 32,000 have fewer than 2,000 inhabitants. 
Above them there are 99 Departements (including the Overseas Departements, or 
DOMs) which are more like counties because of the large geographic areas covered 
(usually about 6,000 km2) - whose populations range from 75,000 to 2.5 million. 
The quickest way to convey the nature of Offices Publics is to compare them to 
housing associations, particularly those which have recently been set up by certain 
Local Authorities (e. g. Newbury or LB Bromley) to own and manage their housing 
stock. I have drawn my case study sites entirely from the Office Publics, and they 
have wider responsibilities more akin to Local Authorities in the UK. 
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Box 2.2: Structure of Office Publics 
limits of annual 
Political Control of the HLM 
Although the HLM organisations are technically independent of the local authority, 
the fact that the controlling role of "President" of the committee of management 
is always taken by a locally elected councillor (either City councillor - normally the 
mayor or assistant mayor - or a Departemental councillor, depending on the 
territorial competence of the HLM) the means that in fact there is a high degree of 
local political influence. In the context of difficult estates, and as will be seen in 
the case studies, the presence of a clear political interest and direction can (as at 
Chanteloup les Vignes or at Meaux) be a driving force behind ensuring that the HLM 
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tackles its problems effectively and in concert with the wider political and social 
aims of the local city administration; and conversely, the absence of political 
interest or frequent changes of administration can (as at Calais) lead to lack of 
direction and ultimately failure of the improvement programmes. 
The composition of the Management Committee is structured to ensure that a range 
of interests are represented. The composition of the HLMcommittee, its allocations 
sub committee, and its executive sub committee is set out in regulations. The main 
committee comprises a mix of elected council members, appointees of the 
Prefecture to represent special interests (e. g. families), tenants, employers, and the 
local Family Allowance Office (CAF). This mixture is intended to ensures a 
moderate and non political committee - although its direction and vitality can be 
influenced heavily by a very active President, and committed city hall 
administration. 
In contrast, the structure of UK Housing committees varies from authority to 
authority, and indeed may be a joint committee (with, for example, Social Services); 
and it will have a guaranteed majority of the ruling political party. 
Finance 
As with UK housing finance, HLM finance is a complex, highly technical subject 
(although a clear and comprehensive summary is provided in Heugas-Darraspen 
1985). Briefly, the important features of HLM finance which contrast with the UK 
local authority position are: 
- HLMs have always been independent financial organisations who are obliged 
to break even, without general balancing subsidies (e. g. housing subsidy or the 
old reate support). Instead, in France subsidy is provided mainly through loans 
at reduced cost (set out below). 
- they are not able to resort to rent pooling, but instead the rents of 
different blocks are linked closely to the funding arrangements under which 
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they were built or rehabilitated. This results in anomalous rent levels related 
to the date of construction and funding programme, and not related to the 
quality of the accommodation or its location; it also causes major problems 
due to the system of housing benefits introduced in 1977, as is seen below and 
in the case studies. 
- they have limited control over their rent levels, with the upper and lower 
ranges of increase being fixed nationally each year. Interestingly in the UK, 
the ringfencing of the HRA, the increasing reductions in direct subsidy, and 
the close linking of subsidy to assumed levels of rent increase are making the 
UK housing organisations much closer to HLMs than before. 
- very little of the HLM social rented stock is sold - only about 0.3% 
annually (Schaefer 1989) 
- construction is aided by the 1% employers tax. Every business with over 20 
people is obliged to contribute a proportion of its total salary bill to local 
HLMorganisations (originally I%, then reduced to 0.77% and latterly 0.62%). 
Nomination rights are normally available in return. 
- HLM property is exempt from property tax (similar to rates) for 25 years 
after its construction. Since 70% of the Office Public stock was built after 
1962, this is was recognised during the 1980s as emerging as a major problem 
for HLM financing (Direction de la Construction 1989). 
- eligibility to French housing benefits [APL] was not, until recent reforms, 
simply on the basis of household income. It was also linked to the property in 
which the household lived, through a system ["conventionnement"] designed 
to channel housing benefits to rehabilitated stock. This has meant that only 
the poorest could afford to live on the difficult to let estates (see below, and 
e. g. Curci, (1988), and Badet (1982)) 
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This housing benefit problem has been one of the most prominent factors in leading 
to a concentration of poor and disadvantaged households on difficult estates. The 
problem has its origins in the Bane Report on housing finance (Bane (1976)), which 
followed a commission of enquiry into the reform of housing finance chaired by the 
then Minister of Finance Raymond Bane. The commission reported that there were 
problems: the immediate post war system 
"had not had the social effect which had been expected, and could perhaps 
not deliver. The aid was badly distributed, generally insufficient in the early 
years, then overpriced; finally it was the privileged middle classes who 
benefited, and not the underprivileged who found themselves excluded" 
(Heugas-Darraspen (1985), p12). 
It was also too centralised and complex. The origins of these problems had been in 
the housing subsidy arrangements introduced after 1945 which were aimed primarily 
at providing support for construction - bricks and mortar subsidy [aide a la pierre]. 
This subsidy was in the form of reduced interest loans, on long repayment periods. 
These loans were funded via a central banking mechanism (the Caisse des Depots de 
Consignations) - which used, for the most part, funds deposited in the main savings 
banks (the Caisses d'Epargne) by French savers, who remain mostly unaware that 
their savings are used in this way. The original terms (under the law of 3 September 
1947) allowed HLMs to borrow up to 90 % of the costs of construction at 1% interest 
over 65 years, but this had gradually been amended. By 1976, the exact details of 
interest rates, loan periods, and other terms varied according to the type of scheme 
- certain schemes were built to lower standards, with lower rent levels, and designed 
exclusively for lower income tenants (see for example Nouyou 1987 for a specific 
example showing that in Rennes ordinary HLM construction was at 3.6% over 40 
years, while lower standard housing for poorer households could be built at 1.2 % over 
45 years). 
The Barre reforms had the major objective of moving from general aid for 
construction to targeted aid for households in need. The reforming law - of 3 
January 1977 - introduced the idea of assistance directed at individuals [aide ä la 
personne], to be delivered through a personal housing allowance scheme called APL 
[aide personalisee au logement]. This, however, was only available in respect of 
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certain homes built or improved under specific funding regimes. It was paid directly 
to the landlord (normally the HLM). The previous system of housing allowances 
called AL [allocation logement], still continued, but it was concentrated on certain 
low income households, was paid to the household, and was considered part of the 
social security system, rather than the housing subsidy system (Kemp 1990). 
In brief, APL is a means tested benefit payable for homes built or modernised since 
1977 with the aid of various state subsidies: for HLMs the main two are PLA [Prets 
locatifs aides] or assisted loans for rentals, which had existed pre 1977; and 
PALULOS [Primes a 1'Amelioration des Logements a Usage Locatif et a Occupation 
Sociale] (or grants for rehabilitation of rented homes for social use). The acceptance 
of these subsidies leads to certain further conditions (such as on the quality of 
improvement works) formalised in an agreement known as "convention nement"; but 
this then permits substantial rent increases to be applied for these properties. The 
introduction of APL has had unexpected and negative social and economic 
consequences, a fact underlined by several official report, principally the report 
"Badet" (Badet 1982), and most recently in a report on an inquiry into some of the 
anomalies created by the Barre reforms, and other current problems, the Bloch- 
Laine Report (Lanco (1989)). Of several anomalies, the principal one of direct 
relevance to difficult to let estates being the appearance of the phenomenon of 
"the part of the housing stock having the highest rents welcoming principally 
the tenants with the lowest incomes" (Heugas-Darraspen (1985) p21) . 
That is, there was a problem of a much higher and continually growing cost of the 
scheme than was foreseen (which for 1986 ran at a level of F20 billion, or over half 
the total of all housing aid). In addition, there were anomalies in the rented housing 
market caused by the differential increases of rent in properties subject to 
"conventionnement", leading to a position where only those who were eligible for 
APL, that is the poorest and most deprived, were able to afford to live in the 
improved properties. Since the bulk of the improvement work on difficult to let 
estates was done using PALULOS, the problem of allocations and of concentrations 
of underprivileged tenants on these estates was made worse rather than better. 
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Subsequent reforms in 1989, following the Bloch-Laine report, were introduced in an 
attempt to resolve some of these problems. They lead to the creation of an new 
benefit termed APL2, a version of APL payable for a wider range of unimproved 
rented properties, and to the unification of APL and AL. 
Finally it should be noted that the problems of property taxes which are beginning 
to be levied, and the increasing burden of interest rates, increasing arrears, and 
voids, combined with increasing problems of disrepair, have lead to concern over the 
continuing financial viability of certain HLMs. The most vulnerable tend to be those 
who are smaller, and have the youngest stock, rather than the established Office 
Publics. 
Allocations Policy 
All allocations are authorised by the Allocations sub committee of the HLM, a body 
which each Office HLM is obliged to constitute, involving a sub committee of the 
main HLMcommittee comprising 2 local councillors, 2 representatives appointed by 
the Prefect, one tenant, and one representative of the local Family Allowance Board 
[CAF]. 
The allocations strategy is much looser, and less public, than in the UK. Generalised 
statements of priority may be published; but points systems or computerised 
allocations systems are extremely uncommon. There are often quotas held by the 
Prefect, by certain local employers who contribute the 1% housing tax, and local 
social organisations (representing for example disabled people, or underprivileged 
groups). Extensive interviewing of applicants is commonly undertaken, including 
contact with previous landlords, neighbours, and if necessary the local police or 
social services. Normally the administration of the HLM will supply case histories 
and recommendations to the Sub Committee, who will make the final (unappealable) 
decision. Certain HLMs can and do decide to restrict the number of immigrant or 
destitute household they accept, and use this as an aspect of rehabilitation of 
problem estates: there is no homelessness legislation (although there has been a 
recent series of legislative changes to improve the opportunities offered to homeless 
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people in most need). There is often both a ceiling and a floor level for income, 
meaning that not only are people denied access because they are too well off, but 
also if a household is too poor to support the rent with under a fixed minimum 
portion of their income (the "resources ratio" [taux d'effort]), they will be refused. 
Attempts to socially engineer changes in estate population in order to reduce the 
levels of disadvantaged tenants are very prominent on difficult to let estates - as 
will be seen in the case studies. Allocations will therefore will be fully discussed in 
that context. 
Caretaking and Day to Day Housing Management 
As will be illustrated in the case studies, the staffing structure of HLMs gives a 
much greater (and increasing) role to caretaking. Very often they carry out functions 
which in UK housing authorities would be done by housing officers. Thus caretakers 
play the role of main contact between the tenant and the organisation. They will 
often have local (block) office with regular opening hours, where tenants will bring 
all manner of problems including repairs, neighbour problems, tenancy matters such 
as changes to occupancy, and so on; they often also collect rents in the office. In 
addition, however, the caretaker will usually clean, sweep, empty bins and so on; do 
minor repairs; and often inspect all repairs orders to asses how they should be dealt 
with, particularly deciding whether they are the responsibility of the HLM or the 
tenant. This difference should perhaps be seen as more a difference of emphasis than 
something completely different from in the UK. In certain UK authorities caretakers 
play this type of role; and it would appear that in the past they did so more than 
now. The main difference to note, however, is that in HLMs they are effectively 
fulfilling the housing officer role as well as the caretaking role. 
Contemporary UK Social Housing Organisations 
As I have already noted, I do not intend to reiterate information about UK housing 
which is widely available elsewhere. The section here is therefore restricted to 
issues which are of comparative interest in the context of this thesis. 
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Structure and Organisation 
There are some 400 housing authorities in England and Wales, managing 4.5 million 
dwellings (Audit Commission 1986). They have widely divergent structures for 
managing their housing (see Kirby et al, (1988)). With an average of about 12,000 
dwellings each they are about double the size of Office Publics described above. 
A key point of contrast with HLMs is the UK local authorities' range of legal 
obligations, which is linked to the fact that historically the function of provision and 
management of social housing has been fulfilled by the local authorities themselves, 
and not through secondary agencies such as HLMs. The legal duties include slum 
clearance, provision of accommodation for vulnerable homeless people, other duties 
related to homelessness, the duty to assess housing needs in the area and make 
arrangements for it to be met, and various public health and building control 
functions. In fact these need not be discharged by a housing department, and 
increasingly authorities are reorganising to contract out many of their 
responsibilities. 
The Emergence of the Right to Buy Policy 
As the next chapter will outline, the immediate post war period produced a fair 
degree of consensus over the general need to have a massive construction drive, 
although "party differences over the respective roles of public and private sectors 
were apparent, and have continued to affect policy development since 1945" (Forrest 
& Murie 1988 p22). These differences have become much more pronounced since 
1979, and there has been a change to what is now an even more polarised set of 
positions on ownership, rent levels, subsidy, management arrangements, and long 
term objectives for housing policy: 
"the housing sector, one of the key areas of the post war "Welfare State", has 
more directly reflected the "Thatcher Experiment" than most areas of public 
policy" (Kearns & MacLennan (1992) p9). 
One important point of contrast with HLMs is the "right to buy" legislation, which 
has been one of the most contentious and debated policy shifts of recent UK housing 
policy. Its origins lie as much in fiscal policy as in housing policy; and it is often held 
to be as much a political measure as a social measure, being linked to a desire to 
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promote individual ownership. It is held by some to have lead to the increased 
polarisation of UK social housing to leave a poor quality residualised sector for the 
more disadvantaged members of society, who become particularly concentrated on 
the difficult to let estates (e. g. Murie (1991), Forrest & Muire (1988), Willmott & 
Muire (1988)). This type of mass sale of social housing is not done by HLMs; rather 
many of the smaller private HLMs [Societe Anonymes] have as their sole purpose the 
provision of low cost owner occupied homes - as mentioned above. 
Allocations 
In contrast with France, UK local authorities are required to publish their allocations 
priorities and procedures. Allocation according to need has been the approach 
recommended as good practice since the publication of the Central Housing Advisory 
Committee report on housing priorities (CHAC 1969), advice which was reiterated 
by the Housing Services Advisory Group (1978). Over half of local authorities now 
use some form of points system for allocating according to need (Spicker 1983; and 
MacLennan 1989). This type of scheme has the benefit that the reasons for 
allocation choices can be explained as being fair, consistent, and in line with stated 
priorities. Problems remain: Clapham and Kintrea (1991) note that there are still 
choices to be made about the different weights to be given to specific circumstances 
and needs, in devising the system; its practical operation may display undesired bias 
or discrimination (see also Henderson and Kam 1984,1987); and English (1982) notes 
that systems based solely on need could move towards the emergence of a purely 
welfare role for public sector housing. Finally the policy which is common in many 
authorities of only permitting one reasonable offer to be refused by households who 
are rehoused as statutorily homeless has lead in some instances to these households 
having to accept offers on hard to let estates which other tenants would refuse in 
preference for a later, better, offer. This has lead to problems of concentrations of 
disadvantaged tenants on these estates, discussed later. 
Repairs 
UK housing authorities are responsible for a much wider range of repairs than in 
France, where many internal repairs are left to tenants to do. Repairs performance 
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is therefore a key issue for tenant satisfaction in the UK, being the most frequent 
reason for between tenants and their landlord (MacLennan 1989). Local authorities 
spend on average (1986 figures) £425 per dwelling per year on maintenance (Audit 
Commission 1986). This has been estimated (McNaughton 1991) at 25% of all local 
authority housing expenditure, 53 % if interest charges and loan repayments are 
excluded, and that maintenance work provides over 100,000 jobs, or one job for 
every 50 homes. Despite this expenditure, extensive problems remain which would 
require substantial investment to remedy (Cantle 1986). Two thirds of response (i. e. 
unplanned) repairs were done by Direct Labour organisations (MacLennan 1989), 
although the introduction of compulsory competitive tendering in 1991 may lead to 
a change in this figure. 
This contrast in responsibilities extends to the position in relation to relet voids. It 
is a formal part of the letting process for an HLM home that a condition survey 
[etat de lieu] is prepared and agreed, at the start and at the end of the letting. Any 
disrepair which is found at the end of the letting, and which was not present at the 
start, is for the tenant to remedy, either by making good the problem or by footing 
a bill for the repair. The idea that there would be a major investment in relet works 
due to degradation caused by the previous tenant (which the Audit Commission 
(1986) found to be a substantial element of repairs expenditure), was seen as 
incredible by many of the caretaking and technical staff who I interviewed as part 
of the case studies. 
Summary and Conclusion 
This short chapter has provided sufficient background on HLMs to permit me to 
embark on the story of how the problems developed on the hard to let estates. It has 
indicated that there are important differences between the legal and organisational 
structures of HLMs and UK housing organisations, summarised over. The later 
chapters will show that despite these differences the types of problem experienced, 
and the approach brought to the problem, are in fact very similar. 
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Feature France UK 
Control Autonomous appointed Elected committee of 
committee councillors 
Statutory Duties Only financial probity Considerable housing 
duties 
Allocations Closed system Public, open, system 
Funding Self Suporting/ indirect Direct subsidies 
subsidy (usually) 
Disposal No disposal: other HLMs Significant Right to Buy 
provide for this market activity 
Staffing Prominence to Prominence to housing 
caretaking role officer role 
Repairs Areas of clear tenant Wider landlord 
responsibility responsibilities 
Table 2.1: Key similarities and differences of HLM and UK housing organisations 
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Chapter Three: The Problems of the Difficult Estates 
Overview 
This chapter provides a historical overview of the origin and development of the post 
war system built difficult to let estates which are the subject of this thesis. It looks 
first at why there was pressure for a housing construction programme; second at the 
reasons for choosing where the estates were built; third at why high rise industrial 
construction was prevalent; and finally at who was housed in them, including issues 
around immigration and ethnic minority tenants. 
Origins of Social Housing in France and the UK 
The early origins of social housing in the UK have already been extensively 
documented (e. g. Burnett (1985), Gauldie (1974), Merrett (1979), Bowley (1944), 
Forrest & Murie (1988)), as they have for France (e. g. Quilliot and Guerrand (1989), 
HLM Aujourd'hui, (1989), Guerrand (1967), Guinchat et al (1981), Laboratoire 
Logement (1989), Afpols (1987), Butler et al (1983)). There are now also some English 
language accounts of the origins and development of French social housing either in 
translation (Cancellieri et al (1990)) or as part of comparative studies (Emms (1991); 
Power (1992)). The briefest of outlines will therefore suffice. 
During the early period (1850 to 1914) progress was slow. In both countries the 
period was one of philanthropic activity by utopian industrialists concerned more 
with either the physical or moral welfare of their employees than with any general 
housing policy concern; and little involvement by the state at national or local level. 
In France the law of 30 November 1894 (called the "Loi Seigfried") created the basis 
of all later legislation on social housing in France, although it led to very limited 
activity. By 1939 only 150,000 social housing units had been built, or about 2% of the 
stock - and 70% of these were in the Paris region 
(Laboratoire Logement (1989)). 
This was partly due to the effects of the Loi of 3 August 1914 which had imposed 
severe rent controls, and remained in place throughout the interwar period, which 
made it difficult to finance the rented sector. It was also due to the economic crisis 
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of the 30s which lead to the suspension of the programme of construction in 1934. 
due to the lack of available public funding (Laboratoire Logement 1989). 
In the UK the main originating act for local authority housing was the 1919 Housing 
and Town Planning etc Act (the "Addison Act"). It set a target of 500,000 new homes 
in 5 years, to be built by Local Authorities, mainly in cottage estates on garden city 
lines, and was more successful in stimulating activity. The subsequent period 1921 - 
1939 saw completions of local authority homes running at an average of 70,000 a 
year (Merrett 1979), giving a total of over 1 million local authority homes in the 
inter war period. 
The prewar totals therefore saw a far higher comparative concentration of local 
authority housing in the UK (about 10%, (Halsey (1988)) than in France (about 2% 
(Cancellieri et al 1990)); although both countries had a large private rented sector, 
which subsequently reduced. 
Why a Mass Housing Programme? 
Generally, there is little mystery about why after 1945 a large scale construction 
was thought necessary in both France and the UK. First, the sheer weight of housing 
need following the destruction of the war; second increasing urbanisation and 
industrialisation, particularly in France; and third the problem of older, dilapidated 
housing, which in the UK presented itself in the continuing problem of slum 
clearance. To these was shortly to be added a fourth, the demographic pressure 
provided by the post war baby boom, although this was not immediately apparent. 
The immediate post war responses of the two governments was quite different, 
however, as is set out next. 
France 
In France in 1945, a study by the Commission de Reparation des Domages de Guerre 
(cited in Boublil 1980) found that some 1.3 million homes, or 10% of the total 
housing stock was uninhabitable, with some 450,000 completely destroyed. Boublil 
estimates that the total stock of 14 million habitable homes was about half the 
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number needed. Of these, the stock in many large cities was old (average of 76 
years, with 30% over 90, according to a Boublil). Some 45% of the population lived 
in communes of fewer than 2,000 people (although this was reduce to 25% by 1989 
(Journal Officiel 1989)) due to rapid industrialisation. Over half the total housing 
stock of 13.3 million homes was over 100 years old (Journal Officiel 1989). The 
pressure to produce new homes, particularly for the planned new industrial 
workforce, was clear. While the pressure slackened during the 50s, it was reapplied 
in 1960, with the arrival of over one million repatriated French from Algeria. 
Despite the appalling housing conditions, housing construction was not an immediate 
Government priority. Rather it was decided that economic reconstruction must take 
precedence (Laboratoire Logement 1989 p27). Although there was much repair and 
re-construction of damaged properties in the immediate post war period, there was 
little new construction. 
By 1950 there were still only a total of 25,000 social rented in the country (Guinchat 
et al (1981)). What grew up instead was an aggressive organised squatting movement, 
which during 1949-50 grew to house at least 10,000 families (HLM Aujourd'hui 
(1989)). Nonetheless three key new laws were passed in the immediate post war 
period: the law of 1 September 1948 which restructured rent controls; the law 21 
July 1950, which set up the Credit Foncier de France, which provided subsidies in 
the form of grants and loans for owner occupation; and the law of 3 September 1947 
which was aimed at relaunching the HBMs, and providing them with financial aid (in 
the form of advantageous loan terms). In addition further changes were made by the 
law of 21 July 1950 which changed the name of HBMs to HLMs, the law of 24 May 
1951 which changed some of the financing, and permitted them to borrow from 
savings banks, and the decree of 9 August 1953 which made obligatory a contribution 
of 1% of the salary bill of all firms with over 10 employees to HLM construction 
funds. 
The first significant government construction target was fixed as the Plan Courant 
in 1953, which called for the construction of 240,000 new homes a year. This 
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coincided with a remarkable social movement which took off in 1954 which was 
initiated by a Capucin priest, Henry Groues, known as "Abbe Pierre", born in 1912 
in Lyons, and a Deputy for the MRP (centre left party) between 1945 and 1951. 
No description of the development of French social housing would be complete 
without some reference to this campaigner (who resurfaced in 1991 by again taking 
up the plight of the homeless). Indeed a film ("Hiver '54"), and a bestselling popular 
account of his life (Lunel 1989) have recently served to reawaken interest in this 
episode in French social develpment, which can most easily be understood by 
comparing it to the impact of "Cathy Come Home" on the popular awareness of 
homelessness in the UK. As it is by and large unknown in the UK, it is worthwhile 
devoting a few lines to the trigger of this movement, by way of comparison with the 
UK events, which are well known to many in the housing field. 
The critical event which launched the public awareness was a broadcast which 
Groui s made on French national radio and Radio-Luxembourg on the lunchtime 
broadcast on 1 February 1954, during the particularly severe winter weather which 
had seen several deaths of homeless people. This was despite his attempts, with his 
colleagues, to provide temporary shelters, done through the Emmaus Association 
which he had founded in 1949, using charitable contributions for its work. The 
broadcast was made possible by a journalist friend of Groues, who had given only a 
vague idea of what was happening to the producer of the programme. Speaking live 
on the first broadcast, Groues said: 
My friends! Help! A woman has just frozen to death, last night at 3a. m., on 
the pavement of a street in Sebastopol, clutching the papers which had lead 
to her eviction two days previously. Every night there are more than 2,000 
people shrunk up by the cold, without roofs, without bread, sometimes almost 
naked. Listen: in three hours, two centres of assistance will be set up, one 
under a tent at the foot of the Parthenon, rue de la Montagne-Sainte- 
Geneviene, the other at Courbevoie. They are already overflowing; they must 
be opened everywhere. This evening, in every town in France, in every 
neighbourhood of Paris, notices must be displayed under a light, in the night, 
at the door of a place where there can be blankets, straw, soup, and which 
reads "Fraternal Aid Centre: - you who suffer, whoever you may be, enter, 
sleep, eat, find hope again, here you are loved". The weather forecast is for 
a month of terrible frosts. So long as the winter lasts, these centres should 
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continue. Before their brothers who are dying miserably, one sole wish should 
exist between men: to render it impossible that this should continue. I beg 
you, let us care enough, immediately, to do this. That so much grief should 
have given us this wondrous thing, the shared soul of France. Thanks be! Each 
one of us can come to the aid of the homeless. For this evening, and later for 
tomorrow, we need 5,000 blankets, 300 large American tents, 200 heaters. 
Drop them off quickly at the Hotel Rochester, 92 rue La Boetie. Bring 
lorries and volunteers for the collection tonight at 11p. m, in front of the tent 
at la Montagne-Sainte-Geneviene. Thanks to you, no man, no poor kid, will 
sleep tonight on the asphalt or the pavements of Paris. " (quoted in Lunel 1989 
p263). 
The response was overwhelming. The story was picked up in the press, and overnight 
"Abbe Pierre" became a household name. 500 lorries arrived the evening of the 
broadcast, and hundreds of homeless people were rounded up to be given assistance 
from all over Paris. Collections were held throughout the country, committees were 
set up to provide aid, and empty dwellings were offered as shelters - "everyone, in 
a few months, spoke of nothing but housing, homes, crisis, solutions, means of 
getting things moving" (Quilliot & Guerrand 1989, p123). 
In addition to this direct action, important as it was, Groues achieved what was one 
of his main underlying aims, the commitment of government funds to the provision 
of temporary accommodation. This measure had been deferred in early January, but 
was now agreed in a specially arranged debate, and indeed the provision was greatly 
increased. The extensive construction of emergency prefabricated housing [cite 
d'urgence] temporary housing for newcomers [cite de transit] and dormitories 
[dortoires] became a feature of French housing policy, and one which lasted for some 
considerable time, including the crisis caused by the influx of Algerian refugees (see 
Power 1993; Quilliot & Guerrand 1989 for more details and pictures). 
Laboratoire Logement (1989) provide details to show the nature of the problem at 
this time. Drawing on surveys by INED in 1952 and INSEE in 1954 and 1955, they 
show that working class households, young households, and residents in the Paris 
region were disproportionately badly housed. Over a third of working class 
households living in "non standard" housing such as single rooms in HMOs, furnished 
rooms, temporary housing, and various hotels and hostels. 22% of households were 
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severely overcrowded. 23% of newly married couples lived with their parents. 38 7c 
of the total housing stock had been constructed before 1871. 
The Government response, seen in the financing and development of post war French 
housing construction prior to the Barre reforms in 1977 (which have been described 
already), can be divided into three main parts (Journal Officiel 1989). The first 
lasted from 1950 to 1965 approximately, and was marked by massive state subsidy 
for construction, for both the HLM movement for rented and build for sale homes, 
and for the private market. The stimulation of HLM building was through both the 
1% employer taxes and the low, fixed, interest rate, 65 year term loans for 90 % of 
the construction costs. The period also saw the development of the legal, financial, 
and technical means to develop industrialised construction, and the mass planning 
mechanism of the ZUP (explained below). By the early 1960s, 40% of the 
construction was of HLM properties. 
The second period, 1965 to 1975, saw a reduction in the extent of stimulating private 
house building, and more attention being paid to specific needs rather than simply 
aiming for high construction figures. In addition, the proportion of HLM costs met 
by grants was reduced, and the preferential rates for loans progressively reduced - 
in 1966,1970, and 1975, (finally rising to 3.6% in 1977). These increased costs were 
often directly reflected in the rents charged, and as a result from 1974 HLMs began 
to experience difficulty in letting new properties (Topalov (1987)). Throughout this 
period, however, the rhythm of construction gradually grew. 
1975 saw the third period, and a complete change of emphasis -a rapid decline in the 
pace of construction, and the creation, as part of the VIIth plan (1975 - 80) of the 
Habitat et Vie Sociale programme, which will be described later, aimed at 
rehabilitation of the HLM estates. Similar changes to those in the UK were 
introduced to stimulate the rehabilitation of older private properties, following the 
Nora-Eveno report on the problems and opportunities in this sector (Nora-Eveno 
1976). This involved grants to landlords and owners, concentrated in designated 
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rehabilitation areas, which by 1983 had reached a total of 430 current project areas 
and an annual expenditure of F60.8 million (Heupgas-Darraspen 1985). 
UK 
War damage was extensive in the UK also, with 450,000 homes destroyed or rendered 
uninhabitable. Together with the backlog of slum clearance, the increase in 
population of some 750,000 new households, and other pressures such as 
overcrowding, around 1.5 million new homes were needed (AMA 1983). Prior to the 
end of the war in 1944, a decision had already been taken to embark on a programme 
of immediate production of temporary dwellings, making extensive use of 
prefabrication. These dwellings were provided and owned by central government, but 
their management was left to the local authorities (Merrett 1979). This programme 
of building "prefabs" created 125,000 temporary dwellings by 1948 (a few of which 
are still in use) (Short 1982). This programme was, according to Donnison (Donnison 
(1967), p165) "very expensive, gave prefabrication a bad name, and (was) dropped 
as soon as possible", although AMA 1983 notes that the dwellings were popular with 
their residents as they were bungalows, in central sites, with gardens, and well 
equipped compared to other contemporary council dwellings. 
Immediately post war, although the government's highest priority was to repair war 
damaged property, a new construction programme was also launched. To implement 
the programme, price control was introduced, arrangements made to ensure an 
adequate supply of building materials and fittings, house price and rent controls 
introduced, and all building was controlled by licensing (AMA 1983). Progress was 
rapid and substantial: by 1951, over a million new homes had been built. Despite this 
achievement, it was still less than the original targets - mainly due to the economic 
crisis of 1947, which lead to cuts in the programmes of social expenditure, and more 
resources devoted to investment in the export oriented sectors (Short 1982). 
However the new Conservative government which came to power in 1951 was 
committed to a programme of 300,000 homes per annum, just over the parallel Plan 
Courant in France noted above. This target was achieved in 1954, with the 
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construction of the 357,000 homes, and although this figure was never bettered, a 
high rate of construction continued throughout the 50s. 
In 1953, however, the publication of the White Paper "Houses: the Next Steps" 
(MHLG 1953) set a new agenda. New building was to be by the private sector, with 
the local authorities providing only for the shortfall below the 300,000 target. Owner 
occupation was to the main tenure, with council renting only for those who were in 
need of this form of subsidised housing. The general needs subsidies for local 
authorities were to be withdrawn (done in 1956 except for housing for the elderly), 
and the local authorities were to have the primary role of clearing the slums and 
rebuilding for the residents displaced, which involved "overspill" housing as well as 
replacing the demolished dwellings with additional numbers of homes, due to the high 
degree of overcrowding which had been present in the slums. In addition, the final 
plank of post war housing policy, home improvement grants, were extended by the 
introduction of 50% grants of up to £400 by the 1954 Housing Repairs and Rents 
Act. 
The arrival of the Labour government in 1964 lead to a new White Paper in 1965 
"The Housing Programme 1965-70" (MHLG 1965). This set a new target of 500,000 
homes to be constructed annually - identified as stemming from, inter alia, the 
needs caused by the 1 million slums that remained, the 2 million other homes not yet 
slums but not worth improving, and the 150,000 extra homes needed for the new 
households forming with the rising population. There was, however, no move away 
from owner occupation as the "natural" tenure: 
"... the programme of subsidised council housing should now decrease. The 
expansion of the public programme now proposed is to meet exceptional 
needs .... The expansion of owner occupation on the other 
hand is normal" 
(MHLG 1965 p8) 
The proposed expanded construction programme was short lived, however. Economic 
crisis, leading to the 1967 devaluation, severely curtailed public investment, and in 
January 1968 the programme was cut back. The 1968 White Paper "Old Houses into 
New Homes" (MHLG 1968) announced a significant change of policy: a move from 
mass clearance areas towards rehabilitation of the older stock. The evidence of the 
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Conservative gains in the April 1967 and May 1968 local elections, combined with 
the disaster of the Ronan Point collapse in May 1968 served partly to persuade the 
Labour government that a mass council housing programme was unpopular (Merrett 
1979). By 1970 local authority starts were at a lower level than any year since 1962; 
the election of a Conservative government in 1970 provided further impetus to 
owner occupation and rehabilitation, and by the 1974 Housing Act, which introduced 
a new role for the Housing Association movement in large scale rehabilitation in the 
new Housing Action Areas, the era of mass local authority construction was over. 
The process was brought to a conclusion in 1980, however, when the radical policies 
of the new Conservative government promoted not only council house sales but also 
the almost complete ban on further local authority construction except in the most 
exceptional circumstances. 
Where were they built? 
In both France and the UK the siting of the post war estates was linked to town 
planning initiatives taken to control and channel the post war building boom. 
France 
One of the main images associated with HLM properties in France is that of the 
monotonous gigantic estates situated on the barren outskirts of otherwise pleasant 
towns. These are the ZUP estates, in which over 1.2 million homes were constructed 
(Renard & Comby (1991). ZUPs [zones a urbanisation en priorite] were created 
under the decree of 31 December 1958, following the consideration of the Bill [loi 
cadre] creating them in the final session of the IVth Republic. They comprised sites 
selected by the Ministry of Construction from an office in Paris, which were to be 
the location of building programmes of social housing. The land was purchased by the 
developing agent using pre-emption rights to purchase at exiting use price - HLMs 
being able to invoke compulsory purchase powers. Each ZUP had to develop a 
minimum of 500 homes, and any new developments of over 100 homes had to be 
located in a ZUP - this was "urban implantation ex nihilo" (Institut Francais 
d' Architecture (1985)), carried out with the support and guidance of the public works 
department [Direction departementale d'equipement, or DDE], and the support of 
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the subsidiaries of the CDC [Caisse de Depots et Consignations] the SCET, which 
was responsible for land acquisition, assembly and site preparation, and the SCIC for 
financing building construction (see Flockton & Kofman (1989) for further details). 
Development was very extensive; for example in the Paris Region, the ZUP 
procedure was used in 22 sites between 1958 and 1969, utilising a total of 5,900 
hectares (about half the size of Paris) for the construction of 140,000 homes 
(Scherrer (1992)). 
The ZUPs were developed under the authority of the Prefect, who administered the 
planning and construction processes, including the coordination of different aspects 
of the development (education, leisure facilities and so on). Rationalisation of the 
planning process was seen as essential, and was officially guided by the famous 
"grille Dupont" which set out the benchmarks to calculate the infrastructural 
requirements for each ZUP (see Institut Francais d'Architecture (1985)). These were 
not always provided, as it was the responsibility of the local municipality, in whose 
area the ZUP had been (often unwillingly) implanted, to make these provisions - and 
often this lead to extreme financial pressures, or simple inability to provide. What 
was created was a series of estates which lacked the necessary infrastructure of 
shops, transport links, schools, hospitals, and recreation facilities which were 
essential to make them work, and attract and retain a stable population. Of the 153 
large estates of over 1,000 units constructed in the Paris region (including the non 
ZUP sites), 44 were in communes whose the population more than doubled because 
of this implantation of social housing (Guglielmo & Moulin, (1986)). Several of these 
issues emerge in the case studies, particularly Chanteloup les Vignes, where, as will 
be set out later, the estate was implanted in the commune (of about 2,000 people) 
totally against their wishes; and the failure to provide adequate infrastructure from 
the start left the commune with an enormous financial problem to meet the costs 
of providing it over the subsequent years. 
The shortcomings of the ZUP system were partially corrected in 1967 with the 
passing of the law which formed the basis for the present planning system in France, 
the Loi d'orientation fonciere. Generally it created a system of two tier planning, 
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with the SDAU [Schema directeur d'amenagement et urbanisme] as the overall 
structure plan in urban centres of over 10,000 inhabitants, and a land use plan, the 
POS [Plan d'occupation des sols], at commune level. Particularly in relation to social 
housing it replaced the ZUPs with a new type of zone, the ZAC [Zones 
d'amenagement concerte] or comprehensive development zones, which could be 
declared for a range of types of development including for housing, industrial or 
commercial uses. This was designed to combat not only the insensitivity of ZUP 
developments based on the technocratic centralism of the procedure, but also the 
burden on local public finances of the previous system. The new procedure was to 
be based on encouraging partnership with private capital, which was to undertake 
the development. This development should also be in accord with the local POS, 
although exceptions were possible, originally and particularly where there was no 
POS in existence, an important loophole (Flockton & Kofman (1989), p130). Looking 
at the grands ensembles constructed in the Paris region, for example, Guglielmo & 
Moulin (1986) note that the majority of them were constructed following derogations 
from the local plans. Between 1971 and 1979 1,682 ZACs were designated, 956 for 
residential use, providing around 750,000 homes (Renard & Comby (1991), p146). 
Indeed the construction of large estates continued after the abolition of the ZUP 
planning legislation; for example two thirds of the Paris region large estates were 
constructed after 1965. 
There may also be a more party political aspect to the siting of the large estates. 
Taking the example of three Departements in the Paris region, Guglielmo & Moulin 
(1986) set out the disproportionate concentration of estates in communes governed 
by the Communist Party at the point of beginning the construction, and a 
corresponding disproportionate lack of starts in communes governed by parties of the 
right. They attribute this partly to the fact that the residents of the estates, being 
mainly skilled or unskilled workers, are likely to vote for parties of the left, and the 
more right of centre communes wished to avoid the possibility of a shift of power 
following the implantation of large numbers of left voters. 
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There is also a "New Town programme" in France, but this is not comparable to the 
UK post war new town programme which is described below, and did not form part 
of the post war building imperative. Rather they emerged following a major shift of 
policy direction in 1969, following the report of the Commission "Villes", which was 
included as part of the VIth Plan (1971-75) (Commisariat General du Plan 1971). 
Previously the ZUP developments had been focused on existing towns; now new 
satellite towns were to be created, but for the employed and middle classes. 
UK 
In the UK, post war planning pressures were to clear the slums, modernise the towns, 
and contain urban sprawl. Slum clearance produced usable land in the centres of the 
older cities, which could be used to construct new council estates. Additional 
replacement dwellings were needed in order both to relieve the overcrowding of the 
slums and to cater for the rising population. Similarly to the position in France, 
owner occupation was expanded by the suburbanisation of the countryside around 
towns, while social housing was concentrated in high density, often high rise, estates. 
In the UK these were primarily in the inner city slum clearance sites. 
The New Towns Act 1946 provided for a radical solution to the problem of urban 
sprawl, and congestion of the major cities, particularly London, by creating well 
planned and self contained communities in the new towns, along Garden City lines. 
The idea was not new, the original garden city movement having been initiated by 
Ebineezer Howard with the 1898 publication of his "Garden Cities of Tomorrow", and 
the founding of Lechworth in 1902 and Welyn Garden City in 1920. The contribution 
of this programme of new and expanded town programme was, however, limited. 
Between 1945 and 1970, it contributed for only 3.7% of the total new housing output 
in England and Wales (Merrett 1981). In contrast, much more emphasis was given 
to maximising land use in the inner city sites, by building at higher densities. This 
policy was supported by the importance given to the green belt planning restrictions, 
which meant that overspill had to be at a great distance from city centres, making 
it less attractive and less possible (Cooney, (1974)). Overspill policies were not 
designed to provide even the majority of new housing, however. 
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The question arises of whether this pressure on land lead to high rise construction. 
Dunleavy (1981) and AMA (1985) argue that it did not, but that other pressures were 
more important, particularly the need to build quickly and cheaply, the architectural 
and governmental pressures to build at high density, the green belt policies, and the 
availability of the slum clearance sites, which lead to local authorities concentrating 
social housing in these inner city locations, as will be seen below. It would have been 
possible to release land for the construction of extensive low density social housing 
estates, as was happening for suburban owner occupation development. Dunleavy 
(1981) also suggests that: 
"[b]y the 1950's the social base with least to gain from public housing, 
primarily the suburban middle class and rural upper class, organised in the 
Conserva tive party, had succeeded in orienting the planning system towards 
urban containment, halting all expansion of the new towns programme and 
resisting any extension of political control or land availability by inner and 
core city authorities. The cities were, in effect, forced to meet their housing 
needs in situ" (p 101) 
Why High Rise and Industrialised Construction? 
It is sometimes suggested that architectural fashion was responsible for high rise 
construction. The key statement of the general architectural principles which guided 
the construction of the high rise estates in post war Europe was the architectural 
manifesto known as the "Charter of Athens" (see Le Corbousier (1957)). It has been 
summarised (Rambert 1956, p9) as follows: 
"Housing estates must respond above all to the rules which we think can be 
expressed in a few words: 
architecture =simplicity 
construction =economy 
layout =green spaces 
orientation =sunny 
facilities =comfort" 
However although this argument was to influence the architects who were 
commissioned to build high rise, particularly in France, the architectural imperative 
was not in fact the key rationale for choosing high rise. There were a large number 
of contributory factors. 
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In their review of high rise development in Europe, Bulos and Walker (1987, p2) list 
the factors shared by the various countries engaging in high rise construction 
(including the UK and France) as including: 
- enthusiasm for the development and trial of new developments, materials 
and designs 
- drive for rational and economical use of land 
- opportunities for private sector developers to benefit from economies of 
scale, forward planning, high output and labour saving methods of 
construction 
Similarly Dunleavy (1981) charts how consistent patterns of high rise construction 
were promoted and adopted in many different post war local authorities in England 
and Wales, attributing this to a collection of forces including government pressure, 
industrial and commercial influences, as well as the influence of the architectural 
and planning professions. 
France 
In 1949 the Ministere de Reconstruction et de l'Urbanisme convened a meeting of 
architects and planners to examine quick ways to build more and cheaper houses. 
This lead to an experimental project of 200 units at Boulogne-Billancourt (site of the 
infamous, and now closed, Renault factory) in 1949, using prefabricated external 
wall panels. This was followed by experiments with the "Camus" method, using 
prefabricated structural external walls, in Saint-Germaine- en-Laye in 1951, and 
most importantly by the third Ministerial sponsored meeting in Strasbourg in 1951. 
Twenty four teams of architects and engineers submitted projects to this congress, 
outlining their proposals for a fixed price construction of 800 homes in Strasbourg, 
to be constructed within an 18 month maximum period. The winning project was 
built as the Cite Rotterdam. Clearly emerging from the designs and programmes 
submitted were two elements: emphasis on industrial processes; and a rationalisation 
and standardisation of the elements of architecture. The method of the large scale 
estates [grands ensembles] had been clearly set out (see Quilliot & Guerrand (1989) 
for details of these developments). 
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Price was a major consideration, and economies of scale were achieved due to the 
availability of very large scale sites through the ZUP land acquisition procedure. 
Heavy industrial methods could be used for very large scale industrialisation of 
construction, even to the point of installing special railway tracks for the mobile 
cranes to position the wall and floor panels. Laboratoire Logement (1989) quote an 
interview with a leading architect of the period, Bernard Zehrfuss, which provides 
a useful insight to the process 
" In France, the most important problem is that of price. For a fixed price 
we must build the best housing possible. ..... The programmes are badly set 
out, and we would achieve better results by a larger organisation, a 
centralisation, and a mass production of the housing..... Ten years ago housing 
estates were thought of in runs of 200 units only, now it is 4,000. The largest 
possible areas must be given to housing developments, for it is not by 
reducing these areas that the price can be forced down. There are other 
methods: making up the units in factories. On the other hand, it is deplorable 
that there should be a multiplicity of plans: 8,000 architects making plans 
which are almost the same: but small differences are sufficient to prevent 
mass production" (p 42). 
The expression "architecture on mobile crane rails" was coined to describe the mass 
construction process (cited in Guglielmo & Moulin (1986)). It was also explained, by 
Lacoste (1959), as a reducing the diveristy of construction by mass production, 
repetition of buildings of the same type for long periods of time, precise and 
methodical planning of large building sites, the coordination of the work of the 
different professions, and specialisation of teams of workers in precise and 
repetitive tasks. 
This method of working was also appropriate for the large pools of immigrant 
workers who were available. However it was only really appropriate for the large 
industrial firms having the resources to tackle such large contracts, excluding the 
smaller construction firms and promoters (Guglielmo & Moulin (1986)). 
UK 
In the UK there was a similar technical push from the government, initially by the 
Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Works and the Scottish Office who set up a 
programme of research entitled Post War Building Studies on House Construction, 
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which produced reports examining and evaluating various methods of non traditional 
construction. This followed the decision set out in the 1945 "Housing" White Paper 
(MHLG 1945) that prefabrication and other non traditional forms of construction 
which make a smaller call on building labour than the traditional methods should 
used to the fullest practicable extent in the construction of permanent housing 
during the emergency period 
Similar encouragement was given to non traditional houses at the start of the new 
Conservative programme in 1952, with Circular 28/52 explaining that the non 
traditional methods 
"take up to 50% less man hours on the site and an even lower proportion of 
skilled labour in certain trades" 
This encouragement continued in the form of circular and reports, being continued 
with the establishment of the National Building Agency in 1964 which had a wide 
ranging role in promoting industrialised building, through technical advice and 
promoting contacts and contracts. 
An important role was also played by the subsidy arrangements. The Housing 
Subsidies Act 1956 played a crucial role in the expansion of the high rise flat: 
additional subsidy was paid for flats constructed for "special purposes" such as slum 
clearance or rehousing people from camps or temporary dwellings - but the rate of 
subsidy was progressively increased for flats in blocks with 4 and additional stories; 
and a new land purchase subsidy was introduced for developments where all or some 
of the flats were over 4 stories. This differential subsidy arrangement was continued 
in the Housing Act 1961, and Dunleavy (1981) has estimated that during the period 
1957 to 1966, the proportion housing subsidies spent on supporting high rise grew to 
between 14 to 17% of the total, or some f-1,300 million over the total life of the 
dwellings from 1953. 
Other pressures came from the exercise of discretion in allocating resources: 
"Housing authorities who seemed to be cooperating were 'rewarded' in terms 
of enhanced capital allocations, speeding approvals etc" (AMA 1984, pl4). 
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Again, in Circular 21/65 the Government made the preference for industrialised 
construction plain: 
"In deciding what programmes to approve, the Minister will be influenced by 
the extent of the proposed use of industrialised methods" 
This was reinforced by the 1965 White Paper (MHLG 1965) which set a target of 40 % 
of new construction to be industrialised by 1970 - double the 1965 level, pressure 
which was maintained in the Circular 76/65 which set out the claimed advantages 
in terms of speed of erection, output, cost, estate design, and quality of these 
methods. 
High rise subsidy was, however, withdrawn in the 1967 Housing Act, and the growing 
tenant criticism, and general loss of enthusiasm of high rise (see AMA 1984) was 
brought to a head with the gas explosion in Ronan Point in May 1968. Thereafter the 
incidence of new high rise and industrial construction declined sharply. 
Who was housed in the new, high rise estates? 
France 
HLMs have always aimed to house a much wider mix of households than in the UK. 
Indeed despite a clear social role to provide housing for those with limited resources, 
they have often sought to choose the best possible tenants, with most resources and 
fewest problems, to minimise management difficulties (Merlin 1990). 
Consequently, initial surveys (primarily by INSEE, described in Laboratoire Logement 
(1989)) during the 50s indicated that HLMs in general were more likely to reject the 
poorest people who were living in overcrowded conditions, and rather select those 
who were better off; and to select disproportionately fewer blue collar workers. The 
practice of linking allocations to local industries or local communes who had 
contributed to the construction costs also led to the housing of high proportions of 
industrial or local government workers. This provoked widespread criticism that the 
HLMswere not fulfilling their social role, but giving a disproportionate consideration 
to their financial interest. 
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By the late 60s the pattern was changing, and also diversifying between different 
sizes of town. In the smaller towns, there continued to be a high proportion of 
middle class households, as well as many new formed households. In larger towns, 
blue collar workers were more likely to be tenants, particularly in the Paris region 
(except for the Central Paris zone). Despite this growing social role, it remained the 
case that HLMs were housing proportionately more middle class families than were 
represented in the population as a whole: in 1968, for example, there 14.5 % of the 
Paris Region population was classed as middle class, but the HLMs had an average 
of 18.4% middle class tenants; and whereas 38.9% were classed as working class, 
only 26.2 of the HLMtenants fitted this description. They were also overwhelmingly 
supplying flats for young families: in 1970,56 % of the population of HLM stock was 
aged under 8 years: this reflected the predominance of large flats - 72 % of flats 
were 2 or 3 bedroom in 1970. HLMproperty was acting as a staging post for the still 
underdeveloped low cost owner occupied market (Laboratoire Logement (1989)). 
The 70s marked a period of further change. The reforms of housing finance in 1977 
had lead to rents in the HLM sector rising faster than in other sectors; and higher 
earning families were denied access to the housing benefits which could offset these 
costs. The proportion of better off families declined, and their place taken by both 
blue collar families and unemployed households. This increasing "social role" 
accelerated in the 80s. The availability of low cost, run down private sector rents, 
including furnished rooms, was declining, and the low income households who had 
been housed in this sector was increasingly turning to HLMs. In addition, the low 
cost ownership sector (provided by private HLMs) was now growing fast, and proving 
more attractive to young working families with average incomes or above, who could 
afford ownership. 
Figures from Laboratoire Logement (1989) and Curci (1988) show the fundamental 
change which had come about nationally by 1984 - 12% of HLM tenants were 
immigrant households, compared with a national average of 6%. Larger families 
were over-represented: of families with more than 3 children, 52% lived in HLMs, 
and of families with more than 4 children, 68%. The proportion of elderly people 
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housed was growing - up by 14% between 1978 and 1984, compared to a general drop 
of 15 %. This was partly because a many older households had moved into HLM stock, 
and then were unable to move out, as they aged further. Between 1978 and 1984, 
the proportion of new tenants rehoused by HLMs with incomes below national 
average rose from 48% to 62%. By 1984 the proportion of HLM rent paid by housing 
benefits had increased to 30% from its 1978 level of 20%: and the proportion of 
HLM tenants receiving these benefits increased from 36 % to 42 %, reaching 47 % for 
recent tenants in 1984 - this compares with a total of 31 % for tenants as a whole 
in all sectors in 1984. 
So, in summary, 
"preferring to house the average earners, in 12 years [to 1984] the HLM 
sector found itself occupied by a population with restricted and lower 
incomes" (Laboratoire Logement (1989) p95). 
UK 
Slum clearance was one of the primary motors of postwar construction: - and 
rehousing previous slum dwellers was one of the main sources of tenants. This was 
enshrined in the 1957 Housing Act which gave Local Authorities the obligation to 
give reasonable preference to people occupying insanitory or overcrowded housed, 
or living in unsatisfactory housing conditions. Not all slum dwellers were 
automatically rehoused, and the process of blight and population drift out of slum 
areas once they had been identified is noted by Dunleavy (1981). 
More importantly, perhaps, most authorities also operated a series of filters to 
others seeking entry to the council sector. These types of restriction are clearly set 
out in the various versions of the Housing Management classic "Housing 
Management" (Macy & Baker 1965 & 1973). These commonly involved residential or 
employment qualifications, and an assessment of the family in terms of cleanliness, 
rent payment record, and tidiness. Though families might not be excluded because 
of problems in passing these homemaking tests, 
"[i]t will be appreciated that the personal suitability of the applicant and his 
wife are a guide to the type of dwelling to be offered" (Macy & Baker 1975, 
p244). 
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The issue of where to house the "problem family", that is a household whose 
standards of behaviour and cleanliness, as well as rent record, were not up to 
scratch, was one of the debates of the period - was it better to house them all 
together, or to mix them in with the "good" families; would they improve according 
to the example of their neighbours, or would the one rotten apple ruin a street? 
Whichever approach was adopted, authorities would try to choose carefully those 
who were housed in the new estates. 
The construction of the New Towns also influenced the residual population on inner 
city estates. They aimed to have high levels of owner occupation (at least 50% being 
the target), and had rent levels which were higher than for equivalent local authority 
flats. This, together with early allocation policies, meant that they attracted 
mainly skilled workers, the proportion of semi skilled, unskilled, and low income 
households being small (Short 1982, p2l4f). Workers moved to the new town for jobs 
- leaving behind the poorer households in the urban centres. These inner city areas 
also served to receive and house the new waves of immigrants, albeit in the private 
sector. Immigrant households were usually excluded from the social rented sector, 
most importantly by residential qualifications. The pattern of immigrant housing is 
considered in more detail below. 
The most important change in the legislation involving allocations was the Housing 
(Homeless Persons) Act of 1977, which introduced additional rights to immediate 
rehousing to certain categories of household, primarily those "vulnerable" because 
of pregnancy, children, age, or disability. This restricted again the ability of 
authorities to house from their waiting list, and as in the 60s the rehousing burden 
had been to provide for displaced slum dwellers, in the 70s and 80s providing for 
homeless households became a primary responsibility. The unpopularity of high rise 
and industrial estates meant that in many cases the only people who were willing to 
accept these estates were those for whom only one offer was available - the 
homeless households. There emerged, therefore, a pattern of unpopular estates being 
let increasingly to more disadvantaged households - the homeless. 
73 
Ethnic Minority Tenants on Estates 
It is important to give an account of the growth of ethnic minority populations on 
estates, as they form a disproportionate proportion of tenants in both countries. 
Furthermore the extent to which public perception of the problems on the estates 
is influenced by the high presence of ethnic minority tenants requires a careful 
unpacking of the facts and issues which lie behind what may often be a prejudicial 
approach. It also provides an initial introduction to some of the programmes which 
operate on difficult estates. 
Patterns of Immigration 
A useful statement of the recent development of immigration and race relations is 
provided by Lapeyronnie & Frybew's (1990) comparative report on the integration 
of minority immigrants in France and Great Britain. This report traces the recent 
patterns of immigration, and their origins. 
Both countries experienced immigration post war from their colonies and ex 
colonies, although the differences in the manner of administration of these colonies 
(local autonomy in the case of the UK, centralising assimilation for France) led to 
differences in attitudes to subsequent immigration. The most marked, according to 
Lapeyronnie & Frybew, is that in the UK there was an early concern over the 
management of the politics of immigration, and the development of related civil and 
ethnic issues. Immigrants, from a different race and culture, were see to present 
problems. This came much later in France, only starting in the 80s - prior to that 
the immigration was seen primarily as an economic issue, linked to the need for 
labour, with only a few specialist agencies concerned with the wider social impact. 
It was driven by economic planning, not constrained by social concerns, and the 




Details of the pattern of immigration in France are shown in the Commissariat de 
Plan's (1988) report on immigration. 
Table 3.1: Pattern of Immigration in France 
Source: Commissariat de Plan (1988) 
One third of the growth in manual workers in the period 1964 to 1973 was provided 
from immigration (having been one half prior to 1964). During the post war years the 
steady decline in European immigration (mainly Portugal, Spain, and italy), was 
matched by an increase in immigrant workers from Africa and North Africa, as well 
as South East Asia. The 1985 3.7 million figure includes 780,000 Algerians and 
504,000 Moroccans. There is also a large Tunisian population (around 200,000), and 
a distinct community of about 400,000 Harkis - Algerian Arabs who fought with the 
French in the Algerian war, then fled to metropolitan France at its end. It excludes 
immigrants from the DOM-TOM (the overseas Dominions and Territories such as 
Guadeloup or New Caledonia), who numbered a further 282,300 in 1982, an increase 
of 64 % from 1975. 
Primary immigration of unskilled workers was severely restricted from 1974 
(Circular of 5th July 1974), with a shift of policy around three axes: suspension of 
primary immigration, aid for repatriation, and an effort to integrate immigrants into 
French society (see Jacquier (1990)). This lead to a marked increase in the arrival 
of families and children to join workers already here. However the Commissariat de 
Plan (1988) report, using details from various reports in the mid 80's, shows that 
immigrants tended to be concentrated in unskilled or semi skilled employment; to 
have lower incomes than equivalent French households; to suffer from higher rates 
of illiteracy, and have children with disproportionate problems with schooling; to be 
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more likely to be renters than owner occupiers (80% rent, including one in 4 in 
HLMs, which is double the rate for French households); to be more likely to live in 
overcrowded or substandard homes; to have larger families; and to be younger than 
French households, mainly due to the absence of elderly family members. 
The concentration of immigrants in HLMproperties is examined further by Jacquier 
(1990), who notes the contrary tendencies for the last 15 years where French 
households are increasingly likely to move to owner occupation, whereas increasing 
numbers of immigrant households live in HLM flats. There are also high proportions 
of immigrants in the traditional loci for immigrant populations: the older, rundown 
inner city houses. The key important fact, however, is the easy access into HLM 
property, often from cleared or renovated inner city older property, with limited 
movement out, which occurred in the early 70s: 
"[a]fter 1968, housing policy favoured the development of low cost home 
ownership of a system built individual house in the suburbs. The better off 
tenants left the large estates for these houses... which had the unforseen 
effect of emptying certain large social housing estates of their "good" 
tenants. Due to the voids and arrears, HLMs found themselves in difficulty. 
For the first time, the Maghrebin families, who would accept the homes 
which the French no longer wanted, were seen as mana from heaven for the 
HLMs" (Blanc (1992) p45)). 
The North African (Maghrebin) immigrants included a majority of Moslem 
households. This has lead to additional problems of assimilation, about which there 
is a live debate in France. Previous waves of immigrants were expected to totally 
assimilate to French culture - the so called "republican" view by which every 
immigrant is expected to adopt the attitudes, habits, and values of the French host 
population. This has not happened to the same extent with the Mahgrebin population. 
On the contrary there is now a thriving Islamic community, and over one thousand 
Mosques. This is explored in a number of recent publications, including Kepel (1991) 
who estimates that including not only official immigrant households and their 
children, but also clandestine immigrants and Moslem households with French 
nationality, the total Moslem population of France by 1990 had reached some 2.5 to 
3 million. He notes that during the mid 70's, following the halt to primary 
immigration and increase in family immigration, the Moslem population saw 
76 
themselves as permanent residents for the first time, and the growth of French 
Moslem consciousness and organisations began to take off - partly as a consequence 
of the injection of petrodollars from supportive contacts amongst Moslem OPEC 
countries. This accelerated sharply in the 1980s, with increasing numbers of 
organisations of Moslems, increasing political action, and the new phenomenon of 
organisation by Mahgerbin youth, known sometimes as "beurs". This lead also to 
conflicts on certain large HLMestates, particularly with the "beaufs" - racist, heavy 
drinking, chauvinistic, violent, white French residents (see Kepel (1991) pl 3f for 
further details). 
UK 
The post war period in the UK saw a similar need for unskilled workers, which also 
initially fuelled immigration. Peach (1981) provides details of immigration into the 
UK post war. In 1951 the black population of the UK was negligible, at about 50,000. 
There were then two overlapping waves. The first was the West Indian movement 
which began in the early 1950s, peaked in 1961, and subsequently died away in the 
early 70's to become a net decline. The second wave was from India and Pakistan 
which got into its stride as the West Indian movement had peaked. The 1971 census 
shows that only 15 % of Pakistanis and 25 % of Indians had entered the country before 
1961, compared with 43% of West Indians. A third wave was that of East African 
Asians, particularly the 30,000 approximately who were expelled from Uganda in the 
early 1970s. 
There were different reasons behind these waves of immigration. Many West Indian 
migrants were recruited specifically in relation to the demand for labour, and 
increases in immigration followed the changing demand for labour. Some industries, 
particularly British Rail, London Transport, and the National Health Service, 
recruited labour directly from Barbados, Jamaica, and other islands. By the mid 50s 
this flow had grown so great that population loss was heavy, with smaller islands 
such as Montserrat, for example, losing almost a third of its population. Peach (1981) 
has correlated the unemployment rates with immigration rates from the West Indies, 
showing a marked inverse correlation. The pattern of immigration during this period 
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was, generally speaking, controlled from the UK in relation to the demand for 
labour. 
The relationship of Indian, Pakistani, and East African immigration to demand for 
labour is less clear. The forces of the sending areas seem to have been more 
important than the demand from the UK. In the case of East African Asians the push 
forces were clearly dominant. 
One essential difference from France, however, was that many commonwealth 
citizens possessed British passports, and had theoretically and practically free access 
to the UK, irrespective of any employment programme. The 1949 Royal Commission 
on Population noted up what it believed to be problems with the integration of 
immigrants who may not be "of good stock", or the right race or religion; and by the 
time of the riots in Nottingham and Notting Hill in 1958, there was a vigorous 
debate, lead by the right wing of the Conservative party. The passing of the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1962 ended this era of free entry - though it had 
been preceded in the previous two years by a rapid influx of immigrants before the 
doors closed - 58,000 immigrants from the Caribbean and Indian sub continent in 
1960,115,000 in 1961, and 72,500 in 1962 up to 30 June, compared with an average 
of 32,000 for each of the previous 5 years. The subsequent waves of immigration 
from Kenya in 1968, and from Uganda in 1972 were equally seen and debated in 
terms of the significance and historical consequences of awarding British citizenship 
-a problem replicated recently in relation to Hong Kong. This early restriction of 
primary immigration of industrial workers, which continued later in France, lead to 
the earlier emergence of family immigration, and an earlier concern with social and 
discriminatory issues. 
Further restricting immigrant legislation was passed in 1968 and 1971. By 1982 New 
Commonwealth immigration had declined further, and was almost entirely made up 
of dependants of people already settled here. Further, by 1984, the UK black 
population was over 40% British born, and over half of those who are immigrants had 
lived here for over 15 years. 
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Settlement was not even over the country, with in 1971 three quarters of West 
Indians, two thirds of Pakistani born and well over one half of Indian born people 
living in the seven largest conurbations, particularly London, Birmingham, and 
Manchester. This reflected a tendency for these groups to move into areas which 
were experiencing a high population loss of white households, who were moving out 
to smaller towns. This lead to a higher concentration in areas of housing stress, with 
for example in 1971 one third of the West Indian population living in areas of housing 
stress compared to 10% of the population as a whole. 
The question of discrimination against ethnic minorities' housing opportunities has 
been examined by a sizable number of published studies, as well as specific reviews 
undertaken by local authorities and other organisations (e. g. CRE (1984a), (1984b); 
GLC (1976); Lambert et al (1978); Rex & Moore (1967)). 
These reports suggest that 
"[t]he housing circumstances of black people in Britain are in many ways 
unusual and inferior to those of white people" (PSI (1984), p68) 
As in France, there is an imbalance in relation to the proportions of owners and 
social renters. In the early 80s, white UK owner occupiers (60 %) outnumbered white 
council tenants (30%) by a factor of two to one; but West Indian households were 
found in only 41 % of cases in owner occupation and 46% of cases in council housing. 
Asian households, by contrast, were found predominantly in owner occupation (72%) 
and seldom in council housing (19 %) - although there are differences between for 
example Bangladeshis, with 30% owning and 53% in council homes, and Sikhs, with 
91 % owing and 6% council tenants. (PSI (1984)). 
In the council sector, PSI (1984) report that black tenants were twice as likely as 
whites to be in flats, particularly black single parents; almost four times as many 
West Indian and Asian households were rehoused in council dwellings as "homeless"; 
and tended to be housed in flats on higher floors. 
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The CRE Liverpool report (CRE 1984) provides an illustration of how this 
disadvantage occurs. The report finds, from an examination of the city's rehousing 
records, that 
"black households have been concentrated certain parts of South City, 
irrespective of choice. The differences in allocations observed could only be 
explained by the factor of the racial origin of the applicants. Therefore there 
is no alternative explanation other than that conscious or unconscious 
stereotyping of black applicants must have entered into the subjective 
interpretation of housing officers... [I]t is primarily due to the unintentional 
racist effect of allocation procedures and practices and also the racial 
stereotyping of white and black applicants by Council officers" (p87) 
South City was the area of town that had been traditionally occupied by black 
households, for the previous hundred years. The study also found that black 
households had achieved a lower quality of dwelling overall, and that they had been 
virtually excluded from the better quality environment of the suburban area of South 
City. 
Henderson & Karn (1987) provide a review of the research on race and housing. 
Looking at council housing they note the study by Policy and Economic Planning 
(Daniel (1968)) of six local authorities, which found that ethnic minorities were 
effectively excluded from access to council housing, a similar conclusion to that 
reached by Rex and Moore (1967). A further PEP study in 1975 (Smith & Whalley 
(1975)), looking at 10 local authorities, found that in all of them ethnic minorities 
were at a disadvantage in getting access to council housing. This was predominantly 
due to restrictions based on residence requirements of on length of time on the 
waiting list. In addition, the restrictions on owner occupiers was disadvantaging 
those Asian and West Indian households who had moved into cheap, substandard 
housing. Over time the residential qualification problem lost its impact, as more and 
more of the ethnic minority households, particularly West Indian, had been resident 
for long periods. 
Quality was also a problem. Smith & Whalley (1975) found that there was little 
awareness of the problem, but that there was a significant impact on the quality of 
accommodation offered due to the priority system, the nature and location of the 
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stock available, acceptance of offers through desperation, choice of areas by blacks 
and whites, poor communication, and racial bias; and they note: 
" it is significant that so much was left to the personal judgement of the 
housing manager who, in spite of his good intentions, may well have 
stereotyped notions which led to this kind of discrimination" (p61) 
Internal monitoring was generally lacking, but in the mid to late 70's some 
authorities introduced it and examined patterns of allocations (e. g. the GLC, 
Lewisham, Wandsworth, Bedford, Nottingham, Liverpool, and Islington). The general 
conclusions were that black families were doing worse, due to a large number of 
factors, including the disproportionate number of homeless black families, the poor 
knowledge blacks had of the council housing system, acceptance of the first offer, 
possibly because of desperation resulting from - bad housing conditions, and 
preference for inner city locations, even where the property available was worse, 
as well as the likelihood that there was a specifically racial bias in the decisions 
made. The conclusion drawn by Henderson and Karn was that no matter what the 
allocations rules and procedures, racial inequality in allocations always emerged, 
confirmed by their own research into the City of Birmingham's allocations 
(Henderson and Kam (1987)). 
Official Aid for Immigrants 
Measures to combat the difficulties experienced by immigrants differed greatly in 
each country. In France the establishment in 1958 of the FAS (Immigrant Assistance 
Fund), initially to assist Algerian immigrants, but extended to include all immigrants 
in 1964, created a body whose main concern was the settlement and housing of 
immigrants. The anti discrimination law of 1 July 1972 made it an offence to engage 
in racist behaviour or discriminatory activities. A national network of welcome 
agencies was instituted by the Ministry of Labour in 1973, and in June 1974 a new 
Ministerial post was created, charged with the affairs of immigrant workers, in 
recognition of the insufficiency of previous measures. Various local programmes for 
the housing and integration of immigrants were initiated and funded. In addition, 
special educational and training measures were instituted during the 70s. There was 
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still, at the end of the 70s, a clear government policy to encourage the return of 
around 500,000 immigrant workers to their country of origin. 
The change of government in 1981 brought an end to the doctrine of repatriation, 
and brought the right of residence to many workers, and the right to association and 
organisation in groups to further their own specific needs and aspirations. Following 
the 1981 rioting on certain hard to let HLM estates, the emphasis moved to the 
assistance for disadvantaged groups, who included many black households. The 
programmes of educational priority zones and of assistance to unemployed young 
people, together with the DSQprogramme, formed the core of a diversity of actions. 
The Commissaritat General du Plan (1988) report provided consolidated information 
and advice on improving these measures to the benefit of the ethnic minority 
population. However the measures taken to date have been fragmented and poorly 
focused, in the view of Lapeyronnie & Frybew (1990). 
In the UK the emphasis has been much more on the creation of an institutional 
framework for the integration of immigrants. The creation in 1962 of the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory council was followed in 1965 by the Race 
Relations Act, which (like the 1972 French Act) forbade discriminatory or racists 
activities, and created the Race Relations Board. The legislation was strengthened 
in 1968 with measures to outlaw discrimination in housing, services, and 
employment, and the creation of the Community Relations Commission at a national 
level, as well as local commissions, to promote good race relations. The creation of 
Community Relations Officers in local authorities was also funded. The Commission 
for Racial Equality was created in 1976, with the passing of a further race relations 
act which forbade indirect discrimination. This new commission had the job of 
providing policy advice; of taking action for the elimination of discrimination; and 
of promoting good race relations. There is no equivalent institution in France, with 
similar powers and duties to the CRE, who between 1977 and 1989 conducted 47 
enquiries and published reports on each, as well as publishing guides and codes of 
good practice on race relations. 
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Social actions taken began under Section 11 of the Local Government Act 1966, 
which permitted special provisions to be made, and paid for by the Home Office, for 
"substantial numbers of immigrants whose language or customs differ from those of 
the community" (from Section 11 of the Act). The majority of these funds went on 
educational spending, though social services spending was also important. Additional 
funding from the Urban Programme (see Chapter Four) was also used to support 
these initiatives, although it was made clear that the presence of ethnic minority 
groups in an area was only one factor amongst others which would influence 
spending. In 1983,38% of the ethnic minority population lived in Urban Programme 
areas, and in the London area this increased to 60 % (cited in Lapeyronnie & Frybew 
(1990) p93). Programmes for the training of unemployed young people were also 
initiated, as in France, under the Manpower Services Commission which was created 
in 1974. This lead to the Job Creation programme, the Youth Opportunities 
Programme, and finally the Youth Training Scheme. 
The absence of a body such as the CRE in France has meant that this type of study, 
concerned with indirect discrimination, has been much less common. In the UK the 
need for equal opportunities policies in employment or housing, to take two 
examples, has become absorbed into management and service delivery culture in the 
public sector as a whole, and in some cases in the large private sector companies. 
There has been a constant emphasis on the civil notion of racial equality, and 
measures to promote anti racism monitored by the CRE and supported by the Home 
Office. In France, in contrast, the emphasis has been on social action, managed by 
the Ministry of Social Affairs and the FAS, and the civil dimension has been almost 
totally absent. One small indication of the differences may be the manner in which 
the French debate is still in terms of "immigrants", a term since replaced in the UK 
with the less emotive and discriminatory term "ethnic minorities" (although the 
French attitude to the Politically Correct language debate is generally cold). 
Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has set out to sketch in the background to the construction and 
development of the post war difficult estates. It has illustrated that: 
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- both countries were faced with a post war imperative to build due to 
extensive war damage, large pockets of poorer older housing, and, 
subsequently, a growing population 
- in the UK the problem of the slums and of slum clearance was a much 
greater motor of local authority activity, reflecting earlier urbanisation. 
- the citing of high rise estates in peripheral areas was a deliberate and 
clearly publicised choice of French g overnment planners; whereas in the UK 
the siting of high rise in inner city locations was less overtly linked to a 
positive planning policy, being more the result of the discouragement of 
greenfield social housing sites. In neither country was the new towns 
programme a main provider of social housing. 
- lack of development funds in France often left the new estates without 
suitable infrastructure such as transport links, schools, or shops. 
- the design and construction methods of high rise were linked to costs, 
labour availability, and to a much lesser extent architectural fashion. 
However the greenfield nature of the French sites permitted a programme of 
full scale industrial construction of a scale not possible in the UK infill sites 
built on slum clearance land. 
- both countries increasingly promoted low cost home ownership from the late 
60s, via the private HLMs in France 
- in the UK the original occupants had by and large been the respectable ex 
slum dwellers, and in France there was an attempt to attract middle income 
groups at the start of the programme. But both countries experienced 
residualisation in the populations of the estates during the 70s. The increasing 
unpopularity of the high rise estates meant that the populations allocated 
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flats there tended to be drawn more and more from disadvantaged groups 
with no other options. 
- more specifically, ethnic minority tenants began to be disproportionately 
concentrated on these estates from the late 70s. This was due to a variety of 
factors, including their willingness to accept properties there, discriminatory 
allocations practices, and their inability to find alternative accommodation 
in other tenures or areas. Immigrant households were therefore used in this 
way to meet the financial needs of housing organisations to fill the void 
properties on hard to let estates. 
It can be seen then that there are two main factors: first, although the original 
objective of providing a large number of new homes had been achieved, the method 
adopted (low cost high rise) had produced estates which were unpopular because of 
their isolation, design, scale, and physical defects. This unpopularity developed at 
a time when there was a growing support for owner occupation in both countries and 
an increasing provision of opportunities for lower income households to move to this 
tenure. 
The result was that mass housing estates found that their units were no longer 
needed or wanted by a cross section of the community. Instead, housing organisations 
had to resort to taking anyone who was willing to move there, and indeed many 
people who were not willing but had no other option. Even this was not sufficient to 
fill all the voids, as will be seen later. The next chapter will document the gradual 
realisation of the origins and nature of these problems, and the initial plans to 
combat them. 
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Chapter Four: Context of the EA and DSQ Programmes 
Overview 
This chapter starts by examining the early governmental awareness of problems on 
difficult estates, looking at what these problems were, and at the initial programmes 
which preceded Estates Action and DSQ. The context of other governmental action 
to combat social exclusion is then provided, illustrating the much longer and more 
varied history of intervention in the UK. 
Stirrings of Awareness 
France 
Particularly in France, many commentators initially had high hopes for the estates. 
Kaes, a French sociologist, in a study of the newly developing social phenomenon of 
the large estates suggested, for example (Kaes 1963), that it would lead to the 
growth of a new, mass culture. 
In contrast, the first statement of the problems of the difficult estates to make an 
impact on thinking about the issues was the Chamboredon & Lemaire's celebrated 
article in the Revue Francaise de Sociologie (Chamboredon & Lemaire (1970)), based 
on a research study of an estate in the north of Paris. Their exploration of social 
relations on the estate leads them to reject many of the utopian notions of 
communal life on estates. The population on these estates is not homogeneous, since 
allocations have been made from a wide range of sources, including employees 
quotas, social service quotas for difficult families, and Prefects quotas. In this sense 
it was totally unlike a normal "neighbourhood" in a town, where self selection would 
bring together similar minded people. Consequently there tended to be no group who 
imposed its values, or set the tone, on the estate. Most people allocated flats are 
denied the ability to choose their neighbours, and the heterogeneity meant they 
could have little in common through which to make real contact, and often feel no 
impetus to be neighbourly. Attitudes to the estate were, however, very closely 
related to the social group to which the respondent belonged. The study's research 
found that the manual and unskilled workers were much more content with life on 
the estate, knowing that there were others housed in much poorer conditions, as they 
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may themselves have been. They also saw themselves as staying on the estate. In 
contrast the young middle class households, or young skilled workers saw the estate 
as simply a stepping stone to owner occupation; and were also much more likely to 
be involved in local associations or organisations. 
This evidence leads them to be very critical of previous assumptions about 
population and social structure on estates -such as the study published by Clerc 
(Clerc (1967)) which simply concluded that there is likely to be an "average" mix of 
population on an estate, compared to the population as a whole. Quoting extensively 
from contemporary commentators on these estates, they also criticise the "utopian" 
approaches which are common. These tend to see the estates as either "miraculous 
diffusions of the needs and aspirations, supposedly universal, of the middle classes" 
(p15) or places permitting the "emergence of a new man, either a little universal 
bourgeois or an eternal man relieved of his alienation his myths and his conditioning" 
(p 15), a view which has much in common with the English ideas of garden cities or 
ideal villages. In fact those who are socially mobile appeared to like the mixture of 
people on the estates, while those who are at one extreme or the other disliked the 
contrasts of lifestyle - particularly the worst off. This also explained, in part, the 
prominence of complaints about noise on these estates: people were forced to live 
alongside strangers with different aspirations and lifestyles, which were all too 
evident in the poorly insulated buildings -a complaint which was as much about the 
type of neighbours as the noise. This antagonism arose from the point of moving in, 
where the better off tenants coped with the generally higher expenses of living on 
peripheral estates, and of new furnishing, whereas the poorer tenants found their 
limited budgets extremely stretched and disrupted. 
This conflict expressed itself strongly in relation to children and young people, where 
the middle class groups objected strongly to the habits and permissiveness of poorer 
tenants. Young people, particularly adolescents, formed a very prominent group on 
estates, partly due to demographic factors (many young parents and few third 
generation adults). The majority were working class youths, whose main gathering 
place was the streets (in contrast to middle class youth who tended to gather in 
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other places, such as schools). If they were unemployed, as many were, they tended 
also to gather until late at night, while the working population was trying to sleep. 
These contrasts of both class and age tended to reinforce each other, and contribute 
to conflicts. What is noticeable about this article is that although it was written 
over 20 years ago, and although the conflict of classes has now been in many cases 
overlaid by the conflict of ethnic groups, nonetheless the basic analysis provides 
considerable insight to the problems of these estates. 
In 1965 the initial official concern about certain of the large HLM estates 
manifested itself in the form of the "Groupes d' Action Municipale", set up by the 
then Mayor of Grenoble, Hubert Dubedout, later to become the first president of the 
DSQ. This was a discussion group of decision makers who wished to change the rules 
of urban development, seeking a more integrated construction programme, better 
infrastructural improvements, more social life, and a more participative style with 
residents on estates - developing the principles which were to be part of the "DSQ 
method" to be developed later. This group was the first to flag up the change in the 
problem: from being a problem of simply having inadequate numbers of homes built 
(construction crisis [crise de logement]), the problem had moved to being one of 
housing conditions ([crise de 1'habitat]). 
Toubon & Renaudin (1987), in their analysis of difficulties on estates, divide the 
housing problem further into one of physical problems ([crise de produit]) and social 
problems ([crise sociale]). They note several factors lead to increasing problems for 
the HLMestates: the development of city centre rehabilitation programmes, for that 
housing which had traditionally provided low cost rented homes, removed one means 
of avoiding high concentrations of low income households in large estates; the 
rapidly increasing numbers of HLM properties meant that the previous allocation 
policies to be fairly selective of stable households was undermined; and this was 
compounded by the various programmes promoting low cost home ownership which 
lead to the better off tenants leaving the large estates, an avenue not open to the 
poorest. Immigration began to be an issue in the late 60s: citing the Paris region, in 
1968 14,000 HLM properties were occupied by immigrant households. By 1975 this 
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had grown to between 60-65,000. Finally they identify the economic crisis following 
the 1973 petrol price hike as a factor which both increased poverty and lowered 
mobility on estates. 
By the early 70s, official circulars had begun to promote a change of direction: 
following three reports on problems on estates (dealing with estate facilities, housing 
conditions, and problems of young people) a circular (of 15 June 1971) set out 
changes to be adopted to develop social and cultural action on estates: developers 
were to try to avoid oppressive, monotonous estates, to avoid segregation of groups, 
develop the social life for groups on the estate, and to improve management. In 
addition, the Circular "Guichard" (after the then Minister of Housing) in 1973 urged 
a reduction in the size of housing estates, restricting the size of new ZAC housing 
estates to 1,000 in communes of under 50,000 residents, and 2,000 elsewhere. By the 
time of these circulars, however, many of the estates had progressed too far down 
the road of planning and construction to be affected. 
1972 saw the establishment of "Plan Construction", set up by the Ministry of 
Urbanism, to stimulate meetings of architects, launch a programme of experimental 
construction, rehabilitation, and involvement with the residents, and develop the 
programme "Programme Architecture Nouvelle" which would reward projects which 
brought a marked architectural innovation in the direction of improvements and 
quality (Institut Francaise d'Architecture (1985)). It presented the first results of 
these experiments in an exhibition "Habitat et Innovation" in Paris in 1973 -a 
parallel with the previous 1949 meeting of architects and planners organised by the 
same Ministry, which had initiated the mass high rise construction programme. The 
organisation has grown and developed, and continues to take an active part in the 
development of solutions to the problems of the Grands Ensembles. Its interests are 
mainly architectural and planning, rather than housing management. The first actual 
operations of rehabilitation of the large estates were in 1975, in Saint-Jean in 
Beauvais and in Grammone in Rouen (Grimaud (1984)). 
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A further organisation, the "Club Habitat et Vie Sociale", which started in 1971 with 
a seminar and address organised by M Dourdan (Toubon & Renaudin (1987)), was 
more concerned with the management problems. There followed a series of meetings 
held across France, organised from 1972 by the then Director of Coinstruction, 
Robert Lions (later to be Director of the National Union of HLMs and author of 
their critical "White Paper on Housing" published in 1975 (UNFOHLM(1975))). 
Further illustration of the problems which had begun to show themselves can be seen 
from a study of Nancy carried out in 1972 and 1979 (cited in Laboratoire Logement 
(1989)). In this report, two main complaints concerned the buildings themselves - 
they were noisy, and generally people did not like living in flats, preferring 
individual houses. The newly acquired modern facilities were welcome, but they 
could not completely compensate for the monotony of the estates. The problems of 
social polarisation were already evident, with better off tenants often opting for 
HLM home ownership schemes to move off, leaving poorer tenants, who often felt 
trapped. These problems were not severe, compared with those which were to 
emerge later, but were sufficient to prompt concern and action. 
The consequences for HLMs of the increasing polarisation were that they were now 
beginning to play a role to which they had neither expected nor been accustomed, 
with massive problems of arrears, and severe management problems. They were ill 
equipped and hardly able to deal with these problems. The large scale repairs 
problems, due to construction defects, were particularly sources of complaint for 
residents and problems for the HLMs; but inexperience and lack of resources left 
them uncertain as to how to cope. This prompted wide ranging discussions on the 
emerging problems, which were incorporated into the Lion's UNFOHLM "White 
Paper" (UNFOHLM1975). This report notes that the main post war task of providing 
homes in bulk had been largely achieved. The speed of urbanisation had produced 
social inequalities, however - overcrowding remained a problem, and social 
segregation between those who were part of the main housing market and those left 
on the HLMwaiting lists. Residents were also rejecting the new housing estates, and 
the identified problems of anonymity, poor sound insulation, social segregation and 
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isolation on the large and monotonous estates were all leading to frustrations and 
passivity. 
The White Paper identified two main causes of these problems. First the market 
factors of urban land use meant that the estates had been concentrated on the 
cheaper land outside of towns, even though in the long term this immediate financial 
economy might prove costly. Secondly the structure of housing subsidies tended to 
provide housing mainly for certain restricted middle income households, at the 
expense of those in greatest need -a reference to the wider context of housing 
finance and support for ownership. The rent levels needed to balance HLM accounts 
were higher than low income households could pay, due partly to inadequate public 
subsidy of social housing (in UNFOHLM's view), and consequently less benefit 
accrued to the poorest. The report also stated: 
"The aspirations of a new lifestyle throws a more intense light on the 
mistakes of contemporary urban policies, and feeds a more intense demand 
for a return to truly social housing, less segregated, meeting more of the 
needs of the users, taking much more account of the future" (quoted in 
Guinchat et al (1981) p 186) 
UK 
As has been outlined in Chapter 1, the development of awareness of problems on UK 
estates was much less of a novel discovery of a previously unknown problem, and 
more the extension of an old problem. 
- "there have always been bad, unpopular or problem estates (terms which are 
interchangeable with "difficult to let") and a degree of social polarization 
between the best and worst in public housing" (DOE 1980 p2). 
Despite this, the origins of the Estates Action programme are much more tied to 
housing design and management concerns than was the case with the HVS, which 
focused as much on social issues. The original DOE study which formed the basis 
for much of the UK policy ((DOE 1980) was based on a 1974 postal survey of 
authorities. Its analysis and recommendations anticipated closely the later Estates 
Action policy. The report set out the origins of the problem as: 
"some London Boroughs found themselves having to advertise new tower block 
dwellings in order to fill them;.... The reports were disturbing because they 
involved new dwellings of a technically high standard... its unacceptability was 
thought to lie largely with its design. " (p1). 
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This description of the problem was immediately qualified, however. Having large 
numbers of unfilled vacancies was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of 
a "difficult to let estate" : 
"the term is misleading ... in that such estates may be easy to let, but only to households in need of immediate rehousing who cannot afford to wait for an 
offer..... difficult to let is therefore a description in most cases of the process 
whereby certain estates progressively accumulate a concentration of families 
who are on low incomes, who are unemployed or who have other related 
social problems. This tendency for families who are less able to cope to end 
up in housing which is in least demand we have called "social polarisation"; 
it is perhaps a more accurate description of the problem than "difficult to 
let". (p 1) 
Discussion with the coordinating author of the report (Mike Burbridge) revealed more 
of the background: during the 60's, there had been a view that the key problem was 
the design of the estates; this was matched by a belief that social engineering of the 
populations of estates - mixing young with old, poor with better off - would produce 
new communities. This was further reinforced by an optimism about the increasing 
general affluence - that people moving onto estates would naturally be employed, 
and would have little need of social support. Surveying and enquiries concerned 
themselves primarily with design issues - the initial dissatisfactions which became 
evident as soon as people moved onto estates was put down to design problems 
requiring architectural solutions. 
The report suggested that there was a new stigmatised, polarised, sector of public 
housing forming in the estates of 60s and 70s multi storey blocks, due to: 
- increased variety and quantity of council stock 
- rising expectations leading to high priority tenants "holding out" for good 
offers 
-a wider range of tenants, including increasing numbers with social problems 
- self selection away from bad estates, and "dumping" of problem tenants 
Underlying this polarisation the report identified that there were wider factors 
(many of which were explored in the preceding chapter), such as 
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- the postwar concentration on speed and volume building had produced 
developments which were inhuman in scale, uniform and repetitive in 
appearance, and inadequately provided with social and community facilities. 
- technical problems, such as water penetration and damp, were symptomatic 
of the fact that the systems had been adopted without proper evaluation and 
testing. Maintenance problems were unfamiliar to repairs teams used to 
traditional dwellings, and left unattended to pending disputes with the 
construction companies. 
- housing management staff would often be too preoccupied with the 
problems of letting the next estate to be completed to be able to properly 
assist and manage the newly occupied estate. compounding this problem was 
the low status of housing management staff, and inadequate provision for 
maintenance. 
The report boldly presented an "approach" to tackle these problems. The key to 
improvements was stated to be a "combined approach" which meant: 
- the problems must be identified accurately and comprehensively; 
- tenant involvement 
- constant monitoring 
The remedial measures which were proposed included not only physical 
improvements, with better management and maintenance, but also revised 
allocations and transfers policies. The allocations initiatives were prompted by the 
fact that it was 
"often just those families finding the greatest difficulties in coping who ended 
up in forms of housing which made the greatest demands on their 
inhabitants.... apathy and low morale could result from a feeling of being 
trapped in unsuitable housing with no hope of transferring out" (p10) 
Strategies suggested included 
- letting flats to childless or non family households: (including teachers and 
other young professionals) 
- reducing child densities 
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- liberalising transfers, with the idea of trading up off a difficult to let estate 
after a fixed minimum period. 
The report notes that the option of disposal of blocks or individual sales was not 
mentioned as few authorities had attempted this. 
The ideas were proposed at a series of seminars for council members and officers 
organised by the DOE. In 1978, initial ideas were developed concerning a pilot 
programme to put them into practice; and in 1979, following the earlier appointment 
of permanent staff under the Labour government, the new Conservative government 
agreed to the formal launching of the Priority Estates Project. 
Initial Programmes 
France: Habitat et Vie Sociale 
Government action came under the auspices of the VIIth Plan, which had within it 
(the report of the interministerial group 28) a programme for the rehabilitation of 
certain large peripheral HLM estates. This was to be done through the 
interministerial group "Habitat et Vie Sociale" (HVS), set up in 1977 to provide a 
permanent coordination committee linking the various ministries concerned with the 
problems of the large estates. The then Prime Minister, Raymond Barre, noted in his 
letter to the Prefects who were taking part in the programme that the new estates 
"seldom had the diversity and the roots which make for a rich social life. 
Above all, their anarchic transformation brings to bear on our society the 
danger of a dangerous social segregation .... certain 
Grands Ensembles ... risk 
becoming ghettos at the gates of our cities" (quoted in Toubon & Renaudin 
(1987) p 5). 
HVS was set up by the Arrete of 3 March 1977, this date marking the start of the 
formal government programme to tackle problems on hard to let estates. Its 
concerns covered both physical degradation on estates, and the more social 
dimension of community life there (see Dupuy (1983)). It was also intended that 
improvement works should be carried out in 50 sites which presented signs of 
degradation, and social and cultural poverty. These operations were also to develop 
measures, primarily through economic development, to prevent the continuing 
development of problems. 
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Selection of sites (see Toubon & Renaudin (1987)) was on the basis of: 
- physical degradation 
- absence of social infrastructure and communal facilities 
- poverty of social life 
and the indicators to be used were: 
- absence of community life 
- unemployment 
- families receiving social security benefits 
- scholastic underachievement 
- levels of working class immigrants (which was thus seen as a symptom of - 
social degradation and lack of qualifications) 
The principles of the operations were: 
- coordinated decentralised programmes with new administrative structures 
- active collaboration with local councils 
- resident participation. 
Operations proceeded by: 
- an initial study to identify the problems 
-a detailed set of costed proposals 
- carrying out of the works (though no specification was made over who was 
to be responsible for this coordination, or who was to be project manager 
["maitre d'oeuvre"] 
The first of these projects were pilot schemes in Lille, Marseilles, Nantes, Rouen, 
and Lorient. There were also projects in two of my case study estates - Stains and 
Meaux. In all about 70 operations were started between 1977 and 1981. 
There are difficulties in trying to evaluate the HVSprogramme. Many projects were 
started, but because of delays preparing dossiers, or getting works under way, many 
fewer programmes were eventually achieved. There was no central coordination of 
schemes or information; no systematic evaluation or criteria set out; and many 
different types and sizes of scheme, from 500 units to 10,000. Some evaluations 
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were undertaken despite the difficulties, particularly by the Commisariat General 
du Plan, who produced a comprehensive report in 1981 (Figeat (1981)), and an 
evaluation of the programme was the basis for certain of the proposals for the DSQ 
(see Doubedout (1983)). Other researchers have compared HVS and the initial DSQ 
programme (Toubon & Renaudin (1987)), or looked at certain estates (e. g. Dupuy 
(1983)), or at the HVS projects in the Ile de France region (e. g. Toubon & Tanter 
(1980), Prefecture de la Region Ile de France (1988)). 
The first phase of 42 projects between 1977 and 1981 lead to works on 65,000 homes 
at a cost of F1,900 million. Although the overall average unit cost was F30,000, 
Fineat notes that due to the low average costs in the first years (about F 12,000), and 
the need to account for inflation, this is better estimated at an average of F60,000 
in 1981 prices. Central government contributed F525 million, of which over three 
quarters was in the form of the housing subsidy PALULOS. The rest of the state 
expenditure was on external spaces (13 %), sports and cultural facilities (4 %) and 
social facilities (6 %), this money coming from the other ministries involved in the 
project (such as Health, Youth and sports, Culture, Education, and the Interior). 
These ministries usually contributed 40% of the running costs of facilities. 
Other non governmental participants in the programme contributed funds. Of these, 
the cities contributed about 50% of the non housing costs, the Family Allowance 
Board (CAF) contributed 50% of the costs of social facilities; the 1% associations 
contributed 10% of the housing expenditure; and the HLMs, either directly from 
their own funds or via loans, contributed 10% of the housing costs. It should be 
noted, however, that the proportion of costs covered by the various partners varied 
greatly from project to project. 
An evaluation seminar was held on 28 October 1981 in Paris, in the presence of the 
then Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy (documented in UNFOHLM 1981). This meeting 
was organised by the UNFOHLMand involved the national association of Mayors, the 
CAF, and the Commisariat General du Plan, amongst others. It presented the results 
of Figeat's evaluation, and announced the beginnings of the new programme, with 
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a showing of a film on improving life on the estates called "Vivre ensemble dans la 
cite". 
Overall, Figeat report was critical of the programme. He concluded that often there 
was insufficient consultation with either local residents or with the local council 
before starting works. In relation to housing management, he notes that "the urgency 
to develop an allocations strategy and decentralised management of the buildings has 
been well noted"(section 2.1), although this often met with resistance from local 
council members or local residents and managers. Often good works were conceived 
and planned, but due to lack of local organisation were not executed fully. Later 
operations, he notes, moved to the realisation that a complete change of image of 
the neighbourhood is needed, and working towards this wider objective is partly 
responsible for the higher costs. But this should not mean that "an HVSdevelopment 
becomes a catalogue of building works to do where the wider objectives set out 
disappear behind the work programme" (section 2.2). Social programmes were harder 
to measure, so local councils tended to concentrate on the measurable building 
works. Social worker intervention still tended to be parcelled up into specialisms 
rather than being coordinated. 
Fineat believes there was an underlying problem: the HLMs and the local council 
members wished to reverse the marginalisation of the Grands Ensembles, and to have 
a more "balanced" population of skilled workers and middle class tenants on the 
estates, such as existed when they were first built -a theme which will be seen in 
the case studies. This was unlikely, however, as there was now a much wider market 
for these groups to choose from, particularly HLM build for sale. Thus 
"this divides the traditional HLMpopulation between the part who are mobile 
thanks to disposable resources, and the other part captive in the cheaper 
houses. The arrival of each new product on the housing market, each new 
strategy for providing homes for certain groups of families, creates in effect 
a further demotion of the zones which are most affected by their peripheral 
location and excessive density" (section 2.3). 
It is therefore wrong to look exclusively at the problems in the estates without 
looking also at the wider housing market in the region - which would lead, often, to 
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radical solutions such as demolition, selling off homes to residents, or fundamental 
changes in local housing strategy. 
He also noted that there are long delays in getting works under way: two years of 
preparatory studies, on average, plus many years further before works start. The 
whole process needed to be "unblocked" - an expression which was to reappear with 
the appointment of the first Minster for the Cities in 1980, with the job of 
"unblocking" the processes of the DIV, the programme which followed the DSQ itself. 
He also notes that tenant participation, which has been of mixed success, requires 
more than just putting out a leaflet, or inviting tenants to a meeting. There needs 
to be a complete change of attitude in the relations of the HLMs to their tenants. 
He also notes that the main problem on estates is actually unemployment, and that 
the success of the programmes would be influenced by this key factor. Nevertheless 
he concludes there was scope to improve and carry forward the HVS type approach, 
but with less red tape, more integrated programmes decided locally, on a smaller 
scale, and the development of a more radical approach to the buildings (reducing the 
density and changing uses). 
Many of these problems were echoed by Dubedout (1983) in his introductory text on 
the DSQ. He set out the drawbacks with the HVS programme: the process 
concentrated too much on the internal comfort of flats, while neglecting the wider 
environment; it did not link into employment training, and education facilities; 
insufficient attention had been paid to resident involvement; there was too little 
involvement by local elected representatives; and the administrative procedure was 
too complex. 
Out of this evaluation came the DSQ. There were 
programme. The election of a Socialist Presidential 
commitment to radical decentralisation meant that 
would need to be replaced by a more decentralised 
More importantly, however, economic and social pi 
difficulty were seen as growing worse. This was 
other reasons to develop a new 
administration in 1981 with the 
the centralised HVSprogramme 
and locally based organisation. 
^oblems in the neighbourhoods in 
particularly highlighted by the 
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disturbances on the worst estates in the summer of 1981, which started at les 
Minguettes near Lyons, spread to Roubaix, Nancy, and La Corneuve in Paris, and 
received considerable media attention. These "riots" had a major public impact, and 
forced the Prime Minister to act quickly to be seen to put in place an immediate 
programme to tackle the underlying problems. The HVS programme was therefore 
superseded by the new procedure of Developpement Social des Quartiers in 
November 1981, on the instructions of the Prime Minister, fresh from his visit to the 
UNFOHLMconference on the evaluation of HVS the previous month. 
UK: Priority Estates Programme (PEP) 
The first programme to set out to deliberately adopt the approach suggested in the 
DOE (1981) report was the Priority Estates Project. Unlike the HVS programme, 
however, the PEP organisation still exists, and works along side the Estates Action 
programme. 
It grew not only out of the DOE report but also out of a variety of initiatives 
promoting cooperative housing, including the DOE's own investigations (see DOE 
(1981), DOE (1979)), and the cooperative housing movement seen to be growing in 
the USA, as well as the publication of the NACRO crime prevention study in 1977 
(NACRO 1977). Its initial aims were to work together with the Department, the 
Local Authorities, and tenants to develop a new style of housing management. 
Although an independent company, it was funded and supervised by the Department 
of the Environment, initially on a three year contract supervised by Departmental 
officials, and thereafter renewed continually until the decision in 1991 that this type 
of work should be put out to tender. 
The initial projects were on three estates - in Bolton, Hackney, and Lambeth. Early 
on, PEP introduced a notion which had not been emphasised in the original DOE 
approach - that of the local management base on the estate, an approach which self 
consciously harked back to the 19th century idea of housing management pioneered 
by the original housing management pioneers such as Octavia Hill. 
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The aims, and a brief history of the project and its development are set out in the 
review report of progress (Power (1991)). The three initial projects had varying 
degrees of success, and an account of their activity was set out in one of the first 
reports (Power 1982). The general approach promoted by PEP was being increasingly 
adopted by local authorities, however, and Power (1991) notes that by the end of 
1980, of the 20 initiatives on run down estates were in place, only three of them 
PEP initiatives. The most successful of these seemed to be where there was a local 
estate-based office with full time staff. By 1982 the then Minister of Housing, John 
Stanley, had been sufficiently persuaded of the importance of the programme's 
approach to launch a film and publicity pack promoting the aims and approach of 
PEP (DOE 1982). 
PEP then developed and diversified, leading to the development of the "PEP model" 
- this model being set out in a three volume guide "The PEP Guide to Local Housing 
Management" (Power 1987). The guiding principles of the "PEP Model" are that local 
management and tenant participation are necessary to create not only a better, 
more flexible, and responsive service to tenants, but also a more cost effective 
organisation, where reduced voids, lower levels of crime and vandalism, and reduced 
rent arrears will offset the additional costs of more intensive management. 
There was a widespread training programme; and a regular bulletin ("PEP Talk") 
promoting projects and ideas. National conferences were organised, involving not 
only UK participants but also forging links with practitioners abroad (including the 
DSQ who attended the 1988 conference (See Saunders 1989)). By 1987 new projects 
involving other forms of local management organisation had developed. This grew 
(according to Zipfel's account set out in the introductory booklet on Estate 
Management Boards (Zipfel (1989))) from problems in implementing the PEP model: 
decisions devolved to tenants' organisations were limited; few projects managed to 
identify and establish an estate budget, one of the keys to control; control over non 
housing services was limited; it was difficult to maintain the commitment of the 
authority to the continuing investment in the estate; and the model was still 
vulnerable to changes from the centre, for reasons unrelated to the needs of the 
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estate. These problems indicated to PEP that there was a need for a new, more 
radical model, which was set out as a more fundamental devolution of management 
powers, responsibilities, and budgets, as an EMB. This EMB model was clearly a 
development from the earlier PEP model, and Zipfel (1989, p14) sets out a useful 
chart of the development of the various PEP models. 
In fact the development of these models and the approach to the problems of 
difficult to let estates was echoed both in the Estates Action programme, in other 
more general developments in local authority housing management practice, and 
local authority organisation generally. The move away from centralised structures 
to decentralised, semi autonomous units was widespread during the 80s and is now 
reflected in the changes in local authority management, where decentralisation to 
local management units is now widely accepted and implemented. This has also 
become a widely used model in many corporate business structures, the most notable 
example being the total decentralisation of IBMinto autonomous decentralised units. 
The application of this process to difficult estates by PEP was thus part of a wider 
change in organisation and financial planning. The contribution of PEP was to define 
and apply this model to housing management. 
Relation to other Government Programmes 
The Estates Action and DSQ programmes are part of wider governmental strategies 
for dealing with problems on difficult estates. Governmental action is normally in 
specific programmes, each with its own boundaries, funding mechanisms, and 
territorial competence. The programmes often show a certain possessiveness about 
their own interests, being rooted in certain specific departments, or organisations. 
This is sometimes tempered by wider attempts to integrate or coordinate the 
programmes. 
France 
In parallel with the creation of the HVS programme, the VIIth plan created the 
"Fonds d' Amenagement Urbain" in 1976, which was mainly concerned with the 
problems of older private housing. It ran the programme of housing improvements 
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called OPAH [Operations Programmces d' Amelioration de 1' Habitat], aimed at the 
improvement of private housing in specified zones. A further interministerial group, 
the Groupe Interministeriel pour 1'Amenagement des Banlieues was created in 1980, 
with the specific task of proposing measures specific designed to improve "life in the 
suburbs", by means of experiments on 13 pilot suburbs. 
1981 saw a new approach (Levy 1989). Initiatives were taken to deal with the 
problems of the integration of problem adolescents, the prevention of delinquency, 
combatting illiteracy, anti poverty measures and measures for the most vulnerable. 
The aim was to treat problems in relation to the client groups, unifying the actions 
of the different partners, rather than having a set of independent measures 
attempted by different uncoordinated agents. Decentralisation of programmes was 
also introduced to tailor programmes to local needs. 
The programmes which were introduced included: 
Zones d'Education Prioritaires (ZEPs), created in 1982, for children with 
educational problems. In 1986,3/4 of schools in DSQ estates were also ZEP 
schools. 
Missions Locales pour 1'insertion sociale et professionnelle des jeunes en 
difficultes, started in 1982, to assist with young people finding employment. 
By 1985 there were over 100 of these 
le Conseil National de Prevention de la Delinquance (CNDP) set up in 1982 
by a grouping of Mayors. It seeks to prevent delinquency by organising, for 
example, summer activity schemes, designed to assist disadvantaged young 
people to make more creative and productive use of their leisure time. 
Contrats d'Agglomeration under the Ministry of Social Affaires in 1982, to 
assist immigrant families to integrate into society. 
Banlieue 89 developed in 1983, to pioneer architectural and planning solutions 
to urban problems 
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UK 
I have already outlined the longer history of attention to the "inner city problem" 
in the UK. Amongst programmes which predated the Estate Action programme are: 
Educational Priority Areas launched in 1967-8 to provide special building 
programmes and special allowances for teachers in deprived areas, defined 
in relation to social indicators. 
Community Development Projects launched by the Home Office in 1969, 
created 12 local teams, similar to those created in the United States under 
the 1964 Equal Opportunities Act, to work closely with deprived communities, 
monitored by an action research team. The programme was abruptly halted 
in 1976, following conflicts between the teams and both local authorities and 
local communities, partly due to many teams embracing Marxist explanations 
of the plight of the people in the areas. 
Housing Action Areas, introduced in 1974, targeted grant aid to clearly 
defined areas of older housing; and in fact were the proving grounds for the 
new Housing Associations. 
The Urban Pro rg amme launched in 1968 by the Home Office in response to 
Enoch Powell's "rivers of blood" speech in April 1968. The programme was 
expanded in 1975, when it was also taken over by the DOE, and occupied an 
important place in relation to estates action schemes until its virtual 
abolition in 1992. In its early years the spending - 75: 25 central and local 
government, - went mainly on day nurseries, nursery education, and child 
care, distributed on the basis of various social indicators. 
An important shift in direction came with the publication of the 1977 White Paper 
"Policy for the Inner Cities" (DOE 1977a) following the results of a series of studies 
of Inner City areas (DOE 1977b). This was followed by the Inner Urban Areas Act 
in 1978, and represented "the biggest single policy shift since inner urban policies 
were introduced" (Hall 1981 p95). The emphasis moved to economic revival; 
increased financial assistance was given to inner city areas; central/local 
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partnerships were to be set up for the larger cities, with smaller programmes of 
specific aid for smaller cities. 
One main beneficiary of the new approach was the Urban Programme, which was 
transferred to the DOE from the Home Office, and received increased funding, going 
from £30 million in 1977/78 to £100 million in 1978/79. Resources were concentrated 
on 32 Partnership and Programme authorities and 155 other authorities which were 
given Other Designated District or Traditional Urban Programme status. 
The election of a Conservative government in 1980 added quite new initiatives: 
Urban Development Corporations, which (like new town corporations) were run by 
Government appointed boards, with the task of taking over the traditional functions 
of local government in their areas, and carrying out large scale redevelopment - 
initially in the Liverpool and London docklands areas, then in 9 other areas. 
Enterprise zones were also announced in 1980, where planning controls were lifted, 
and local taxes waived, to promote the creation of new industries. There were 26 in 
all of these created in the UK. 
In 1985 clearer Ministerial guidelines were set out for the Urban Programme, and 
57 authorities were invited to bid to become the new Inner Area Programme 
authorities. Urban programme expenditure was to fit into an overall strategy for 
tackling economic, environmental, social and housing problems. 
Its objectives were to: 
- encourage enterprise and new business 
- improve people's job prospects, motivation and skills 
- make inner cities more attractive to residents and business, for example 
by 
tackling dereliction, bringing buildings in to use, improving transport links, 
and improving housing 
- make inner city areas safe and attractive places to live and work, for 
example by reducing crime, improving education, and developing better 
facilities for arts, recreation and sport. 
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The programme must demonstrate value for money, and be additional to the local 
authorities main programmes. The criterion of additionality, that is to be something 
which would not otherwise be done, was one which was developed during the 80's in 
response to Treasury's (generally accurate) concern that Urban Programme funds 
were simply being used to substitute for investment the Local Authorities would 
otherwise have done themselves anyway. The programme guidelines are now set out 
annually for local authorities, and it is assessed in regular reports (e. g. DOE 1986a, 
DOE 1987a). The funds come from several Departments: for example in 1987-88 
from Environment (67%), Education and Science (15%), Health and Social Security 
(15%), and Transport (3%), reflecting the variety of initiatives. 
Coordinated control over the variety of programmes which were springing up, 
including Estates Action, became a priority for Government during the 1980s. City 
Action Teams, involving the Departments of Employment, Environment, Trade and 
Industry, and the Training Agency, were launched in 1985 to coordinate government 
and private programmes at the "city" level; there are currently 8 of them, plus a 
rolling programme of smaller and temporary Task Forces (16 at the end of 1991), 
with the job of stimulating local enterprise and preparing people for jobs in a smaller 
local area. 
A new coordination mechanism was launched in 1988. Mrs Thatcher's celebrated ad 
lib on the night of the 87 Conservative election victory, to the effect that the inner 
cities remained to be conquered, lead to a highly publicised launch of an apparently 
£3 billion new drive to coordinate all the inner cities programmes, under a new 
Minister for the Inner Cities, and with the name "Action for Cities". Much of the 
funding was from already existing programmes, but the coordination element was 
new. The overall objectives remained similar to the Urban Programme objectives, 
to enhance job opportunities, bring buildings and land back into use, encourage 
private investment in the inner cities, improve housing conditions by widening choice 
and reducing housing stress, and to encourage self help and improve social fabric in 
the areas (DOE 1988a). 
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The final coordinated development, and one of direct relevance to this thesis as it 
incorporates parts of the Estates Action programme, was the launch in 1991 of "City 
Challenge". This was a competition for limited resources between local authorities 
(15 in 1991, with 6 uninvited bids, and 11 successful; all 57 UP authorities in 1992 
with 20 successful). The bids had to demonstrate programmes of partnership with 
local business and voluntary sector interests to tackle local economic, social and 
environmental problems. The resources were topsliced from existing inner city and 
housing programmes, including Estates Action. 
The Action for Cities programmes therefore carries out many of the activities which 
are done by the DSQ programme in France. It is different in that it is much less 
tightly structured: - there is no overall coordination in the form of a permanent 
administration and Director, and no permanent publicly accountable interministerial 
committee. It also has a much wider scope, covering many areas of planning, 
economic and land development which are not part of the DSQ remit. 
The most important difference, however, is that the Action for Cities programme 
does not provide a coordinated, locally based, social programme focused on an 
estate. Its geographical remit is wider, focusing on cities or areas of cities, partly 
because there as fewer sufficiently large and distinct estates in the UK of sufficient 
size to merit a programme of their own. This has changed recently in City 
Challenge, but up to that point the links between the Urban Programme and Estate 
Action were not systematic or necessarily coordinated. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has outlined the background to the emergence of the Estate Action and 
DSQ programmes. Together with the previous chapters this has shown that in both 
countries: 
- there was an early realisation that certain estates were being abandoned by 
all but the most disadvantaged groups. The expectation that new, utopian, 
communities of mixed income groups would establish themselves had thus 
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been frustrated. This was partly due to promotion of other more attractive 
home ownership opportunities for better of households, and the residualisation 
of the unpopular estates for those with no other choice, as noted in the 
previous chapter. 
this was exacerbated by "dumping" of "problem" tenants on estates by the 
landlord agencies, identified by the DOE and, as the case studies will show, 
clearly a factor in France. 
- the original HVS evaluation recognised many of the difficulties with that 
type of programme: the administrative difficulty of running integrated cross 
departmental programmes; the wider problem of the housing market as a 
whole; the key role of unemployment on estates; and the difficulties in 
involving residents. These are themes which will recur. 
- it was recognised that the estates had severe design problems. The high rise 
flats were unpopular; there were major repair problems needing urgent 
attention including noise penetration, insulation, and heating systems. The 
estates were also monotonous, poorly laid out, badly maintained, and lacked 
adequate infrastructure and facilities 
- more importantly, there was a growing awareness of management problems, 
which had been unexpected and which required a new approach from the 
landlord organisations. 
In the UK the programmes to tackle the problems had started much earlier, in the 
60s, as part of a general "inner city" programme; in France they were more linked 
to action by local authority mayors creating pressure on the government. 
The HVS/PEP programmes: 
- stressed the need for local, decentralised action 
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- stressed the need for resident participation 
- involved an overall, strategic approach, which could short circuit 
bureaucratic delays 
- included works of physical improvement 
There are further differences between the approaches: 
- the explicit UK attention to housing management issues, only implicit in 
France 
- the HVSattention to social problems, including the education, leisure, and 
health issues, as a local HVS package. Despite the presence of a range of 
other inner city initiatives in the UK, they were not focused on one estate in 
this way. 
There is therefore the curious picture of the French model, whose social and housing 
programmes were focused on the estate, but did not have a clear element of housing 
management measures. On the other hand the UK measures emphasised housing 
management issues, but was not necessarily accompanied by estate based social 
measures, which were often unrelated and directed at a wider area. 
The next chapter will provide details of the Estate Action and DSQ programmes 
themselves, as an introduction to the case studies. 
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Chapter Five: Estate Action and the DSO 
Summary 
This chapter presents a comparative account of the Estate Action and the DSQ 
programme, looking at their creation, 
It proceeds by dealing systematically 
aims, organisation, activity, and evaluation. 
with the same aspects of both programmes, 
bringing out the similarities and differences. The chapter is based on published and 
unpublished written sources, including those collected as part of the case studies; 
and on interviews including those conducted in the context of the case studies, and 
those with officials in both countries as listed in the first chapter. 
Creation 
DSQ 
The creation of the DSQ announced by the Prime Minister following the Assises of 
Social Housing, noted in the previous chapter, was confirmed by the Council of 
Ministers on 23 December 1981. The Commission was charged with three main 
objectives, set out in the letter of 25 November from the Prime Minister to the first 
chairman of the Commission, Hubert Doubedout, (reproduced in Doubedout (1983)): 
- to initiate, on an experimental basis, social and economic development plans 
on a small number of neighbourhoods of national significance 
- to examine how to initiate a national decentralised policy based on these 
initial projects, to treat all of the difficult neighbourhoods needing such 
global and diversified action 
- to create a forum for the exchange of experiences, and for discussion and 
consideration of the action taken 
The Commission which was set up reflected these objectives, included not only 
representatives of the Ministries with an interest, but also representatives of local 
councils, unions, residents, professional urbanists, and social work professionals. Its 
organisational structure and its budget were not formalised until its integration into 
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the 9th Economic Plan in 1983 as Programme 10, "Mieux Vivre en Ville" which gave 
priority to social housing neighbourhoods. It was clearly from the start, however, a 
project which had the objective of initiating new ways of working across 
departments, which had the full backing of the Prime Minister. On this basis, the 
DSQ made a tentative start in 1982-83 with 23 pilot projects (including one of the 
case study estates, Grande Synthe). 
In addition to being the development of the HVS programme Levy (1989) also 
identifies the DSQ as a growing out of difficulties being experienced in social work, 
where it was becoming clear that certain social problems could no longer be treated 
by traditional client based social work solutions: individual clients were now having 
to cope with a "situation of the progressive breakup of the social fabric" (p 17) in 
addition to their own individual problems. He also notes that one of the main 
objectives was to "avoid the phenomenon of ghettos and the risk of social explosion 
which they induce" (Levy (1989) p 31). 
The programme was founded on two guiding principles (DIV 1989): inter-ministerial 
working, involving 11 Ministries, and partnership [partenariat], which involved the 
associations, the unions, the local organisations, the HLMs, researchers, and other 
experts. The policies built round these principles involved: 
-a national commitment to assist the neighbourhoods in difficulty, 
involving 
all local and state agencies contributing to the effort 
- ensuring that primary responsibility for the programmes 
lay at the level of 
the local authority - both in terms of developing the policy and its day to day 
implementation 
- treating the underlying causes as well as the symptoms of the problems: a 
comprehensive approach to problems 
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- ensuring that residents and their associations were fully involved in the 
programme 
These objectives remained stable through the life of the programme, extending 
beyond the review in 1989, which lead to the creation of a new body, the Delegation 
Interministerielle a la Ville (DIV)which dealt with for the new round of projects in 
the 1989-93 programme. The programmes were seen from the start as long term, 
and "global", involving many different agencies and ministries. 
The DSQ "approach" was first spelled 
out in Doubedout's (1983) classic 
statement of the DSQ method. The 
book covers many aspects of the 
programme, from the key underlying 
principles to the details of 
administrative organisation. It 
includes discussions of how to have 
dynamic local organisations; 
evaluation; allocations policy and 
avoiding social segregation in 
neighbourhoods; educational and social 
development of adolescents to prevent delinquency; economic actions; crime 
prevention; and how the programme was to fit into the new decentralised structures. 
Its production, as an initial report on the progress after a year of the Commission's 
work, was required in the Prime Minister's original letter of appointment. 
This approach was intended to bring a new dimension to the revitalisation of the 
difficult neighbourhoods. The projects were to be organised around the 
neighbourhoods, involving local people in the planning, as well as all voluntary and 
state organisations - this was the partnership idea. The role of the local commission, 
and more particularly the DSQ team under its project manager (of whom more 
below) was to cut through the red tape of departmental bureaucracy in order to put 
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Box 5.1: Key DSQ Concepts 
the needs of the neighbourhood and its residents first - the interdepartmental idea. 
Previously there had been a history of programmes making plans and decisions in 
isolation from each other, a phenomenon known as "saucissonnement" - cutting up 
the expenditure as if it were thin, discreet slices of cold sausage. In total contrast 
there was to be a "horizontal" ["transversal"] structuring of the programme on the 
ground, with this DSQ team in a position to make the links between different types 
of social or improvement programmes, directing them all towards a common set of 
aims which guided the whole project. 
The type of works carried out by the programme will be fully illustrated in the case 
studies. The original intentions are set out in Doubedout (1983) and in Pesce (1984). 
There were several elements, the physical works to the housing and environment; 
improved management of the stock; and a wide range of social measures 
physical works had a range of objectives: 
- urgent remedial action was often required to remedy the building defects. 
This included heating and insulation works, in line with the national 
programme of thermal insulation following the oil crisis of 1974 
- treating the extensive disrepair and deterioration, due partly to vandalism 
- finding means to combat the monotony of the estates, and their physical 
isolation. This was partly by the provision of better shops and facilities, or 
better transport links, although this was the responsibility of the city and not 
the HLM. 
- better management and maintenance of the common parts and green areas 
- where appropriate providing a better housing mix by demolition, newbuild, 
or changes of use 
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better manag ement of the stock included 
- better and local management, including introducing a social dimension to 
housing management 
- "re-establishing a social balance in the neighbourhood" (Doubedout (1983) 
Chapter 4). This was to be done both by stopping further allocations to 
disadvantaged and immigrant households on estates, and by opening up the 
housing market elsewhere to these households. The allocations on difficult 
estates were to be done by local committees making sensitive allocations, and 
new tenants were to be welcomed and integrated 
social measures included 
- the general objective of "social integration [insertion]", which is the central 
concept in the French approach to the social problems on estates. This term 
is, roughly, the opposite of "social exclusion", and refers to the general 
objective of assisting residents with not only with the more obvious problems 
of finding a job, or claiming benefits but also with more basic issues such as 
health care, eating well, and looking after children. The approach to 
"insertion" is often via clubs, associations, drop in centres, child care 
facilities, or in the case of young people via sports and leisure activities. 
- focusing on the problems of young people. These dealt with a range of 
educational and training issues, including scholastic underachievement; 
providing after school and holiday clubs and sporting activities; and dealing 
with the more serious problems of drug abuse, and delinquency. 
- special provisions for immigrant residents (such as language clubs), including 
dealing with what were often special problems of isolated moslem women. 
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- developing the underlying aim to achieve a sense of citizenship 
[citroyennite], that is to say an integration not only to the social life of 
society, but to its political life as well. 
- an emphasis on encouraging "cultural" activities 
- making links into employment opportunities, including stimulating work 
experience programmes and engaging the support of local employers in taking 
on estate residents 
The overall objective was the reintegration [desenclavement] of the estates, and 
their residents, into the city and society as a whole. 
The way that the DSQ programmes are presented, for example in discussion with 
DSQ officials or with Prefectural officials, is that it is a methodology as much as 
a programme. The aim was to make cities, regions, and local people approach the 
problems in a new, more imaginative and wide reaching manner, and to enable 
programmes to be planned and executed which would avoid the worst excesses of 
bureaucratic delay and departmentalisation. The approach was the key idea to get 
over: the programmes would follow once the right attitudes had been achieved. 
Estate Action 
This was started later, its creation (as the Urban Housing Renewal Unit) being 
announced by the Secretary of State at the Department of the Environment, then 
Patrick Jenkin, on 26 February 1985, and launched on 19 June 1985 by Sir George 
Young, then a junior DOE Minister. The original impulse was almost entirely 
political: Ministers wished to push forward the progress of privatisation of council 
housing which had been started by the successful Right to Buy legislation. The key 
political objective was diversification of tenure and ownership on council estates. 
The desire to break up the large tracts of council estates lead to a wish to involve 
the private sector in the redevelopment of land and buildings on these estates. The 
original promotional brochure "New Homes from Old" (DOE 1985) provided 11 
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examples of the type of scheme which were to be promoted. This included the 
example of the Stockbridge Trust in Liverpool which had been one of the major 
projects launched by the previous Secretary of State, Michael Hestletine, as part of 
his highly publicised 1981 Merseyside initiative. The programme was therefore partly 
a continuation of the initiatives which had followed the Brixton and Toxteth riots 
in 1981. Unlike the 1981 launch of the DSQ in France, however, the distance of the 
start of the programme from these events made it much less of a direct response 
to civil disturbances. 
The priorities of the initiative were clearly set out in DOE (1985) : 
"Often a rundown estate can be transformed by the injection of improved 
locally based management, supported by physical and environmental 
improvements. But in some cases.... more radical solutions may be necessary. 
In these circumstances disposal of a part, or the whole, of an estate, to the 
private sector for redevelopment may prove an attractive solution. " 
The earliest development of Estate Action was independent of the PEP programme, 
and did not grow out of any evaluation of PEP, or direct intention to extend or 
change it. Nor was the original development of ideas based on contributions from the 
officials who had been responsible for the programmes to improve hard to let 
estates, or on any evidence requested from them (this view expressed by Mike 
Burbidge, and supported by Pinto's other interviews (Pinto (1991) p103). PEP 
directors, primarily Anne Power, were invited to many of the meetings at the start 
of the programme, but were not formal members of the Advisory Group which was 
set up. It was only after the initial planning of Estate Action had been undertaken 
that members of the advisory group decided that management improvements would 
be an essential part of the programme. By the time the programme became public, 
however, PEP was a central element. The programme was also clearly rooted in the 
Department of the Environment, and the links which were made to other 
programmes were very weak and unstructured, even to the Urban Programme which 
was part of the same Department. 
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The general objectives of Estate Action (as it became in 1986), at the start of the 
project (see DOE 1988b), were to target resources on estates which go furthest 
towards achieving: 
- estate based management giving residents greater say and control 
- diversification of tenure 
- attracting private investment 
- estate based enterprise initiatives 
- new ways of running estates such as tenant coops and trusts 
- bringing empty properties on estates quickly back into use particularly for 
homeless people 
These aims will be illustrated in the case studies. A further aim, which quickly 
became central, was crime prevention and the increasing of estate security. 
Pinto (1991) presents an account of the development of Estate Action, and its 
approval by the Government, based on interviews with contemporary agents. In my 
own interviews, many of the original agents suggested that the UHRU programme 
was in fact "cobbled together" in response to urgent Ministerial demands. These 
included the need to attract private money to invest in difficult estates, and 
divesting local authorities of control if at all possible (this approach being in line 
with wider governmental policies), as well as making the package more attractive 
to Treasury officials. What emerged, and was subsequently developed and changed 
over the following seven years, was a reasonable set of changing attempts to turn 
these political objectives to some form of programme. The programme reflected 
year by year the various inclinations of the Housing Minister in office at the time, 
and this particular bias was laid out in each year's Ministerial Guidelines which 
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accompanied invitations to bid (compare, for example, the 1991 Ministerial guidance 
(DOE 1991a) to the 1988 guidance (DOE 1988b)). Unlike the extensive and public 
consultation through a national committee seen in the DSQ programme, the Estate 
Action programme seems a typical example of UK government policy development - 
short term changes to respond to immediate political requirements, and a very 
pragmatic approach. 
"Partnership", key value in DSQ, was not an issue at this planning stage. There was 
certainly little prior consultation with local authorities as a whole, and 
"as far as the authorities and their associations were concerned, the reaction 
to the launch of EA was of privatisation under another guise" (Pinto (1991) 
p106) 
Authorities read into the programme a hidden agenda: 
"We have been very suspicious of the privatisation element of Estate Action 
ever since a gaffe by Ken(neth) Baker regarding its true motive, namely that 
of priming estates for sales and privatisation" (Ibid. p106, from an interview 
with an AMA spokesman) 
They also often rightly regarded the money as simply "topsliced", i. e. money they 
would have received in general capital spending consents if EA had not existed, and 
therefore available to spend as they saw fit. The express purpose of the programme 
was to force authorities to spend money in a way the government regarded as more 
effective in tackling the problems. Two related complaints - that the money 
provided was small and inadequate in relation to the housing disrepair problem on 
these estates, and that it was redirecting essential resources towards the essentially 
political objectives of disposal and tenure change - were to be frequently repeated 
during the initial years of the programme (Pinto (1991)). 
Estate Action increasingly stressed changes in management structures and control, 
in parallel with the PEP development of cooperative (and later Estate Management 
Board) models. This increasing attention to diversifying tenure was developed in the 
Tenants Transfer provisions of the 1988 Housing Act, along with the development 
of Housing Action Trusts which were, like Urban Development Corporations, 
intended to transfer control of estates from local authorities to appointed boards. 
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The overall aim of Government policy was to reduce the role of local authorities as 
landlords -a trend most recently seen in the announcement of compulsory 
competitive tendering for housing management functions. Estate Action was only 
one step in this explicit general direction. 
The programme was also presented partly as a demonstration programme, to show 
authorities what could be done, and establish new approaches to management, stock 
transfer, and estates renovation. In many cases it was in fact used by authorities as 
supplementary funding to bolster their reduced capital programme, as will be seen 
in the case studies. Nonetheless the commitment to additionality, that is 
encouraging authorities to undertake works which they would not otherwise fund, and 
the wish to providing exemplary approaches to emulate, was (according to one of the 
central Estate Action controllers in the period to 1990) amongst the main aims. 
Despite its lack of formal links to other programmes, at the local level authorities 
were in fact expected to try to attract funds from other government programmes - 
as well as private funds - all of which would go to improving the estate. Thus 
authorities would frequently link Urban Programme bids to estates bidding for Estate 
Action funds - although the decisions on these bids were made entirely 
independently. Community Refurbishment Programmes were also sometime linked, 
for example in the Wigan case study. These were partly funded by Estate Action 
Urban Programme (a separately identified element of Estate Action funding), partly 
by Community Programme resources (later to become Employment Training), and 
partly by the Local Authority. The scheme aimed to enable unemployed people to 
undertake work programmes, mainly for environmental improvements. It was 
intended that as many local estate residents as possible would be included in the 
programme, and that on the job training would be part of the employment. The later 
development of this was the formal inclusion of partnership packages in the City 




At the start the DSQ set out several principles of its administrative structures 
(Doubedout (1983) p14): 
- the local mayor must preside over the local commission which oversees the 
project 
- all the local agencies must be involved in a local partnership ([partenariat] 
as well as having a permanent link with the local residents 
- very tight administrative coordination, supervised by an administrator in the 
Prefecture 
-a pragmatic approach to problems and solutions 
The overall structure of the programme was put in place in 1984, absorbing both the 
23 initial pilot "national sites" and the sites in the "ilots sensibles" programme which 
had already been initiated by the Ile de France region. 
There were several levels of organisation. At the national level was the National 
Commission itself, which met two or three times a year to maintain an overall 
watching brief on the programme, and set the main direction of policy. This 
committee involved elected local and national politicians, civil servants from the 
Ministries concerned, the National Union of HLMs, trades union representatives, 
resident association representatives, and other experts. There was also an 
interministerial executive, which met monthly. In parallel there was a permanent 
administration operating at the national level, coordinating, advising, and monitoring 
the progress of the schemes. The General Secretary was the chief officer, supported 
by ten or so (the number varied) principal officers [Charges de Mission] who had both 
territorial and a functional responsibilities. Their role was to "fix" things (according 
to Levy's (1989) report), and through their links with the several projects in their 
region, they were able to resolve problems, provide advice and contacts, and knock 
heads together. It also publishes a quarterly journal "Ensemble" ("together"), the first 
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word of the title of the original definition of the DSQ programme in Doubedout's 
(1983) "Ensemble, Refaire la Ville". This magazine provides messages and 
information from the national office; updates readers on policy initiatives and 
developments; presents examples of good practice or original ideas which seem to 
be working; and provides a kind of bulletin board for exchanges of information and 
thereby partially fulfilling the Commission's third general objective of providing an 
exchange of experience, and focus for discussion. It appears an excellent medium to 
link projects and to enable sharing of skills and ideas on a practical level, as well as 
having more reflective articles on the underlying principles. 
At the regional level, the Prefect coordinates the contributions of Central 
government, and the elected President of the Regional council jointly directs the 
DSQ policies in each site, along with the local mayor. This is done by means of a 
Regional DSQ committee, based on a contract between the region and central 
government. Contracts are very important to the structure of the DSQ programme, 
being the agreed documents at both the regional and the local level which structure 
the financing and objectives of the projects. They were normally for a period of four 
years, and were comprehen sive descriptions of the long term goals as well as the 
means by which they are to be undertaken; an aspect of the programme not present 
in the UK. The agreement on the sites in the region takes place at this level of 
regional contract, as well as coordination of training for staff working on the 
projects. 17 of the Regions signed such a contract, setting out the responsibilities, 
particularly the financial commitments, of each party. The Rhone-Alpes region, 
however, refused to sign such a contract, deeming the treatment of these problems 
to be a matter which had been fully decentralised to its own competence. In fact as 
the programme proceeded certain sites in the region were directly linked to the DSQ 
programme. 
At the local level, the Mayor of the commune where the project is situated chairs 
a Local DSQ Committee, which takes the lead in defining the programme and 
assuring its execution by the appointment of staff and the engagement of 
organisations to undertake the projects. The main interested parties are represented 
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on this local committee, which also appoints and supervises the local DSQ team, 
under the control of the Project Manager [Chef de Projet]. Levy notes that "although 
sometimes very dynamic, these local committees could also sometimes be 
formalities to the point of being non-existent" (Levy 1989 p22). 
The project manager role is key to the progress of the scheme. This role is to ensure 
that the project works properly: 
"commissioned, under the authority of the local community, to identify the 
actions to undertake and their feasibility, to coordinate the activities of the 
organisations involved, to keep an eye on the bidding files submitted and the 
processing of them, to ensure the compatibility of the means of carrying out 
the programmes, their linkages, their coming to fruition, to organise the local 
team and its motivation, and to evaluate the actions undertaken, and their 
suitability" (Pesce (1984) p 9). 
Delarue (1991) lists their duties as first to listen to the residents, so that they can 
present their point of view to the planners and funders of the project; second to give 
direction and impetus to the actions being undertaken by the technical teams; and 
third to be the "centre of gravity" between these two groups and the elected 
members, officials, and managing agents (including the HLM) who are in charge of 
the project as a whole. 
The role is a pivotal one, needing skills of project management and administration; 
technical skills in overseeing the projects; and considerable political skills in 
negotiating with the many different agencies and representatives. A wide range of 
backgrounds is represented by this group as a whole (see article in "La Gazette" 
12.11.90), including architects, urbanists, trades unionists, community workers, 
educationalist, and those with a technical scientific training. However Delarue 
(1991, p209f) notes that the Mayors, who appointed them, tended to seek people with 
more "technical" competencies, and in preference to either those with local 
knowledge, or with social work or educational skills. 
Not unnaturally this is a difficult role to fulfil; discussion with Toubon indicated that 
the failure to ensure that the Chef de Projet was sufficiently distanced from the 
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Town Hall lead to problems in many projects. The Town Hall was the locus of the 
formal approvals for most of the schemes, and for much of the funding; if the Chef 
de Projet was totally integrated in the Town Hall, perhaps with an office there, 
perhaps being formally integrated into the administration, there was the danger that 
the necessary distance to provide pressure against the delays and bureaucracy of the 
town hall would not exist; and their role as champion of the neighbourhood project 
against all opposition would be compromised. The mayors would also tend to appoint 
people they felt they could control, rather than having experienced troubleshooters. 
It was certainly clear from my case studies that some Chefs de Project (for example 
at Chanteloup les Vignes or at Bethune) operated from offices in the Town Hall and, 
as far as I could determine, as part of the municipal administration, although this 
did not seem to have compromised their effectiveness in those cases. 
Estate Action 
Estate Action was structured much less formally, in that the programme formed part 
of a wider Department of the Environment structure of support for housing, and was 
managed in most cases as part of a wider housing programme in the authorities. 
Pinto (1991) illustrates that in the majority of authorities no special project manager 
or team was appointed to oversee the work: with only 17% having an EA team. That 
is, there is not such a distinct identity to the programme, with its own National 
committee overseeing its policies and development, as with the DSQ. 
The first year of UHRU/EA saw members of the team writing to authorities offering 
the services of the team, and conducting over 200 estates in over 100 authorities, 
many visits being in conjunction with the officers from the DOE Regional Office. 
These visits were aimed at presenting the opportunities of the programme and its 
approach to local authorities. Many of these visits were done by Mike Burbidge, the 
coordinator of the original hard to let report, by Peter Emms, the Head of Unit, and 
by Bill Woolf, then Chief Executive of the Northern Counties Housing Association. 
They discovered, according to Emms, that there was in many cases an open door, and 
authorities were keen to target the new resources and approach where it was agreed 
it would do most good. It is, however, worth noting that Pinto found that the main 
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reason most authorities gave for being involved in the project was that it provided 
additional resources - almost half his sample identifying this as the most important 
reason. 
The structure now has a central team dealing with policy issues, guidelines for the 
scheme's administration, bidding for resources, and Ministerial business. The last two 
years have seen this team also involved in central bids, a development with started 
in 1990-91 with certain "national" schemes, which were to have higher levels of 
Estate Action funding (normally the authority had to contribute 50% from 
mainstream HIP), and larger schemes. This was developed in the following year, 
when the first City Challenge schemes were also developed. 
The regional offices of the DOE were the main administrators of the schemes after 
1987. These offices were responsible for arranging the bidding process in their own 
region, for approving bids within their resources, for monitoring the programme, and 
for providing day to day advice. There was no contractual relationship between the 
office and the authority, unlike the DSQ; spending approval up to a specified limit 
was agreed for one year of a project, and a new application for continuation funding 
would be made in the following year in the event that the project extended that far. 
The regional office could assist by providing access to the consultants EA has on 
offer; and would ensure that the appropriate paperwork was completed. 
There is also promotional material on offer, though this is limited. A video was 
produced, showing some of the schemes in progress; and in 1991 the first part of the 
three part "Estate Action Handbook" was produced. This handbook is designed to 
assist authorities in learning the lessons of the programme, by a series of checklists 
and advice notes on how to approach similar projects. 
Choice and Approval of Schemes 
DS 
The first 23 "national" sites were chosen centrally, with the advice of the Prefects 
in the Regions where they were located; thereafter in the context of the 
123 
decentralised structure introduced in the 9th plan (1984-8), the choice rested mainly 
at the Regional level, with the advice of the national DSQ office. 
Cities interested in being included in the programme were required to submit full 
application files setting out the characteristics of the neighbourhood which made it 
suitable for treatment under the DSQ procedure. This followed Doubedout's 
statement that there are two main types of problem neighbourhood which can be 
identified: 
"those whose essential need is for the rehabilitation of the buildings, and who 
are amenable to procedures and financing currently addressing that objective; 
[and] those who require a treatment indissolulably linked to economic, social, 
and cultural problems, and deterioration of the quality of life. " (Doubedout 
1983, p87) 
These files [dosiers de canditature] were to contain details of the social, educational, 
housing, environmental, and employment problems which justified the 
neighbourhood's inclusion in the programme. They presented a comprehensive 
description of the neighbourhood, demographic details of the population, skills and 
educational information, details of environmental issues, and summarised the main 
problems on the estate. The bid would also present outline proposals as to how the 
problems were to be remedied. These documents were a key source of information 
in preparing the case study background descriptions, and were often prepared by 
independent consultants (teams of sociologists or urbanists) commissioned by the 
city. It was essential that the local mayor was willing to put forward a bid: the DSQ 
team did not have the authority at either a national or a regional level to force any 
city to bid. 
The Regional DSQ council would then consider the proposal, and prepare the 
contract. Generally speaking most of the bids put forward were accepted, partly 
because of the contacts made during the extensive preparatory work. Once the 
contract was signed, funding for the projects set out in the contract would be made 
available during the 4 year period of the programme - although in fact there were 
often many changes and variations negotiated. 
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Although HLMs were closely involved in the development of schemes, they were not 
innovative partners, by and large. Discussion with one regional (Prefectural) official 
in Nord Pas de Calais, and another in Ile de France, lead to indications from both 
that the HLMs were often unwilling or tardy partners in developing the new types 
of scheme; and only slowly became involved in the "DSQ method". The stimulation 
for the development of projects tended to come from the city, or sometimes indeed 
from residents. 
The original selection of sites was regarded, in Levy's (1989) report, as one of the 
weak points of the programme. The report team considered that certain of the sites 
would have been just as well dealt with by traditional measures. Nonetheless the 
DSQ communes in which the DSQ sites were situated showed similar general 
characteristics: high proportions of manual workers; of single parents; of 
unemployment; of large families; and of immigrant households, particularly 
Maghrebin. 
Levy recommended a much tighter definition of the criteria for DSQ sites, and a 
reduction in the number of sites to no more than 150. For the next programme (the 
DIV), however, this advice was entirely disregarded, and a 400 site national list was 
prepared. This was partly (according to Nicole Smadja, one of the authors of the 
Levy report, who was an Ile de France Prefectural official) because the mayors 
realised that not only was the programme a source of funds, it also represented 
prestige and national prominence, visits from Ministers and national officials, and 
generally was a good idea for promotion of both the city and themselves. 
Estate Action 
The annual invitation to bid for Estate Action funds was accompanied by the 
Ministerial Guidance on the types of project which are likely to be favourably 
received, as has been noted above. In fact many of the Regional Offices are in 
regular contact with their local authorities to discuss possible bids. Discussion with 
the officials in regional offices indicated clearly that they had a good rapport with 
the authorities, and would guide them in preparing bids, although no bid could be 
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guaranteed funding until all the bids had been received. All bids received by 
regional offices are ranked and annotated, in line with a provisional allocation for 
each region. 
Bids are made on Form A and Form B, as they are called. These forms ask for 
summary details of the estate: - the type of properties, construction type, levels of 
unemployment, voids, arrears on the estate, management and maintenance 
arrangements, and an outline of the proposed programme. The key instruction on the 
forms appears on the front page: "Please give best estimates where actual figures 
are not available. " Since accurate data about estates is frequently not available (as 
explored in Chapter 1) and as the DOE do not appear to question the figures very 
closely, the likelihood of inaccurate estimates is high (as I can confirm from 
personal experience having once been directly responsible for completing a 
(successful) Form A and B application). 
Recommendations will be made by Regional officials to support those proposals 
which seem to fit the most number of the current criteria set out in the guidelines. 
They also need to assess the real level of need on the estate (using "gut feeling" and 
local knowledge, I was informed). Regional officers are well aware of the need to 
distinguish between authorities who "genuinely" wish to pursue the types of initiative 
promoted by EA, and in contrast those authorities who will say anything to get the 
money, of which there are certainly many. They need to ensure that not all the 
estates are in Labour run authorities; they also need to spread the resources round 
a bit - one regional official noted the difficulty of not repeatedly choosing the large, 
difficult estate, but of at the same time not turning the tap off too soon, before the 
benefits of the Estate Action funding have taken root. They also seek to pick 
projects which they are confident will spend all the allocation which is given to 
them. The final decisions are taken centrally, however, once all the regional bids are 
received. 
The process of decision making at the centre between regional bids is rather 
complex. The centre makes a bid for money as part of the Public Expenditure Survey 
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process, based on (according to one official) basically poor information about the 
scale of the problem, using many sources of information including feedback from 
regions. The total pot is divided between the regions, partly according to the 
Generalised Needs Index score (50%), partly according to actual bids, and partly 
according to performance the previous year. When the actual annual lists come in, 
the approvals are given generally in line with the recommendations of the region, 
although this is not guaranteed. Any bids of over £5 million (1991) go for direct 
Ministerial approval. Some years certain regions will so better than others, due to 
a higher "quality" of bid - for example in the first and second years of the scheme 
the London region got a smaller proportion to the resources that would have been 
expected from the proportion of poor stock. However this whole process is not 
transparent: it was described to me by a regional official as a "black box". Pinto 
(1991) notes there is no systematic relation between levels of housing deprivation 
(in so far as they can be established) and EA awards - partly because some 
authorities did not bid. 
Despite the intention that "additionality" criteria should be met, in fact some 
authorities will already have planned to do the types of work on the estate for which 
funding is sought. This was the case in a number of my case studies, and Pinto notes 
that many authorities bid because they had already formulated plans to introduce 
local management, or try improved management arrangements, both of which were 
key EA bidding points. 
There is a problem with the focusing of resources in this way. Estate Action sets out 
to be experimental and to show authorities how to improve estates. However it does 
this by investing large sums in small pockets of housing, at a level which is totally 
unsustainable over the totality of stock with comparable difficulties. For example 
many schemes were provided with highly sophisticated surveillance equipment and 
concierge lodges (as in, for example the Manchester or Brent case studies); and 
others were provided with extensive improvements, including community rooms, as 
part of a package to promote Estate Management Boards (for example in Bloomsbury 
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Estate in Birmingham, not a case study). There are not sufficient funds for other 
authorities to follow the "example" however. 
This is recognised by officials at the DOE. Shortly after the introduction of the 
programme they, and Ministers, became aware that with an estimated 2,000 plus run 
down estates in England and Wales, the EA programme was only scratching the 
surface. Worse, bids from the larger and more difficult estates tended to get 
rejected in the early years as they would, rightly, need a large proportion of the 
small available resources. A number of initiative were devised, not all related 
directly to Estate Action, to do this, including Housing Action Trusts and City 
Challenge. 
Funding Mechanisms and Expenditure Details 
DSQ 
The financing of the DSQ projects is much more complex than Estate Action, and 
a point of weakness of the system (see Levy 1989). This is partly because the funding 
for projects was normally via a number of different sources, principally central 
government, the Regions, and the HLMs themselves. It was not at all certain, 
however, that the partners whose contribution were needed would all be willing to 
put up the funds at the time the project was ready to spend them. 
This was particularly so with central government funding (the DSQ funding, or "state 
contribution"). However, 
"All the state funding is specific. Each budget approval is controlled by each 
ministry, according to clear regulations and in line with directives given by 
each one of them" (Levy (1989) p22) 
It came from a total of 17 different Ministries, whose individual commitments to the 
programme made up the total "DSQ budget" - although this budget in fact was 
created by earmarking a specific amount in principle for priority spending in DSQ 
sites, to be released when proposed projects came up for approval. These approvals 
for individual schemes within the overall local programme had to be obtained in 
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every case, which involved including meeting the expenditure guidelines for each 
Ministry. 
This approval work was mainly done at the regional (or sometimes Departemental) 
level, where there were technical teams to vet all spending proposals and authorise 
the release of funds. These approvals could take a considerable time to achieve, 
however, and Smadja, in conversation, indicated that in certain (not infrequent) 
cases, the local groups who had organised to propose a project, and bid for funding, 
had already collapsed and disbanded by the time the approvals were received. 
Funds were divided generally into two main categories: housing funds, and funds for 
"complementary" activities [accompagnement]. The later covered all the actions of 
social, educational, employment, and other initiatives, and were for both capital and 
revenue purposes. They were often paid to the organisations who were involved in 
the running of the local Programme. The housing funds came from one ministry, (the 
Minist6re de I'Equipement, du Logement, des Transports, et de la Mer, ) and was 
mainly in the form of the housing grant PALULOS (paid for rehabilitation of HLM 
stock), which provided between 20% and 30% of the costs in the form of grant aid, 
to a limit of 00,000 average per dwelling. The other main aides were PAH [Primes 
A I'Amelioration de Mabitat), grants paid to private owner occupiers in areas of 
older housing; and grants paid by ANAH [Agence Nationale pour I'Amelioration de 
Mabitat] to private landlords in OPAH programmes [Operations Programm6es 
d'Amelioration de Mabitat] (improvement programmes for older private housing as 
part of a DSQ neighbourhood). A large part of the total budget of these grants was 
paid in DSQ sites: growing from 20% in 1984 to 36.9% of the total expenditure of 
PALULOS and PAH in 1987 (Levy (1989) p35). 
The total funding for the 5 years (1983-88) of the first DSQ programme of 148 
programme sites was set out in DIV 1990. Note that in the table below the totals 
include expenditure on private housing in DSQ sites - either because the site 
included some older housing or because the site was an inner city rehabilitation area. 
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Type of Housing Units Type of Aid Amount Average per 
affected (Fm) unit 
HLM Rented 170,037 see below 8,965.4 52,726 
2,043 1 PAH 1 18.8 1 9,202 
1)710 1 ANAH 1 76.8 1 44,918 
. 1: 1)x(1 'Total Housing ]Expenditure. Source: 
The HLMfigures must be further disagregated into the contribution from the various 
partners. The figures are: 
11 Source of Finance I Amount (F million) 
I% 11 
Central State (DSQ) Grants 2,277.48 1 25.4 
11 HLM and others 1 (mainly loans) 1 5,962.84 1 66.5 
Region (mainly grants) 725.07 1 8.1 
'rable -ni. z: tireak(lown ot hxpenditure sources tor social Housing Nource: i4z5 
Quartiers (DIV 1990) 
Notes: 1. "Others" will include investment by social partners in housing projects to benefit 
specific groups, such as investment by the Caisse d'Allocations Familiales, as well as the I% 
employers tax of which 0.1% was devoted to projects for im-nugrant households. This may 
often be grant aid. 
In terms of regional variation, a third of the investment went to the Ile de France 
region; and three quarters of the investment went to the four most urbanised 
regions, Ile de France, Provence-Alpes Cote D'Azure, Nord/Pas de Calais, and 
Rhone-Alpes. On average each region received F2,380 per dwelling; but the average 
for four regions was much higher, with Ile de France highest at F4,260, Picardie at 
F3,440, Auvergne at F3,220 and Lorraine at F3,040. 
Estate Action 
The funding here is more straightforward, and has been partly set out already. 
Generally speaking the EA programme contributed 50% of the borrowing approval 
for the scheme, although this could be increased to up to 90% for the larger 
"national" schemes. The balance had to come from the authority's mainstream HIP, 
or other sources primarily the proceeds of council house saled. This meant that the 
choice of the estate, and the works to be done on it, must be of sufficient 
importance to merit the authority devoting the HIP to meeting the balance. 
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The expenditure pattern is set out in the table below, for the first 4 years of the 
programme (this has been chosen as a comparative period for the DSQ, as they were, 
except for the pilot schemes, 4 year contracts) : 
me from the DOE. 
As is the case with the DSQ, the unit cost figure is actually a little misleading as 
the expenditure in most cases, and in both programmes, was on the exterior of the 
buildings or on the common parts rather than on the individual units. It provides an 
indication of the level of spending, however. This can be seen from examination of 
the use to which the money was put, which can be seen from the following table: 
11 
Type of Improvement 
I% 11 
Security works 22 
Improvements to fabric 23 
Heating and insulation 22 
Management facilities 6 
Homelessness initiatives 2 
Environmental works/remodelling 1 25 
Table 5.4: Breakdown of Purpose of Expenditure, Estate Action Source: Estate 
Action Annual Reports. Percentages of total values devoted to types of activity, 
summed for all four years; inconsistent categories have been amalgamated where 
appropriate. 
Unfortunately this type of breakdown is not available for the DSQ programme. 
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C0Mn2rJP, nn-, nf 'PxMnditure 
The comparative problem is well illustrated by any attempt to compare these total 
and average expenditure costs. The DSQ contribution in the form of PALULOS 
(mainly) is a grant contribution. Equally the small contribution by the Region is 
mainly in the form of grant aid, not loan sanction. There is no equivalent to this 
spending in the Estate Action programme as it consists entirely in supplementary 
approval for borrowing by the local authority. Some supplementary UK expenditure 
comes from the proceeds of council house sales, however, as will be seen in the case 
studies, for which there is no French equivalent. Other problems occur in comparing 
expenditure in terms of the total investment in the building structure. This would 
involve an additional adjustment for the comparative costs of housing construction 
and maintenance for similar type so building work in each country, in addition to 
simple comparison of the money values using exchange rates. 
This said, the tables indicate that there were more sites in the UK (579, cf 148); and 
more units were affected (260,738 cf 170,039 units); but that more units per site 
were affected in France, reflecting the larger estate size. The pattern of build up 
of sites in the UK was not in fact reflected in France (not shown in the tables) as 
most sites were initiated at the start of the programme, and continued for the full 
period. 
Comparison of central investment is best be done by comparing the Estate Action 
total of f450 million with the total DSQ Central State contribution of F2,277 million 
(say f230 million), as the matching HLMand regional funds in France equate roughly 
to the local authority's own HIP contribution. A further comparison can also be 
made of the total investment per unit by all sources, on the assumption that Estate 
Action contributes 50% of the total cost. The details are set out below. 
UK (£) 
5,273 1 3,452 
il investment/unit 1 1,340 1 1,726 
Table 5.5: Comparison of Unit Cost Expenditure, UK/France 
Sources: EA figures; 148 Quartiers (DIV 1990) 
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This would suggest a higher level of investment per unit by central funding in the 
UK, but a lower total investment. In fact the UK figure for total investment may 
well be an underestimate, since the case studies will show that in come cases there 
is considerable additional investment of HIP resources (and, in one case, council 
house sales income), rather than just being 50% on top of the Estate Action funding. 
The next chapter provides more detailed discussion of these figures, in the light of 
the useful additional evidence about patterns of spending derived from the case 
studies. This will also show that the average expenditure on the case study estates 
is very similar to these national averages. 
The general point can be made here, however, that the levels of unit cost investment 
of central funds are very similar, at about £1,500 per unit in both countries; and that 




At a local level, it was common (for example in most of my case studies) for a 
monitoring and evaluation report to be completed at the end of the programme. 
Often this also served as the basis for the bid for the site to be included in the 1989- 
93 programme, and it often contained useful comparative data on the changes in the 
neighbourbood since the start of the programme. These could take several shapes, 
however, as is brought out in the case studies, with certain evaluation reports being 
much less empirical and objective than others. 
The main regular monitoring was by the local DSQ committee (where it existed), 
who received reports, including often annual summary reports, from the Project 
Manager, covering the technical and financial issues for each part of the programme, 
as well as details of expenditure, programming, and completions of projects. It was 
not common for the HLMto produce reports, however - only in one case study had 
this happened, and Prefectural interviews confirmed that this was unusual. 
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The other important monitoring took place at the regional level. The regions needed 
to Plan expenditure on an annual basis, and therefore required the DSQ projects to 
submit estimates of the expenditure programme for the following year. This was also 
prepared by the Project Manager. The region would also intervene if the programme 
seemed to be moving away from its original intentions, or emphasising one element 
at the expense of another: this was the case for example in Nord Pas de Calais, 
where the Region intervened in my case study sites when the emphasis on the 
cultural aspects seemed to be excessive. This was a last resort type of intervention, 
however. 
In relation to national monitoring of the programme, Levy (1989, p52) notes that the 
absence of a systematic grass roots monitoring was one of the weaknesses of the 
programme. The general concern was the attainment of specific objectives, but 
without much common assessment of how they were achieved, and the success of the 
outcome. The national DSQ office maintained details of spending, but there was no 
running assessment of the impact of the programme. 
Estate Action 
The key issue for Regional Offices was to ensure that the money allocated was being 
spent on programme, without slippage. To this end regular financial reports were 
prepared, mainly to show progress of spending. In addition a review form, Form D, 
was completed at the end of each year by the Regional Offices. This gave details 
of the management arrangements then in place, details of voids, arrears, repairs, 
right to buys achieved or other sales to private owners, as well as asking for 
indications an whether the state of repairs, cleanliness, vandalism, and crime had 
improved or worsened. This was not a comprehensive or in depth monitoring, but 
rather a cursory indication of progress. 
In addition, annual reports were produced by EA centrally, covering the national 
programme as a whole. These, however, were short, glossy promotional reports, with 
some limited figures, and intended to promote the programme and its progress rather 




The annual reports produced by the DSQ teams did not include common evaluation 
statistics, by which a systematic evaluation could be carried out (Rosenberg & 13ýhar 
(1990)). The main general evaluation of the programme is the Levy (1989) report, 
although there was a supplementary report commissioned by the Minister for the 
City, Michael Delabarre, published as Delarue (1991). The Levy report was 
commissioned in 1987 in response to threats to axe the programme by the Chirac 
government during the period of "cohabitation". The report was put together fairly 
hurriedly (six months only was permitted), and is based on a variety of interviews, 
case study sites, and additional papers and reports which had been commissioned. 
The general conclusion of the report (not surprisingly) is in favour of the DSQ, 
although it puts forward a wide range of points, positive and negative, about the 
programme. The key important positive aspects are considered to be: 
- generally the programme represents value for money. For a fairly small 
investment, many people appear to have been assisted; 
- there was a generally high level of achievement of programmed spending 
and achievement of objectives; 
- there appeared to be many innovative examples of positive results. This was 
particularly in relation to housing conditions, education, resident 
participation, and employment measures. 
- there was evidence of effective partnerships in the projects: the elected 
local officials were taking an effective part, the local commissions were 
working reasonably well, and the HLMs surveyed indicated that in 80 % of the 
cases they had adopted a new and more participative approach in the DSQ 
neighbourhoods. 
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In relation to housing, certain sites had apparently opted to develop the social 
dimension in advance of the rehabilitation, but this seemed a reasonable choice. The 
quality of the rehabilitation works was not always high or particularly distinguished, 
however. Voids seemed to be going down in many sites, but this was not the case 
everywhere (only examples are given, however, no total trends). Certain sites had 
invested heavily in those parts of the estate which seemed to have the worst 
problems. Often HLMs were hesitant to invest in DSQ sites as they expected the 
residents to destroy and vandalise the improvements; and the residents were 
unwilling to participate as they feared that improvements would lead to higher rents 
and evictions. These fears had frequently been overcome. There were also now many 
more local offices on estates. New management approaches had been adopted, 
including new allocations policies, training and a more tenant oriented role for 
caretakers; residents have been involved as employees in carrying out the works; 
regies de quartier have been formed to improve day to day maintenance and upkeep 
of the estate (see Meaux case study for details); funds to assist with rent arrears 
problems have been set up; buildings have been demolished or used for different 
purposes than mainstream letting. (Many of these improvements will be illustrated 
in my case studies set out later). 
Rather rashly, Levy states that 
"since the start of the DSQ, none of the phenomenons of explosions which 
might have been feared have taken been generated. This may well be 
attributed to the actions of this policy" (p39). 
The riots of 1991 and 1992 were to show that this view was unfortunately too 
optimistic. 
There are also certain weaknesses set out in the report. The weak selection criteria 
and absence of systematic monitoring have already been mentioned. The 
Departements were not really involved in the process, despite their general planning 
role in social affairs. The most pressing problem, however, was the complexity and 
inefficiency of the financial mechanisms, also noted above. 
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The report also notes aspects of the programme which are "uncertain". One main 
objective of many DSQ neighbourhoods was "social balance". This meant both 
improving the quality of life for the residents, and trying to rehouse fewer new 
tenants with social problems and more "average", socially integrated new tenants. 
Manycities emphasised this latter aspect, byrefusing to allocate to households who 
seemed too "difficult" [lourd] such as unemployed single parents or immigrant 
households; they sometimes also attempted to evict the most difficult households, 
particularly in the inner city DSQ sites of older housing; or finally certain DSQ sites 
left part of the neighbourhood unimproved, a sort of internal mini ghetto. In fact 
these practices simply moved the problem of the most "difficult" families elsewhere 
in the commune; and the problem remained unresolved, in Levy's view. He notes, 
however, that the requirement to draw up local housing plans [Plans Locaux de 
Mabitat or PLH], were designed to counter this problem by setting out plans for 
rehousing all people in need on a commune or departemental basis. The recent 
legislative developments are briefly noted below, for information. Levy also notes 
that many of the improvements seem to be "fragile": certain improvements may be 
evident when there is an active DSQ team making the running and supporting all the 
initiatives, but when they leave, will the impetus remain, or will the neighbourhood 
sink back into its previous state? A planned withdrawal programme of the team 
seems to be necessary in many cases, rather than a quick withdrawal of support. 
The second part of the report is a series of recommendations covering many aspects 
of the programme. These followed by and large the findings of the study, including 
recommendations on choice of sites, simplifying the finance, and reducing the detail 
in the regional contracts. In fact the DSQ was overtaken and absorbed into a new 
body, the Delegation Interministerielle a la Ville (DIV), and although some of the 
recommendations were incorporated into the new structure, many were overtaken 
by events. 
The main technical report was produced by the (by then) DIV, in the form of a 
summary report of the " 148 Neighbourhoods" (DIV 1990). This is an excellent 
collation of information on all the sites, one per page, giving outline details of the 
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problem, the programme, expenditure, and a brief commentary, as well as collating 
the information by region and nationally. It contains little by the way of analysis or 
evaluation, however, being mainly a source document for figures, and a promotional 
document for the DSQ to demonstrate the extent of its activities. 
The author of the second commissioned report (Jean-Marie Delarue) became the 
second Director of the DIV(after Yves Dauge). It offers one of the most articulate 
and comprehensive overviews of the development of the programme. The report is, 
however, is written more in the context of setting out the development of the new 
programme, which is briefly dealt with in the next section. 
Estate Action 
The Estate Action programme has been closely linked to the PEP programme, as 
already set out, and both have had a number of evaluation studies initiated, though 
independent research findings have generally not yet been published. 
Evaluation of the PEP approach has been in two main ways. First, PEP themselves 
have revisited the "20 Estates" which were the subject of the 1982 report (Power 
1984), and presented the evidence for the continuing progress (Power (199 1)). A more 
formal independent evaluation has been carried out by the Department of the 
Environment, who in 1987 decided to carry out a thorough assessment of the 
achievements of the project. Three separate, but linked, projects together aimed to 
provide a comprehensive picture of the outcome of the PEP approach. These were: 
The LSE Housing Impact Study: This aimed to evaluate the impact of PEP on 
the housing service and the environment. It used two "experimental" estates 
where PEP was working, and two matched control estates. The elements of 
the study were: 
first, to monitor the management changes; 
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second to monitor housing management performance, in relation to 
matters such as lettings turn around time, repairs completion time, 
rent arrears, and voids; and 
thirdly environmental standard indicators. 
The Home Office Crime Study: Using the same estates as in the study above, 
comparison was made by: 
before and after surveys looking at levels of victimisation, fear of 
crime, and tenants perceptions of the estate 
crime figures from police records 
detailed "ethnographic"observations and interviews with tenants 
monitoring of management changes 
development and analysis of performance indicators on standards of 
housing management 
measurement of environmental standards 
evaluation of the changes in housing management from discussion with 
staff and others 
The CAPITA Cost Effectiveness Study: This was to study management 
performance and costs in local authority priority estates where initiatives 
were underway to introduce locally based services, devolved budgets and 
tenant participation on the lines of the PEP model. The work involved 
developing a model for establishing estate budgets, implementing this model 
across the PEP estates, then monitoring the costs and performance of the ten 
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estates in five authorities over a two year period to evaluate the cost 
effectiveness of the PEP model. The model groups housing management 
functions into 6 main areas: lettings activity, maintenance, voids, debt 
management, tenant satisfaction, and estate cleanliness. It aims to record 
improvements in the key variables, and introduces an elaborate system of 
weighting them in terms of the difficulty to achieve change. The weighting 
was devised by the researchers in consultation with the participants in the 
study. 
The results of these studies have not yet been published. 
Independent evaluation of the Estate Action programme as a whole was 
commissioned in 1989 from a major firm of management consultants (Coopers 
Lybrand), although the contract was subsequently transferred to Capita, who did the 
one of the PEP studies. The research involves looking at 6 estates at various points 
in the programme, as well as 6 comparative estates (though the idea of control 
estates is not considered possible). This has not been published yet either. 
Finally the Government sets out to monitor and evaluate the overall Action for 
Cities programmes in various ways, some set out in the 1990 Action For Cities 
report (DOE 1990a). Independent assessment of the programmes was also recently 
published by the Policy Studies Institute (PSI 1992), making comparisons to the state 
of major indicators at the time of the 1977 White Paper. They produce some heavily 
qualified conclusions, but are unable to be more positive than to state that 
"surprisingly little has been achieved ...... the gap that the government's 1977 
White Paper sought to narrow [between inner city and other areasl.. remains 
as wide as ever" (p82). 
Development 
This thesis deals with the DSQ and Estate Action programmes, so only passing 
reference can be made to the developments after the programmes. The subject is 
too fast moving to make this summary comprehensive, or even contemporary, but 
its rapid development gives interest to this section. Both programmes have been 
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developed, in whole or in part; and both countries have experienced further riots of 
a similar nature to the early 80s. 
DSQ 
In 1988 the DSQprogramme became the DIV[Delegation Interminmisteriel a la Ville] 
was documented by the publication of a report setting out various views which had 
been aired on the idea, and the main new objectives (DIV 1989). The DSQ was 
essentially merged with another organisation, the National Commission for the 
Prevention of Delinquency; the DSQ programme was expanded greatly to cover 400 
projects; these were divided into different types of contract, depending on the 
nature and size of the problem, including DSQ contracts, but also initiating 
"conventions du quartier", "contrats de ville" and "conventions villes-habitat". 
In 1990 further riots occurred. President Mitterant appointed the mayor of 
Dunkerque, Michael Delebarre, to be a new troubleshooting "Minister for the Cities" 
although in fact he did not have a ministry. The riots continued, however, including 
several deaths, and the summer of 1991 saw desperate attempts to prevent further 
rioting by an emergency programme of increased aid for holidays and sporting 
diversions for young people during the summer. During 1991 the problem of the 
grands ensembles, and of urban disturbances, became a national issue - though it was 
very much linked to the immigration issue, as many of the rioters were perceived 
to be young Mahgrebins. The press ran extensive reports and articles on the issue - 
see for example the 20 - 26 July 1991 issue of Nouvelle Observateur "Special: The 
Suburbs - before they go up in flames"; or L'Evenement de Jeudi of 3 -9 October 
1991 "Sickness in the suburbs: Whois responsible? ". 
Delarue set out certain differences between the situation in 1990 and that in 1980: 
- the economic difficulties, which produce unemployment, have increased, 
and the estates now have many more people who are long term unemployed, 
and increasingly unemployable. The economic growth of the period 1986-9189 
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hardly touched the estates as the residents lacked the skills to take 
advantage. 
- there is an increasing problem of migration of unemployed rural workers to 
the estates, particularly in West France, providing a constant flow of 
disadvantages residents to replace those who manage to get a job and move 
out. 
- there has also been the cumulative impact of the housing benefit 
(APL/conventionnement) problem, which continues to trap many households. 
- the eventual flight of the remaining "militant" manual workers who 
originally formed the basis for estate associations and community life has 
lead to a vacuum, which is not being filled by the new arrivals. The levels of 
resident participation in the programmes is therefore going down. 
- there is a corresponding decline in participation in political and civic life 
and institutions. 
" the powerlessness of young people to find jobs, that of the police to 
end the drug traffic, or of the landlord to make his homes more sound, 
the powerlessness, as a consequence, to provide satisfactory basic 
rights, translates itself into political decline" (p44) 
There had been movement on the legislative front also. Three important new laws 
gave a wider impetus to the policy to combat the increasing residualisation of the 
large estates. The 31 May 1990 (Bresson) law created a range of new duties for local 
government, HLMsand support organisations designed to tackle the housing problems 
of the most vulnerable people; the "anti ghetto" law of 31 May 1991 [loi 
d'orientation pour la ville] obliged all communes over 200,000 to provide a fifth of 
their new housing in the form of social housing (or pay a penalty to central 
government). This is aimed at distributing social housing away from the traditional 
concentrations, and from the in poorer cities. A third law, less oriented to housing, 
provided for the provision of f90 million of local tax revenue from the 130 richest 
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communes to the 300 poorest in 1992, rising to f 150 million in 1993, as part of an 
exercise in directly transferring resources to support poorer communities. 
The development continues. Bernard Tapie, the maveric entrepreneur and socialist 
owner of Marseilles Football Club, was appointed Minister for the Cities for a few 
weeks following the 1992 Regional elections, until forced to resign on charges of 
irregularities in his business dealings. Further riots occurred in 1992; a young 
Maghrebin youth was shot dead shortly after the election of the new government in 
March 1993, leading to new riots and the reemergence of the urban issue at the 
heart of the new government's programme - and a statement is expected in late 
April 1993. 
Estate Action 
The programme was "relaunched" on 11 February 1991 with tighter criteria. It was 
also to form part of the new, competitive, City Challenge initiative. The programme 
was to be targeted on the larger and more run down areas. This was matched with 
increased resources, which for 1991/92 were E270 million, and for 1992/93 were f 364 
million. The autumn statement of 1992 indicated, however, that there would be no 
further new City Challenge funding after the current round, as there would be no 
further new Urban Programme funding. The position of the programme is therefore 
in doubt. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has outlined the basic features of both programmes. The DSQ 
programme has emerged as a complex interministerial process with a complex of 
committees, commissions, contracts, and reports, with its own semi technical 
vocabulary of "transversal" working, "partenariat", "insertion", "desenclavement" and 
so on. It is highly structured and several levels of administration, and seeks to 
manage a comprehensive coordinated social and housing programme in the estate 
neighbourhood. 
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Estate Action, on the other hand, is a predominantly housing programme ýOich has 
only recently moved to being part of an integrated package of measures. Prior to 
that, and during the study period, it had loose and informal links with related social 
and economic programmes, particularly at a local level. It has no special supervising 
commission, seldom has any dedicated team on the ground (rather being integrated 
into the wider housing activities of the authority), and is administered as one of 
many inner cities programmes. 
There are many points of similarity. Many of the guiding principles are shared, 
particularly: 
- resident involvement 
- local housing management 
- concern about residualisation 
- emphasis on a large element of physical rehabilitation 
- consideration of demolition, change of use, and newbuild 
Both programmes were also 
- seen as experimental or demonstration programmes; 
- targeted on very similar types of estate, that is unpopular estates with 
many disadvantaged tenants and poor management 
- subsequently developed into wider programmes (although the future of 
Estate Action is now in doubt) 
There are also differences: 
- the wish to reduce residualisation was expressed in France through a policy 
of trying to manage allocations, a process likely to be seen as discriminatory 
and illegal in the UK 
- the UK emphasis on tenure change and tenant management is not reflected 
in France 
- there is no attempt to involve the private sector in estate housing 
development schemes in France (although the case studies will show their 
involvement in commercial developments) 
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- the DSQ is a four year contractual programme; Estate Action funding is 
allocated annually 
- the funding mechanisms for the DSQ were complex and cumbersome; unlike 
the straightforward allocation process for Estate Action 
This chapter has, however, mainly presented the formal objectives and structures of 
the programmes, rather than looking at how they in fact operated on the ground. 
Their real impact, and the actual nature of the similarities and differences, will be 
examined next in the case studies. 
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Chapter Six 
Chapter Six: Analysis of The Case Studies 
This chapter sets out the consolidated information from the case studies, illustrating 
the themes which have been set out in the preceding chapters by reference to the 
case study estates. The aim is to illustrate how the policy intentions of the DSQ and 
EA programmes operate on the ground; and to comment on the comparative 
successes and failures of various approaches. 
As noted in the first chapter, the figures and tables presented here are not 
subsequently used to test a formal statistical hypothesis. Some figures in the case 
studies were not available, and indications of trends are given instead. Other figures 
have had to be constructed on slightly different bases from estate to estate, 
explained in the case study annex. My aim has been to indicate the presence or 
absence of certain problems or phenomena, and the scale of the problem. Note also 
that the estates are all in a state of flux. The outcomes of the programmes set out 
below and in the detailed case studies are therefore as of the date of the fieldwork. 
Since then thing may have changed, either for good or ill, and my descriptions are 
clearly not of definitive results. In many cases the programmes are continuing on the 
estate; in other cases some of the achievements evident today are already being 
undermined and degraded, and the estate may slip back to its previous problems. 
Most of the tables are in the form of providing short comments under general 
headings. I chose this method, rather than simply using a tick (-, /), as more 
information can be provided about similarities and difference in a short note. These 
notes may appear somewhat cryptic at times, but (I hope) comprehensible, and fuller 
explanations are of course in the case studies themselves. 
Many of the descriptions will echo the problems set out in the preceding chapters. 
This is to be expected, if the case studies are indeed representative. The difference 
here is that the descriptions are drawn entirely from my findings on the case study 
estates. 
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Individual Case Studies 
While the main aim of this chapter is to set out the links between the case study 
estates, and draw together the common issues, nevertheless the estates have unique 
characteristics which mark each out from the other. Although these individual 
aspects are only seen from a reading of the case study annex, a flavour can be 
gleaned below: 
Chantel=: is an estate built in the countryside without a rail link, three times the 
size of the village where it was implanted. The HLM is run by an ex-army officer 
with his regimental flag prominent in his room. The village is run by a vigorous local 
politician who recently toppled a Socialist government minister to win a seat in the 
national parliament. Together they have made reasonable improvements, despite 
recent civil disturbances. 
Meaux: is a large estate where innovative new management practices are probably 
only succeeding in holding back the tide of decay. 
Stains: had a visionary architect committed to consultation, who transformed the 
facades to imitate a varied street frontage; but where the social problems are only 
now being tackled. 
Calais: has failed to produce any housing improvements, despite a good social 
programme. Progress was undirected, commitment was low, and conflicts prominent. 
Bdthune: suffered from stock surplus and isolation, but political commitment ensured 
new links to the wider town. 
Grande : is an estate which is most of the town, dominated by the declining 
adjacent steelworks which used to provide all its income and tenants. The whole city 
administration is therefore involved in the programme. 
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Brent: has not yet found any solution which begins to tackle its problems, and now 
seeks HAT status. The EA programme, based on security measures, failed. 
Islington: only had the problems of security. It provides a valuable in-depth external 
evaluation of concierge schemes, although my own investigations were hampered by 
trades union suspicion. 
Wandsworth: invested massively from stock sales, and provided a successful 
transformation of image based on external remodelling and population manipulations 
unconsciously reflecting the French approach. 
Manchester: provided striking conversions by "decapitation" in a well executed large 
programme; but had less success with concierge based tower block works. 
Salford: achieved patchwork improvements in a wide ranging programme. The 
unexplained withdrawal of new EA funds leaves its development open. 
Wigan: solved its problem of excess unpopular stock by so extensively remodelling 
the remaining housing, with the assistance of housing associations and the private 
sector, that it no longer physically resembles a problem estate. 
The individual differences between estates are important, and provide the essential 
context to understanding whether and why certain measures worked. I have tried to 
bring out many of these details in this summary chapter, but the annex provides the 
full basis for these selective judgements. 
Basic Site Details 
Table 6.1 sets out the estates in the order in which they will appear in subsequent 
tables - listing first the Ile de France schemes, alphabetically, then the Nord Pas de 
Calais, London, and North West. 
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The largest estate was in fact in Salford, in the North West. Two of the French 
estates illustrate, however, a phenomenon not seen in the UK, which is that in 
Chanteloup and Grande Synthe (and, to a lesser extent, in Wthune) the estate forms 
a major part of the total community, illustrated by the "city population" column. 
This is never the case in the UK, as already discussed, and table 6.2 similarly 
illustrates that only one of the French estates is in the inner city, with in contrast 
only one of the UK estates on the periphery. The case studies also illustrate in more 
detail that the French estates are often designed and constructed in such a way as 
to be enclosed, and turned in on themselves by virtue of the construction pattern and 
traffic layouts. UK estates are much more likely to be accessible and navigable in 
the manner of other, adjacent, streets and estates. The French design and location 
leads to additional problems of segregation and isolation from the rest of the 
community, as well as special environmental problems. 
Analysis of table 6.1 population figures, comparing the original population to the 
original units, indicates another difference - in France there tends to be a higher 
level of large families on the estates, particularly immigrant households (an average 
of 3.2 people per unit in France c. f2 in UK). In the UK the estates in the North 
West, and in Brent, have been let to high numbers of single people. 
The table also shows that 8 of the estates have experienced stock losses - 15 % 
average for all estates, though 6 lost 26% on average (25% for 3 in France, 28% 
UK). This has been due to many different factors: in the case of Wandsworth it has 
been due to a vigorous programme of right to buy sales resulting in large scale 
change of tenure. In Bethune, and in Meaux there have been programmes of both 
demolition and change of use of stock, mainly for office development. Grande Synthe 
pursued a large scale demolition programme; Calais demolition and new build. 
Manchester has pursued a vigorous programme of removing some upper stories in 
maisonettes ("decapitation"); and Wigan, finally, pursued demolition and disposal to 
housing associations and private developers. These reductions in stock have been the 
result of three main factors (with the exception of Wandsworth): the unpopularity 
of the estate leading to difficulties in lettings; in the peripheral regions, a decline 
149 
in the overall demand for rented housing; and in all cases a wish to reduce the 
overall population density, and more particularly the density of disadvantaged 
households. These reasons will be explored in more detail below. 
Table 6.2 illustrates further basic details of the estates. They were predominantly 
constructed in the 60s, only one being started in the 70s. The "block types" 
represented on the estates often include tower blocks of up to 20 storeys. In France 
these are complemented by long, five to eight storey slab blocks ("barres"), whereas 
in the UK blocks of maisonettes are more common. There is also the phenomenon 
shared in estates in both countries that certain towers are entirely or predominantly 
of one flat type - which lead to problems in every case. Where the towers were 
entirely family flats, the density of children, and of use of the entrances, lifts, and 
stairs, lead to a rapid and extensive degradation of the blocks, as well as difficult 
neighbour problems. On the other hand where blocks were entirely single person 
dwellings, or used as such, there were problems of high turnover, noise, abuse of the 
common parts, and often drugs or criminality. 
This table also shows the political complexion of the city council in power during the 
works. Surprisingly only 2 councils had changing administrations; but less surprising 
is that two thirds were administrations of the left - although this ranged from a 
highly pragmatic Labour council in Wigan to a Communist council in Stains. 
Population 
Table 6.3 provides brief population details, using data at the start of the 
programmes. These show that populations are generally poor, many existing on 
benefit payments, generally unskilled or semi skilled workers, suffering from high 
levels of unemployment. Not shown in the table is the corresponding absence of 
white collar and professional workers on estates. The households are predominantly 
young families, and in many cases large families. In certain of the UK estates there 
are high numbers of single parents. There are disproportionate numbers of young 
single people, particularly in some of the UK estates, as previously noted. 
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The detailed evidence from Chanteloup, Stains and Calais clearly indicates that 
HLMs historically used the estates to dump its worst tenants, and thereby keep them 
off the better estates. Although HLMs had generally "quotas" of immigrant or 
difficult households to rehouse, in many cases the entire quota would be allocated 
to the "dump" estate. In Calais the people who had lived in the shanty town outside 
the city were directly housed on the estate. The evidence from Meaux shows that 
residualisation occurred with the construction of an adjacent, better estate to which 
the better tenants were transferred. In Wandsworth and Brent there had been a 
similar problem with large numbers of homeless households being consigned to the 
estate as no one else could be forced to take it. Wigan and Salford had a different 
problem, where there was such a stock surplus that noone at all could be found to 
take the units, leading to indiscriminate letting, often to transient young people who 
caused considerable disturbance and damage. 
In France, though not so much in the UK, there were problems of high levels of 
alcoholism, including teenage alcoholism, on certain estates (for example Calais), 
as well as a growing drugs problem (for example in Stains). Drugs were also an issue 
in Brent and Manchester. 
The residents' difficulties were also clearly reflected in the comments and 
assessment of many of the main agents on the estates, who quickly identified this 
as the underlying issue which was not tackled by the physical works. This was most 
pronounced in France, where in many cases staff on estates would make direct 
reference to the difficulties of management and improvement while there were so 
many tenants with multiple problems. This sometimes lead to positive hostility to 
the residents, who were seen as incapable of responding adequately to the physical 
improvements made. The frequent rapid degradation of the improvements was seen 
as evidence that the main problem was the people themselves, rather than any other 
external factors. 
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EthniC Minority Population 
There are high ethnic minority populations on seven of the estates, while on four of 
the others it is very low. This contrast partly reflects the regional differences - the 
high levels being in the Paris and London areas, with the exception of Grande Synthe 
where there was a specific recruitment of immigrant labour to the steelworks. There 
is also some suggestion of exclusion of ethnic minorities from the other estates, 
explicitly seen in Salford where racial harassment of any black families venturing 
on the estate was described, also to an extent a factor in Calais. There is no estate 
where the ethnic minority population reflects the proportions in the city as a whole - 
it is either very much bigger, or smaller. 
Some problems in certain of the French estates stem from difficulties in integration 
by immigrant groups. The Meaux study, for example, sets out particular problems 
with Malian families, both due to polygamy, to language difficulties, and to the 
tradition of putting up relatives in the family home. In other estates, such as Grande 
Synthe, the presence of large immigrant families produced special problems, dealt 
with there by creating specially large units. In many of the estates the immigrants 
were from North African (Mahgrebin) Moslem backgrounds, as has been set out 
previously. This was not at all the case in the UK, where there were few of the real 
problems of language, religion, and cultural integration which were evident in 
France. UK ethnic minorities on estates, with the exception of small groups of South 
East Asian families, were primarily English speaking Christians. 
There was also a stark difference in the range of comments and assessment by 
agents on the subject of "problems" caused by immigrant households, set out in more 
detail in the studies. It proved fairly common in the French estates for HLM staff 
at all levels - from caretakers to the manager of the local office - to espouse 
attitudes which in the UK would be immediately seen as racist. There was little self 
consciousness about this, rather it was presented in a quasi factual manner. The 
remarks would be about the attitudes, habits, and behaviour of certain ethnic groups, 
expressing hostile and negative feelings, including the traditional remarks about 
their smell, eating, and social habits. These attitudes were not present amongst the 
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DSQ team staff (who would sometimes refer unhappily to the HLM staff attitudes). 
In the UK, on the contrary, there was no such overt racism, and evidence in certain 
of the estates - primarily Brent, Wadsworth, Islington, and Manchester - of positive 
programmes aimed at equal treatment of ethnic minority tenants and staff, or 
sometimes racism awareness training programmes, introduced following the 
recommendations of the 1982 Scarman report on the Brixton civil disturbances. 
Many French interviews raised points concerning immigrants, ghettos, and rioting, 
which are taken up in Jelen (199 1). He rejects the notion of large HLM estates as 
to ghettos". This is a view strongly argued by Viellard-Baron (1990) who maintains first 
that the widely used term is factually inaccurate, in relation to either its historical 
meaning or its contemporary American sense, and second that its use serves to 
further isolate and disempower the populations on the large HLM estates. Jelen 
documents a specific viewpoint put to me in a number of the interviews, that the 
main problems are caused in families where parental control and authority have 
failed to be exercised over the male adolescent children. Female adolescents are 
seldom associated with problems on estates, a point also made repeatedly to me. The 
problem appears worst in households of young North African families, where the role 
model of the illiterate, docile, parent, willing to work long hours in a factory for low 
wages, but now unemployed, is totally rejected by the French educated son. 
Generally these children, according to Jelen, have been brought up under little 
supervision, and learned from the streets that it is more profitable to make money 
from crime, particularly from drugs, than to "slave for F5,000 a month" (p205). 
There are, he estimates, perhaps numerically few hard core problem youths on large 
estates, but they create a media image, however, which comes to represent the 
estate. Jelens conclusion, which was not inconsistent with the case studies, is that 
".. the critical problem is of parental authority .... and the weak perception by 
the parents of the role of education in socialisation. From this insufficient 
schooling comes unemployment, delinquency, drugs, and exclusion in the true 
sense of the term. " (p216) 
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The Problems on the Estates 
Tables 6.4,6.5, and 6.6 set out the main problems on the estates. In 6.4 1 have set 
out concisely the key problem on each estate. The two subsequent tables provide 
additional details under general headings. 
Unpopular Estates with High Voids: 
One of the main difficulties linked to the unpopularity of the estates was that of 
void units, a major problem in eight of the estates and the main problem in Grande 
Synthe, Bethune, Wigan, Manchester, and Salford - that is in the provincial regions. 
There were both financial and management problems caused on the estates which 
had become unlettable. Financially in France the loss or rent income lead to further 
problems in being able to maintain the blocks. The attempt to fill the voids 
sometimes lead to compounding the problems of social isolation and unbalanced 
population mix - in Brent, Salford and Manchester, the lack of demand for tower 
blocks lay behind the creation of severe problems in these blocks, due to 
indiscriminate lettings to young single people; in Meaux and Bethune and Grande 
Synthe, the absence of demand generally lead to the acceptance of any household 
who was willing to take a flat, often poor or immigrant households with multiple 
problems. 
This problem of voids was often compounded by that of high turnover of tenants. in 
the main those moving off were those who had access to a better standard of 
accommodation, usually the better off tenants. This left the poorest trapped on the 
estate. In most of the estates, however, there tended to be a high differential 
turnover between different blocks, some having an essentially stable and integrated 
population. In Stains, Manchester, Brent, and Salford, turnover was concentrated in 
the towers which had unstable, young single tenants. The consequence of high 
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Sometimes external factors compounded the problem. In Meaux, as noted, the new 
adjacent estate increased the turnover problem. In 13,6thune the general development 
of low cost owner occupation in the surrounding rural areas lead to a high migration 
out of the town as a whole. In Grande Synthe the massive reduction in employment 
in the steelworks, which was the estate's rationale, lead to the high voids. In Wigan 
and Salford the existence of a gross housing surplus lead to the most unpopular 
estates becoming that surplus. 
Arrears: 
The economic difficulties of tenants are reflected in the levels of arrears, which 
surfaced in ten of the estates. In many cases, however, tenants were living on 
benefits and a substantial part of the rent was paid, although meeting the residual 
element was often a problem. 
Poor ima2e: 
The main problems outlined above result in one problem which is shared by all of the 
estates - that of the estate's image. This is a due to physical isolation, to poor 
facilities, to the effect of large numbers of voids, to disrepair and design problems, 
to the general awareness on and off the estate that many residents are in difficulties 
and socially excluded, and to the problems of high crime rates. This is compounded 
in many cases by physical ugliness or drabness, particularly due to the presence of 
several large, grey, slab blocks presenting an image of repetition and sameness. The 
image problem is social also, however, with problems of drugs, crime, and poverty 
making the estate a "no-go" area in the eyes of many of the residents of other parts 
of the town - such as was the case in Meaux and Calais, or in Brent and Manchester. 
Employment opportunities and the provision of services and goods were explicitly 
reported to be prejudiced by an address on the Meaux or Brent estates. In 
Chanteloup one of the main underlying issues was the fact that the village onto 
which the estate had been grafted (without consultation) had a totally different type 
of population - leading to the estate becoming an isolated imposition on the village. 
The image problem manifested itself in very similar ways in both countries. 
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Environmentally barren: 
All the estates suffered from poor use of external space around the blocks, and 
inadequate management of the open spaces, sometimes, particulary in the UK, 
leading to problems of personal security in moving about the estate. In other cases, 
for example Manchester and Wigan, the absence of private space around the blocks 
had led to a high rate of burglary in the blocks. In many of the French estates there 
were problems with the circulation of traffic, for example in Stains where the cars 
were not separated from the pedestrians and front doors opened onto garage 
entrances. Chanteloup suffered from the deliberate design of an environment 
denuded of green areas: this was the result of an architectural idea to create a 
"prairie" of sand and stones. 
Design and repair problems: 
Disrepair and problems due to design defects were common. Heating systems 
difficulties were shared by estates in both countries, as were problems of degraded 
entrances and stairwells. French estates tended to suffer more from problems of 
lack of noise insulation; and the frequent presence of basement areas which had 
become disused, vandalised, and the locus of adolescent criminal or antisocial 
gatherings. In the UK the spaces under blocks were often used for garages, in all 
cases disused, vandalised, and often the locus of illegal gatherings. Both countries 
had problems of drugs dealing and use, often in isolated areas of the estate. Refuse 
disposal was a common difficulty, as was lift breakdown. 
It is also striking that internal Problems with the basic equipment in the flats was 
seldom presented as a problem. Traditionally problems of inadequate housing have 
been linked to the absence of standard amenities: hot water, toilets and so on. On 
these estates, however, the flats were provided with adequate space and full modem 
amenities, and would have been perfectly adequate had the common parts of the 
estate been in similar condition. 
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Indifferent housing management 
Remote, unresponsive management was a feature of the majority of estates. In four 
cases there was already a local office, but in two of these cases the office had little 
in the way of special management adapted to the needs of the estate. The 
management arrangements tended to be identical to those for other homes managed 
by the organisation, despite the obvious differences due to the problems on the 
estates. In Chanteloup and Stains, the management had been by an Interdepartmental 
HLMf6r Paris (OIRP). This organisation eventually saw its stock transferred to other 
HLMs in 1981 due to total mismanagement - this was seen in the form of high voids, 
uncontrolled arrears and inadequate rent accounting, untrained and very poor staff, 
indifferent repairs and general neglect of the estate. 
The problem of a serious lack of an adequate repairs service was reflected in Brent, 
Calais, Grande Synthe, and Manchester. In France this was a general problem for 
many of the difficult estates: 
"Examples are known, for example, that in certain neighbourhoods it takes 
two months to replace a broken electric light fitting, although in one of the 
better neighbourhoods it is done in 24 hours" (UNFOHLM(1992) p40) 
Absence of infrastructure: 
The absence of adequate infrastructure in the form of schools, leisure facilities, 
shopping facilities, and local jobs, was often cited as a problem, particularly in 
France where the new greenfield sites required to provision of these other facilities 
from scratch. It was not so much of a problem in the inner city estates, like Salford, 
Islington, Wandsworth, and to an extent Calais and Stains. The problem was generally 
that intended or promised facilities had not been built, often because of a lack of 
resources. Chanteloup suffered most from this, as the village was totally unable to 
provide the infrastructure necessary to make the estate work, and the rail link with 
Paris was not built until almost ten years after the completion of the estate. Schools 
and educational provision were areas of concern, leading to many of the French 
estates being granted Educational Priority Zone status as the accompaniment to the 
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DSQ programme. The absence of jobs was due in some cases to the decline of local 
industry: extensive cutbacks occurred in the giant steelworks adjacent to the Grande 
Synthe estate, and in the car factories near to Chanteloup. 
Security: 
Some UK estates (Islington, Brent, Wandsworth, Manchester) had problems with long 
interconnecting walkways, or long isolated pathways through the estate, leading to 
problems of personal security, compounded by absence of adequate lighting and 
unimpeded access to all blocks. There were also problems with crime in the form of 
burglaries and personal assaults in lifts or dark comers of the estate. This was not 
so much seen as an issue in France, despite in some cases high levels of criminality 
on the estates. In the UK, however, this issue of security and crime prevention 
became one of the key problems for Estate Action attention. 
Absence of community life and resident participation: 
One consequence of these problems set out above was that the population, already 
suffering from various social and economic disadvantages, was confirmed in its 
negative self image and passivity. There was a very low level of participation in 
estate associations or organisations. This was compounded by problems of illiteracy 
and language difficulties. In Wigan, Brent, Grande Synthe, and Chanteloup there 
were frequent conflicts between neighbours or groups of tenants. The isolation was 
compounded by the problem of drug and alcoholism abuse. Many people preferred to 
stay indoors drinking than to go to a meeting. There was an absence of participation 
not only in estate life, but also the wider life of the community and city. 
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Summary 
The case study estates have problems similar to those described in the preceding 
chapters. There is one exception to this, Islington, where crime and fear of crime 
appears to be the main rationale for its inclusion in the programme. For the other 
estates, however, the clear picture is that of problems of design, infrastructure. and 
disrepair leading to the estate being difficult to let, which in turn lead to the 
concentration of unemployed and disadvantaged tenants on the estates in an attempt 
to reduce the central problem of voids. This was compounded by poor management, 
including neglect, remote and indifferent management, and sometimes the deliberate 
decision to dump problems there. All these factors compounded the problem of the 
poor image of the estate, and the problem of lettability and voids, with the growing 
high crime rates and problems of drugs and alcohol lead to increasing social isolation 
from the general life of the community, on top of the already existing physical 
isolation. 
There are also contrasts: the metropolitan estates have higher proportions of ethnic 
minority households, who are absent from many of the provincial estates. The voids 
problem in the provincial estates is due to a gross surplus of stock. The problem of 
crime and fear of crime appears much more prominently in the UK estates. 
There are also factors not discussed in the background chapters. There were 
problems of young males, often from immigrant households, who seemed to lack a 
family structure which would control their behaviour. There was a stronger relation 
of crime and fear of crime to certain design aspects of UK estates, particularly 
walkways and the overall estate layout of open spaces between blocks; and in France 
the management problems were compounded by a personal hostility and lack of 
sympathy with the disadvantaged tenants on the part of HLMstaff, exhibiting itself 
on certain occasions as blatant racism. 
The next section deals with the proposals which were made to deal with these 
problems. 
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Housing Management Objectives 
Tables 6.7,6.8 and 6.9 set out the original housing management objectrves. 
Voids: 
The priority given to dealing with voids reflected their prominence as a problem. 
The exact solution varied, partly according to stock type. 
Stock reduction by demolitions were common where there were high void tower 
blocks (e. g. Salford, Wigan, Meaux, Grande Synthe). In Manchester and Wigan there 
were also programmes to remove upper stories of blocks (decapitation). Change of 
use for offices was common in France (Meaux, Bethune) though not in the UK. Wigan 
also disposed for improvement for rent and sale, and Chanteloup sought to improve 
for disposal to a high rent HLM. 
Strategies to fill the empties were also common. Some offered blocks or parts of 
blocks for institutional or special lettings (for example for students, or young people 
- Meaux, Salford). Salford operated a policy of open advertising, as did Manchester 
for a short period, whereby anyone who was willing to move onto the estate could 
do so, subject to certain minimum checks designed to try to root out the worst of 
the antisocial tenants who might apply. 
Arrears: 
Arrears, surprisingly, are not always a stated priority of the written programme 
proposals, even when they are a problem - perhaps because it was generally accepted 
that tackling them was important. They were often mentioned as key aspects of 
better management by the estate managers, however, due to their income generation 
aspect. The French approach on half of the estates was to propose a special aid 
commission, which had the power to make special grants or loans to tenants in 
difficulty, with conditions about continuing repayments. These commissions would 
be made up of both housing and social work officers. Only Brent shared this type of 
approach in the UK. 
166 
Allocations: 
In all the French estates there were proposals to restore social balance by selectiN, e 
allocations - some form of local allocations policy was to be devised to try to 
socially engineer changes in the population str-ucture. This was often expressed in 
terms of restricting the numbers of unemployed people, and encouraging employed 
tenants to move in. Equally it was often put to me in terms of "no more blacks" to 
be admitted until the proportion was reduced to what was seen as a more balanced 
level. There are a number of HLMsalso believed to operate a "one for one" policy 
of not admitting more black families unless another black household moves out. 
There was a proposal to combatting this type of activity in the recent Besson law, 
by forcing HLMs to give reasons for their refusals - but in the end the clause was 
dropped (see Blanc 1990). 
In contrast in the UK only Wandsworth espoused any similar objective, but couched 
it much more in terms of a balance of owners and renters, which was expected 
naturally to produce a more even social mix. This was based on sons and daughters 
of existing tenants, and since many of the existing tenants who were black had 
relatives who wished to move onto the estate, in this case the type of bias to white 
families which is often the result of those policies did not occur. The key notion in 
Wandsworth was that those who moved onto the estate should positively wish to live 
there, rather than finding themselves there as a last resort. It was hoped that the 
commitment of those who had chosen to move on would act as a stimulus to improve 
the estate. 
Elsewhere Manchester aimed to retain existing communities in blocks by operating 
certain sensitive decanting choices; - but this did not affect new tenancies. 
Otherwise the standard computerised allocations systems which operated for all 
estates were the most prevalent in the UK. 
Additionally solutions were proposed to reduce the social rented stock: Wands"'orth 
promoted leasehold ownership. There were also frequent attempts to produce a 
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better housing (and tenant) mix by the construction of new homes on the estate 
(Meaux, Bethune, Calais, Wigan, plans in Brent). It is noticeable that in the UK onlý, 
Wigan and Wandsworth actively planned any significant changes of ownership of 
estate flats, despite one of the key Estate Action aims being to encourage tenure 
diversity and the involvement of the private sector. Many more proposals of this 
type were made on the French estates (Meaux, Chanteloup, Bethune, and Grande 
Synthe). 
Local Offices: 
Proposals to develop a new office and new local services were very common - 
unsurprisingly as there were major planks of the overall national programmes. 
Proposed improvements to management included a new local office in eight of the 
estates, sometimes replacing a previous partial service. In three of the other cases 
(Islington, Manchester and Grande Synthe) there was already a local presence, and 
in the final case (Calais) a local office was planned (but did not materialise). Equally 
many planned management improvements, mainly related to providing a local service 
adapted to the needs of the estate population. 
New Staff Roles, includinp- CaretakinR: 
Planned changes in local staff roles were particularly noticeable in France which 
often gave a much enhanced role to caretakers, including in some cases proposing 
to provide them with their own improved offices from which they, and often their 
wives, would undertake basic housing management functions like logging repairs, 
taking rents, or managing contract cleaning staff. This was sometimes (Chanteloup, 
Stains, Meaux) backed up by new training packages highlighting the social role they 
were expected to play. In contrast in the UK only in Manchester were caretakers 
seen as part of the package of estate improvement strategies; and indeed the 
caretaking role was being planned to be reduced in Brent and Islington. 
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Plans were also made on all French estates bar Chanteloup for other staff to be 
trained into the more sensitive management needed. This element of planning to 
develop a new staff awareness through training was not seen in the UK, except in 
Islington as part of a wider programme. 
Participation and partnershiD: 
The aims of participation of residents in the improvement process, and of 
partnership with other agencies and groups can be treated together, as they often 
overlap. Joint working with other partners was a key aim in all cases: in France this 
involved the HLM working with the DSQ team; in the UK this involved a 
commitment to some form of inter departmental working to provide an integrated 
package of improvements on the estate. A considerable number of good intentions 
were expressed on this subject in many of the planning documents, and as listed in 
table 6.9. 
UK moves towards corporate working involved the various local authority 
departments responsible for aspects of the estate: such as coordination of the 
environmental, refuse, and other services (Manchester, Salford), often by the local 
office (Wigan); or some form of local committee or forum (Brent, Islington). The 
context would be that these other departments had their own programmes and 
priorities, and attempts would be made to bend these programmes to the benefit of 
the estate, or to fit in some way with the predominantly housing programme. 
Partnership and participation also focused on the creation or support of resident 
groups on estates. All estates planned consultation with tenants during the 
improvement works, seeing this as a key element of the approach, no doubt partly 
because this was required by the structure of the national programmes, but also 
because they recognised this as a problem. Here there was another difference 
reflecting the programme structures: in the UK the emphasis was on tenants 
associations, and tenants halls; in France there was a wider aim to promote groups 
which would assist the tenants in the wider process of "insertion". This meant that 
169 
there were a wider range of associations planned to assist tenants as part of the 
wider DSQ process, primarily organised around specific interests. These covered 
mainly ethnic groupings (particularly for Mahgrebin households, for example in 
Grande Synthe or Chanteloup); groups for women tenants (for example in Meaux): 
and in many places for adolescents (for example the attempt to create a youth 
committee in Grande Synthe and Meaux). The emergence of the Regie de Quartier 
movement also made a key link between the DSQ, the HLM, and the tenants. This 
movement aims to give employment and training opportunities via a maintenance 
organisation set up on the estate; see Meaux case study for more details. 
The aims of participation in France were generally linked closely to the wider 
objective of tenants reclaiming "citizenship" [citroyennite] or their rightful place in 
society (along with the "insertion" objective which was very commonly documented 
in the plans). This citizenship was wider than simply an economic role, through 
employment; not simply tied to participation in estate management issues, but also 
related to civic notions of being an active participant in local issues and voting in 
local elections, to being a participant in local democracy in the widest, comune 
wide, sense, and in enjoying the general benefits of French life in the way the 
majority of other citizens did. 
More traditional methods were evident in the UK, with the construction of a new 
tenants hall in Wandsworth, or the stimulation of a tenants forum in Brent. The 
main focus in other estates was to provide consultation mechanisms for the works 
and try to promote tenants associations from that. Tenants associations were also 
promoted in France, not least because the HLM structure, set out in Chapter 2, 
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committees. It was in fact hoped that the work of the other associations would assist 
in promoting representatives. The general aim of participation was also to move to 
a point where tenants took more responsibility for their estate - via the local 
neighbourhood committees set up in Grande Synthe or the resident associations in 
Bethune. 
Surprisingly, given the Estate Action later emphasis, in none of the UK estates was 
the concept of tenant management or cooperative management prominent. 
Questioning of agents on this point indicated that on none of the estates was it part 
of the programme objectives, nor was it part of the expectation or demand from 
tenants. Indeed in Wigan, one of the most successful case study estates, it was 
suggested clearly to me that if the condition of resident interest in alternative 
management or tenure had been a condition of EA funding at the time of their 
application, they would not have been able to comply, and possibly would not have 
been in the programme. 
Summary 
In line with earlier chapters, the estates show a commitment to improved 
management, most usually a new local office. In France, new management strategies 
included introducing a new social role for caretakers. Partnerships are also 
prominent, including both promoting associations for residents to participate in the 
process of improvements. In France more broadly based associations were developed 
to assist in achieving a wider social integration and citizenship, as would be 
expected. 
The effective treatment of voids is a more prominent housing objective than 
expected, involving two main strategies: reduction of the available social rented 
stock by demolition or change of use, and strategies to fill the voids such as 
institutional lettings or open advertisement of vacancies. 
175 
Rehabilitation Objectives 
Considerable rehabilitation works were planned, with a variety of programme 
objectives. This section, and tables 6.10, and 6.11. also presents some details of 
what was achieved, rather than leaving them to the later "What Happened" section. 
This is partly because the details of plans and proposals developed in consultation 
with residents as the programme progressed. It is also because to include all details 
here will save on the need to repeat the description of the physical works later. 
Major Restructuring or Changes of Use 
Considerable remodelling works were proposed. The most spectacular changes were 
in Manchester, Wigan, and Salford where there were "decapitation" works - 
maisonette blocks were changed to terraced family houses by the removal of the 
upper floors to leave two storey dwellings. These were then provided with 
conventional pitched roofs. Wigan combined this with a programme of rebuilding of 
certain blocks, which involved effectively demolition (except for foundations and 
internal ground floor walls) then complete rebuilding. Grande Synthe also did 
considerable remodelling, mainly the creation of large family units for households 
with 5 or more children. These were created at the ends of blocks by integrating all 
the floors into two units, each with its own entrance, the upper large unit accessed 
by an external stair. This was done to cater specifically for the large, mainly 
Mahgrebin, families who were already on the estate. 
Some programmes planned remodelled flats in relation to special lettings or 
allocations initiatives: Salford rehabilitated the interiors of flats prior to its "Join 
the High Life" advertising campaign designed to attract new tenants. It also 
transformed one block onto a singles block with furnishing, repairs and redecoration, 
and the provision of communal facilities. Wandsworth did some minor remodelling 
of internal flat layouts and sizes to deal with a fire exit problem. 
Bethune, Grande Synthe, and Meaux also provided extensive office space by change 
of use of flats. This was part of the drive to attract people to have a better image 




the Appearance of the Estate: 
Treatment of the external appearance of the blocks was a major strategy to achieý, e 
the aim of changed image in certain estates: - mainly in France, but also in 
Wandsworth and to an extent Wigan. The most striking plan was in Stains where the 
architectural team started with a vision of making what were previously monotonous 
blocks into individual buildings with the diverse characteristics of a city street. This 
was achieved by the addition not only of external wall colours and coverings, but 
also embellishments to the roofline and gable walls to alter the look of the buildings. 
These changes were all extensively discussed with tenants prior to introduction, as 
noted above. The effect was combined with the opening up of two new entrances 
from the estate to the town - done in one case by the partial demolition of some 
lower floors of a block to form a virtual arch through which a passage and bridge 
was constructed. The effect is very striking (see photos at case study). 
Similar external decoration was carried out in Chanteloup, including the construction 
of enormous mural mosaics of the faces of famous French authors on the gable ends 
of the blocks which surround a central open space. The improved blocks in Bethune 
and Grande Synthe were provided with a colourful, substantial cladding, and the 
external insulation panels in Calais were brightly painted. It should be noted, 
however, that many HLMestates are constructed from coloured panels, and indeed 
that the identification of an HLMestate on the landscape is often made easy by the 
sight of garish high rise blocks. Calais also had a large scale mosaic on the ground 
depicting Bleriot in an aeroplane, covering a very large area of the centre of the 
estate including interruptions where blocks of flats occurred. 
This type of external fabric improvement was not so common in the UK. Wandsworth 
was the only estate to have a similar programme of decoration - transforming the 
previous grey blocks to very brightly coloured facades, including windows in primary 
colours and new bay windows at irregular intervals (wherever the tenants requested 
them). In addition the walkways which remained were covered over with bright roofs 
which had the appearance of pantomime oriental bridges. The effect of these 
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changes was also startling. The North West estates were mostly affected by the 
changes due to decapitation set out above, rather than external cladding. 
Heating and Insulation 
French programmes frequently had the objective of providing better heating and 
insulation, including both thermal and sound insulation. Thermal insulation would be 
mainly by new insulated cladding panels, but also by reducing the sizes of windows. 
The objective of thermal insulation was partly tied to a wish to reduce service 
charges for heating (as in Stains, which in fact achieved a 50% total reduction in 
heating charges). It was also linked to a wider government programme to improve 
insulation in buildings, following the 1973 oil crisis and fuel cost rises. Sound 
insulation improvements were to reduce noise transmission in blocks, due to design 
faults in the original construction. 
Insulation work was not commonly an objective of the UK programmes. The new 
roofs in Manchester, Wigan, and Salford decapitated blocks were fully thermally 
insulated, in line with guidelines for new construction - but none of the UK estates 
identified insulation as a main objective, despite its clear benefits to tenants. 
Heating improvements were made in Salford and Wigan 
Refuse Disposal and Lifts 
The problem of refuse disposal was a shared objective. Meaux, Calais, and 
Wandsworth all sought to improve the methods of refuse disposal. Equally lift 
replacement was also an objective in estates in both countries, but the high capital 
cost kept the numbers of replacements it was to achieve low. 
Internal Flat Improvements: 
As noted above, problems with the insides of flats were not common, and this was 
reflected in the proposed improvements. Some estates had small internal 
improvements packages, which tended to be some minor works within an overall 
budget limit (Meaux, Bethune, Manchester). Brent provided new front doors, but 
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mainly as part of a crime prevention initiative; likewise the improvements to heating 
or insulation were driven by other concerns than internal flat rehabilitation, although 
they were clearly of benefit to individual tenants. 
Staircase Works: 
Considerable attention was paid in all estates to proposals to improve the common 
entrances and stairwells to blocks. Most introduced plans to redecorate, and often 
restructure, the entrances. The general aim was to make the entrance more pleasant 
and welcoming; to eradicate graffiti and disrepair which was commonly present, by 
hiding it under stronger, vandal resistant materials; and frequently to provide a 
differentiation between blocks by having different colours or patterns in each block. 
In France there was also often a plan to provide stronger letterboxes to deter theft 
of mail - letter boxes were sited in the entrances, as the post delivery service 
stopped there. 
Security Works: 
Here there was a marked contrast of approach between countries. The concern with 
crime, which was to an extent shared in both countries, was expressed in the UK by 
the extensive provision of entryphone schemes (3 estates) and concierge schemes (3 
estates), in contrast with only two estates in France (Grande Synthe and Chanteloup) 
which installed entryphones, and no instances of concierges (that is people primarily 
to control entry to blocks). 
There was also much more attention paid in the UK objectives to planning specific 
crime prevention or personal security measures. These were translated into 
programmes to reroute paths into less secluded parts of the estate; improve lighting; 
provide defensible garden spaces around blocks; and particularly the demolition of 
walkways linking blocks. Every UK estate had objectives and works of this type. In 
contrast, crime and fear of crime was dealt in France by anti delinquency 
programmes aimed at involving young people in purposeful training and sports; by 
bricking up basement areas where they gathered and drugs and alcohol were 
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With the exception of Brent, improvements to the green areas and open spaces were 
also part of the objectives of all estates. There were a large variety of types of 
improvement. Layouts of paths and circulation areas were common in French 
estates, to create more secure pedestrian areas away from traffic; changed layouts 
to provide additional security were more common in the UK. The creation of 
identified garden areas was common in the UK; and the creation of more communal 
areas for sitting, or for children to play more common in France. Tree and shrub 
planting was universal, and the removal of unsightly external buildings 
(sheds, garages, and so on) occurred in both countries. There were also estates 
(Wigan, Meaux) where the provision of these environmental improvements was used 
as an opportunity to create some local jobs and training. 
Summary 
The specific rehabilitation solutions to be adopted were not specified in the original 
national programmes, but in fact common solutions were adopted on many estates, 
reflecting common problems (and also reflecting the choice of sites). Shared 
approaches aimed at improving the image of the estate included staircase and 
entrance improvements, and environmental works to the green and open spaces. 
Improvements to heating, refuse systems, and lifts were common. 
There were also clear differences of emphasis reflecting national perceptions of the 
problems. French estates focused more on thermal and sound insulation, and planning 
significant changes to the external appearance of the estate. UKestates emphasised 
crime prevention measures in the form of entryphones and concierge schemes, 
seldom seen in France. 
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Non Housing Objectives 
Brief mention of these provides useful background to the housing strategy, and its 
evaluation, set out in Tables 12 and 13. 
Ima2e, and Isolation 
Most of the estates had a general aim of transforming the image of the estate. In 
France this was usually more explicit stated in these terms; in the UK it was 
implicit in other actions. This objective was to be attained through the other parts 
of the programme: the rehab programme, the attempts to establish a more mixed 
population. 
Physical isolation was also stated as being important in the French estates. This was 
partly because of the real physical isolation of the French estates - although the 
definition of the problem was wide, and included isolation from the employment, 
cultural, and other general benefits which were available elsewhere in the city. 
There is also a more general problem of the quality of general services on estates. 
In Brent, Chanteloup, Stains, Manchester, and other estates, local services were 
denied, including deliveries or credit agreements. There was also a tendency for 
criminal activity to be drawn to the estate, latterly particularly drugs. 
Amongst the strategies attempted to combat image and isolation problems, one 
involved attracting business to the estate (tried by Meaux, Grande Synthe, and 
Bethune). The idea here was that if an individual from outside worked on the estate, 
they would see that it was not as bad as its reputation, and improving. This worker 
would then talk to friends about the estate, and through this better message being 
spread some of those friends might be inclined to put down the estate on an 
application for housing. By this roundabout route a wider group of applicants and 
tenants might be attracted to the estate. The second aspect of this was that when 
businesses saw that there were other successful businesses operating on the estate 
they might be less hostile to employing estate residents, or providing services. For 
example in Meaux the successful persuasion of a major savings bank to open a branch 
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in one of the office conversions in a block was seen as a breakthrough, as it %vas felt 
that it was a major selling point to attract other firms. 
Insertion 
The different approach of the DSQ and EA programmes to "insertion" of "excluded" 
tenants has already been set out. The case studies confirmed that the French 
estates all included this in their overall programmes as a key aim; but it was an 
incidental extra in the UK. A further issue worth noting here is the attention paid 
to sports facilities and programmes in the DSQ. The provision of sports halls or 
grounds was an important part of trying to integrate the adolescents in many estates 
(Chanteloup, Meaux, Stains, Bethune); this was complemented by major programmes 
of sports activities during the long summer holidays, which complemented the 
programmes of camping and country holidays which has been a feature of French 
Social Security for some time (for example "colonies", or childrens camps, paid for 
by the Family Allowances Board [CAF]) 
Economic 
Economic objectives were present in both countries, as expected. There were often 
problems encouraging businesses to set up on or near the estates, because of their 
image of crime, of poverty, of ill trained and inadequate residents. Explicit 
strategies were devised to combat this. A regie de quartier was created in Meaux, 
and one planned in Calais. These represented means to involve the residents in the 
estate, as well as provide training and employment opportunities. This was reflected 
in the CRS scheme in Wigan. In Chanteloup the expansion of the industrial and 
commercial base of the village was one of the most important measures being 
pursued by the town hall, and the construction of a new industrial estate and several 
hundred jobs was a key achievement. Grande Synthe and Bethune aimed to create 
new job opportunities with aid to business and tenants; Calais had a job club to help 
with locating and applying for jobs. 
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In the UK the involvement of business was generally restricted to initiatives for 
small scale local enterprise, for example in converted garages (Wandsworth), or the 
encouragement of better shops on the estate. The links to employment and retraining 
actions was stressed much more in the later Estate Action guidelines and 
programmes, and most estates making applications recently have had to demonstrate 
initiatives in this area, including programmes designed to assist tenants prepare for 
and find jobs. The overall responsibilities for stimulating jobs, and for assisting 
unemployed people to find and fill them are, however, within the remit of the 
departments of Trade and of Employment, not of Environment (e. g. DTITask Forces, 
or DE Employment Action, Youth Training, or Enterprise programmes). This 
distinction was more clearly marked during the case study years, prior to the Action 
for Cities programme. 
Summary 
Evidence from the French estates reflects the DSQ national focus on the physical 
and social isolation of estates. Equally, as anticipated, the DSQ estates involved a 
more comprehensive programme than EA, with sports, employment, and other 
initiatives. Comparisons are most difficult in relation to these wider non housing 
issues, however, due to the very different contexts and national programme 
objectives. 
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Tables 6.19 - 6.21 set out a summary of the main outcomes of the programmes. A 
summary of changes to the key indicators of voids, arrears, stock changes and so on 
is provided at table 6.22. 
One key underlying factor to the outcomes was the political support offered by the 
French city councils in relation to the programmes. This is seen most prominently 
in Chanteloup, Meaux, Bethune, and Grande Synthe in France, where the 
commitment of the mayor and the city council was instrumental in ensuring that the 
programme continued to make progress. This was important for two reasons. First, 
the support of the elected mayor could assist the project manager considerably in 
ensuring that the programme was kept moving. More importantly, however, the 
commitment of the mayor ensured that resources could continue to be diverted from 
other parts of the city to the estate in difficulty. One of the main underlying 
problems for these estates, as noted already, was underinvestment. The need for the 
city to pay its share of the costs of the DSQ programme could be politically 
difficult. Residents of more affluent areas of town could easily consider that any 
money spent on difficult estates was simply wasted. Furthermore the votes to be 
gathered on difficult estates were disproportionately low, as few residents voted, 
compared to the more participative middle classes. The ruling party therefore took 
a risk by supporting the DSQ works. This was particularly evident in Mthune, where 
there was an explicit campaign of public persuasion to explain why resources were 
being diverted to the estate. The contrast can be made with the support for housing 
works in Calais. There the absence of such continuity of support lead to a failure to 
carry out many of the necessary works, and a general underachievement of the 
housing programme (despite a more successful social programme). 
This is not so much an issue in the UK. Wandsworth benefited from the borough 
administration supporting estate transformation for disposal as leasehold; and Wigan 
had a similar commitment to stock reduction. All authorities had to provide 
matching HIP funds for the EA works (normally 50 %), and to that extent had to deny 
resources to other estates - but this appeared to be less of a problem than in France, 
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as decisions were hidden in housing department overall programmes which excited 
less public interest. 
Phvsical and Environmental Works 
With two exceptions (Brent and Calais) extensive physical changes were implemented 
to the buildings and estates. Some estates were transformed in their outward 
appearance, or were remodelled, as noted above (Wigan and Manchester with 
decapitation; Wandsworth, Stains, Chanteloup, and Wthune, with external changes). 
These changes were clearly permanent. Meaux also achieved some changes with the 
demolition of one "barre", and the construction of new family homes in the centre 
of the estate, although the massive presence of the remaining blocks still dominates 
the site. Equally Salford achieved some changes with limited decapitation, but 
remains dominated by the overwhelming presence of the other towers and blocks. 
In this respect Wigan was fortunate that the need to demolish its towers for 
technical reasons provided the opportunity to alter the balance of the estate, and 
following the decapitation and demolition works, the estate is utterly different in 
appearance from its former self. Most estates had also done works to the stairwells 
and common parts. 
The extent of the demolition or reduction of available stock for social renting (by 
sales or change of use) is one of the most striking overall outcomes, already noted 
above, with half losing over 25 %. 
Improvements in the greens and general environment have had a more limited 
impact. The difficulties of designing and managing internal and peripheral open 
space on estates is evident from the case studies. Dealing with land adjacent to 
blocks presented least problems: extensive enclosing of gardens for individual flats 
in blocks, or as communal garden space, has had a marked effect on those areas of 
the site - and some of the work here was very imaginative and visually striking (such 
as in Salford, and Wandsworth). 
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The large open spaces between blocks present an altogether more intractable 
problem, however. Generally new paths, play areas, planting boxes and trees, and 
seats have been provided. These are very vulnerable to vandalism and disfigurement 
by graffiti, and damage to young trees and shrubs is common. They also require high 
investment in maintenance which is not always forthcoming. 
Even more of a problem is that of the peripheral spaces, leading in some cases to 
extended derelict land from old industrial sites or intended but unbuilt housing 
developments. Surrounding land problems are present in Calais, which is surrounded 
by the cleared sites of previous temporary housing, Stains which has an unused 
building site, and Manchester, which has derelict former industrial sites. Meaux, 
Chanteloup, Bethune and Wigan have sites which are bounded only by fences, leading 
on to farm land or scrub land outside the estate. This problem has not been resolved 
satisfactorily on any of the case study estates. 
The overall problem with these physical and environmental improvements is their 
"fragile" nature, an expression much used in France, indicating that they 
improvement can quickly and easily be reversed by vandalism or lack of 
maintenance. Improvements such as new heating systems are lasting in their benefit. 
Many others, however, involve changes to the appearance or presentation of the 
estate, and are open to deterioration, which can be very rapid if fast and effective 
maintenance and repair works are not carried out. In both countries, however, there 
appeared, and was reported, to be an insufficient level of investment in the 
maintenance needed to ensure that the rehabilitation works remain in good condition 
on many of the estates. This was a theme which was returned to again and again in 
discussion on the French estates. This was particularly true in relation to 
improvement to entrances and staircases. 
In certain cases the maltreatment of the improvements has begun in the stairs and 
moved out into the estate as a whole, part of a creeping destruction of the 
improvements made. In Calais, the improvements to the external cladding panels, 
and installation of insulation, had to be supplemented by additional strengthening 
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brickwork at the lower floor levels -basically to the height beyond which adolescents 
could not throw panel cracking large stones. In Stains the DSQ team counted 2 years 
of maintained good treatment as a success, but were finding that after that, the 
initial petty vandalism tended to deteriorate to more destructive degradation. In 
Salford and Manchester the problem of degradation was almost immediately 
apparent in certain blocks, although in others (mainly those with particularly good 
caretakers and stable populations) there was an opposite trend, that of increased 
personalisation of the block by mats, notice boards, pictures, and the like. In many 
estates, particularly in the UK, there was an immediate problem with the security 
systems, which were often subjected to deliberate destruction fairly soon after 
installation. 
Manap-ement Chanp-es 
At the conclusion of the case study visits, all estates except Calais had local offices 
operating. There was evidence (from both improvements in the key indicators and 
from consistent comments of key agents) of distinct improvements in Chanteloup 
and Stains (which could not have got much worse), and in Meaux, Wandsworth, 
Salford, and Wigan. There were also limited improvements in Islington, mainly in 
relation to the wider borough programmes of service improvements, and in 
Manchester. 
In relation to staff training and attitudes, the intention to provide better training 
and a better understanding of problems has had varying success. In some estates (for 
example Meaux, Wandsworth, Wigan, and Stains) there was a team commitment to 
the improved management of the estate, and to working together with the wider 
programme of assistance and improvement. Elsewhere, however, it was less clear 
that this intended attitude change had not taken root. This was particularly so on 
some French estates (Bethune, Grande Synthe, Calais)., where certain prejudiced 
attitudes seemed little changed. 
in two cases (Chanteloup and Stains) a change of ownership just prior to the 
programme starting, from a totally mismanaged and incompetent previous HLM, 
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enabled the introduction of more effective systems for monitoring of rents, arrears, 
voids, and repairs. In one other case (Brent) there was a continuing failure to 
establish basic information about the occupancy of the estate, and to provide basic 
services, which made the job of the estate staff extremely difficult. It was clear 
that the effective operation of basic administrative and physical services was 
essential before the intended changes in staff attitudes and performance could take 
effect. In addition, sometimes the attempts to provide a better service were 
frustrated by poor delivery of basic services, such as estate and street cleaning, 
housing benefit, and repairs. 
There were sometimes conflicts between the housing staff and other participants in 
the wider programme over the relative importance of various of the key financial 
indicators. DSQ project managers or staff often accused the HLMs of being too 
obsessed with the achievement of financial targets for voids and arrears, suggesting 
that policy decisions about improvements were often too influenced by financial 
considerations. This was so in Stains, where changes in the improvement package 
followed the HLMrevising its willingness to invest so heavily in the estate; and in 
Chanteloup and Bethune where the need to keep expenditure down had severely 
reduced the available budget to maintain the improvements, to the concern of the 
DSQ team. There was little doubt that many of the improvements in staffing and 
training in France had also aimed, as in the UK, to ensure better income generation 
on the estate. 
The emphasis on the new caretaking training and role was welcomed in most estates 
in France, and on most of the estates discussion with the caretakers provided a 
wealth of information about the estate, its residents, and the HLM, indicating their 
involvement in the job and estate. It appeared that the new "social" role, including 
intervening in neighbour disputes or handling some low level arrears cases, was being 
managed on the basis of the intimate day to day knowledge of the blocks which the 
caretakers had built up from being resident and always present inspecting the blocks. 
These changes appeared in most cases to have produced a high level of commitment 
from the caretakers involved, and a reasonable level of service to tenants. This was 
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the case in only 2 of the UK estates; on two of the other estates the role of 
caretakers was being reduced; and on the final two it was left as a minor aspect of 
management. 
The use in the UK of concierge staff, and their relation to caretakers, was the one 
of the least successful aspect of management changes. In none of the four estates 
which had concierge schemes was the system being run successfully, although 
Islington had many fewer problems than the others. Apart from a variety of 
technical problems, the management arrangements appeared generally 
unsatisfactory, with changes in staff frequent, disputes between caretaking and 
concierge staff frequent, and a belief in the worth of the systems noticeably absent 
from almost all agents involved, except sometimes in Islington. This is not to say 
that the other systems could not be made to work. It was clearly the case, however, 
that the improvement brought to the estates were very limited at the time of my 
visits. 
Brent (where there had been several attempts to provide different types of security 
system, all of which had failed on the estate) illustrates best a further underlying 
problem. The systems relied on the cooperation of the vast majority of the tenants 
in the block before it would work. Where there was a minority, even a small 
minority, who did not wish the scheme to work, then it could not be made to work. 
Only Wandsworth had a system of entryphones which seemed sufficiently robust to 
have withstood any period of use. The French estates with entryphones seemed to 
have fewer problems with them. Some of them were out of use, but generally they 
seemed to be less vandalised than in the UK. 
Participation 
Tenant consultation was realised most fully in Stains, where the local architectural 
practice devised many different approaches including events for children - who 
would report back to their parents - building of models and exhibitions, and stair by 
stair evaluations of improvements already made in other blocks. Despite this, the 
continuing participation of residents in local groups was low. Chanteloup and Meaux 
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also achieved reasonable participation, and have continued this into various 
associations and groups. Elsewhere in France the participation of residents was not 
fully achieved as intended. 
Manchester achieved the most participation in the UK, where each tenant was sent 
a set of plans, and both block and individual discussions were held. Here again, 
however, as in Stains, the level of continuing participation was very low. 
Wandsworth, Wigan, and Salford appear to have achieved reasonable levels of 
participation in local groups, while Islington and Brent remain with less than 
intended. 
The general picture, then, is of limited participation in about half of the estates, 
despite the national intention to make this central to the programmes. Participation 
and citizenship is explored in Delarue (1991) who notes that the weak presence of 
residents associations in France can perhaps be explained by the fact that the 
previous community leaders were the often the more organised and unionised 
working class tenants, sometimes militant organisers; but these households have now 
fled the estates. The associations have therefore become less and less able to 
present the case for the residents, and have increasingly become groups to provide 
support and aid to specific disadvantaged groups. This failure of associations extends 
to a general failure to participate in the local political life, and press the case for 
the estate residents at that level. This is a problem as in many cities the local 
political structures have not responded adequately to the needs of these estates. 
Wider Programme 
ted As expected, the coordinated achievements which could be identif here are 
mainly in France. In Calais the achievements of the wider social programme are the 
main positive aspects of the programme, in contrast to a much more limited housing 
changes. In several cases there were very strong links between the Town Hall, DSQ 
team, and HLM (particularly Stains, Grande Synthe, Meaux, and Wthune). The 
benefits of these partnerships were frequently mentioned by agents as positive and 
novel aspects of the DSQ programme and process. Much was achieved on these 
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estates - extensive economic stimulation aimed at jobs on the estate in Chanteloup 
and Meaux, a very comprehensive training, employment, and cultural programme in 
Grande Synthe, extensive assistance to immigrant tenants in Meaux. There were 
major proposals and plans in Stains, although they have yet to be achieved. Indeed 
the physical improvement works in Stains and B6thune were recognised at the end 
of the first DSQprogramme period to have been achieved at the cost of not paying 
sufficient attention to the more social aspects of the overall programme. 
In the UK, by contrast, there were generally indifferent achievements of the 
interdepartmental working plans. Most was achieved in Wandsworth and Salford, 
although in both cases there remained tensions. Islington has a formal programme 
of integrated neighbourhood services, which coordinated action relating to the 
estate. Brent and Manchester had limited success in introducing new practices. It 
is, however, much harder to make a reasonably based judgement in relation to this 
issue, as it would have required reviewing the programmes of other council 
departments, and looking at the comparative achievements in their fields, which was 
not done. 
PODulation StrategLes 
Contrary to the national and local intentions, only two estates had achieved a 
significant change in the population which lived there at the end of the programme. 
Wandsworth had introduced two key changes already mentioned: first that only 
people who actively wished to move onto the estate could join the waiting list - 
including and particularly friends and relatives of existing residents; and second that 
this would be supplemented by extensive sales of flats on the estate, providing (it 
was believed) a wider pool of people who would be committed to improving the 
estate. Wigan had adopted a programme of redevelopment by housing associations 
and private sector builders which had lead to a large influx of owners and housing 
association tenants - although there were some problems with the new owner 
occupiers building a "Berlin Wall" round their part of the estate. 
In contrast, most of the French programmes to socially engineer a change in 
population of the estates appeared to have failed. The attempts to attract other 
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tenants of a more "desirable" character were generally unsuccessful, as only the 
poorest remained willing to take the flats. This is a very significant failure, as it 
reflects the views of Figeat at the end of the HVSprogramme, as well as the views 
of Delarue (set out in Chapter 3): - there is no evidence that a mix of tenants can 
be in fact attracted to live on these estates as they are at present. This is reflected 
in the UNFOHLMreport on population strategies (UNFOHLM(1992)), which also 
concludes that the focus should be to improving services for existing residents, not 
simply seeking to "dilute" their presence with new, more stable, households, who will 
not come. 
The Wandsworth/Wigan approach is beginning to be implemented on some of the 
other estates. In Meaux there was still the hope that "better" tenants could be 
attracted to the estate, with the demolition of one long block and construction of 
new HLMfamily homes being seen as a new opportunity. Equally in 13,6thune there 
is a continuing hope that the continuing popularity of the better part of the estate 
may move over to the neglected section following the extension of some new 
building. Similar hopes were behind the proposals for large scale redevelopment in 
Brent through a HAT, to import middle income households, although this has not 
been agreed for implementation. 
Expenditure 
The table over indicates summary information on the levels of capital expenditure. 
The "cost per home" figures here and in the case studies refer to the cost per 
remaining total number of original social rented homes on the estate at the 
programme end. 
The France/UK comparison is not straightforward. There is a general problem of 
what to count as part of the DSQ/EA programme, and what to count as part of the 
regular capital investment in the estate. Salford, Wandsworth, and Manchester, for 
example, are cases where all related capital expenditure on the estate, which was 
part of the programme, has been included, as the choice to make that investment 
was presented to me as being part total integrated improvement programme. Time 
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is another problem - Wandsworth, Manchester, and Stains had sustained programmes 
lasting over 7 years, which increased their totals. There are also the wider problems 
of comparability of exchange rate values and building costs. In the figures below, all 
costs are in fUK. 
The overall comparisons are: 
It is worth repeating here the national table set out in 
Chapter 5 for all Estate Action/DSQ expenditure: 
11 1 
France (f) I UK (f) 11 
11 
All investment/unit 1 5ý273 1 (3,452)1 1 
Central investment/unit I ý340 
1 ýL26 
I ýj 
Table 6.15: Comparison of Unit Cost Expenditure, UK/France 
Sources: EA figures; 148 Quartiers (DIV 1990) 
Note L: This figure is an crude estimate, assuming simply 50% on top of EA funds. 
These tables show that the average expenditures nationally are very similar to the 
case study averages, suggesting the case studies are not unrepresentative. 
The figures suggest a similar level of government investment through the 
programmes; and a high level of additional investment from other sources. The total 
investment in certain of the UK estates is considerably higher than my original 
estimate, reflecting investment of additional HIP and proceeds of sales. This shows 
that my crude estimate of 50% on top of EA funding is too low, and that the average 
total investment form all sources is probably nearer to the French figure. 
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The Wandsworth investment of sales receipts, and the Salford and Manchester long 
term HIP programmes, are similarly to the large scale city investment in B6thune 
and Grande Synthe. The considerable variations between these high spending schemes 
and the others can be seen by comparing first these 2 highest spending French 












This illustrates that the levels of DSQ investment are not greatly dissimilar between 
the highest and the lower cost schemes, but that there is a greater variation in EA 
spend. This in fact is reflected in the national figures (not quoted here), which show 
major variations between some very high spending schemes and other small scale low 
spend estates. The different levels of top up funding leads to a further difference, 
almost double the total investment in the higher spend French schemes, and four 
times more in the UK. I would not claim that this pattern would be repeated 
nationally in exactly these proportions; but the figures clearly indicate that there 
is a wider range of additional funding contributed by other agencies in the course of 





rz. r-4 m 
ro (13 41 r_: -P (o U) Q) f-I 134 r-ý 04 
r-ý 4J ul z N ý4 
Q) En M 
rg r. 4. ) Q) 
4-) 0 (0 (A >1 
(n r-i Q) ý4 0) 4-4 r-ý 
> M 
4-) 0 z C) ro (D 
r. 4-) --1 r. r-4 ý4 :j ro 0 4-4 a) 
ý4 4 r. 0 > 
U) u a) 0 
ro > ul M 9L4 
. r-4 r-4 0) ro m ro ý H 0 IQ) Q) C14 
> 
0 4J 4-) 0 0 
0 r-, In ý4 ý4 
co ý4 0) tp 04 0 44 
0 0 Fi r. ý4 
r-l ý4 4-) 0 P, 4-4 0) 
ý4 0) U) ; 
-=. 
0 
1: 4 0 a) (0 ý4 Lo 
. r-l ý4 44 ro ro 0) U) 04 rl rc$ 
a) 4-) a) 
ro 0 4-4 4-4 
Q) r. Lo H -H 
r-ý -ri 4-) > 4-) tp 0) 
0 r, 4-4 M 9 H0 r. r. 
ý4 0 a) :j a) ro Q r-I r. 4 
(4-4 ý4 0 . -1 r. r. 
4 En ý4 H H 
fý rý 4-) ý4 4-) 4-) ro fa 
U) z 04 ri) z r=; 
0 0 (D 00 a) 








0 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 0o F. 




r-I N m t LO Ln 























































>4 4-) 0) 
0 0 ý4 4-) 
r 4-) 
0 
a) 0) ý4 
4-) :j 4-) r. 0 z 
z z gý U 4-4 (0 
m 0 (0 -, 4-) (o 0) r-I 1: ý C r-4 t)-i -ý 
-P ý(L) 








































The main general conclusions above could not generally be anticipated from 
expectations based on the national programme set out in previous chapters, and are 
that: 
- physical works programmes were generally achieved as planned, and 
represented general successes. Spend had been closely monitored by the 
funding bodies. Many improvements on estates were to entrances and 
stairwells. 
- the prevalence of demolition and change of use as a solution was more than 
might have been expected. The dramatic loss of stock, and the root and 
branch solutions like decapitation, provided a radical approach which served 
to remove the underlying problem of unpopular stock. 
- the most prominent changes to the remaining stock were those involving 
fundamental transformation of the appearance of the estate, such as in 
Chanteloup or Stains, or those involving extensive remodelling, such as Wigan 
or the decapitation works. 
- many of the physical improvements, particularly to common parts such as 
stairwells, are already subject to vandalism and disrepair 
- there was a clear concentration by landlord organisations on income 
generation and key financial indicators such as voids and arrears. These 
benefits were a major motivation for cooperation with the programme. 
- there was an emphasis on crime and crime prevention measures on the UK 
estates which was not present in the original statement of the EA 
programme, although it appeared in later guidelines. This was reflected not 
only in Islington, but also in the concierge and entryphone schemes. These 
improvements were not common in France, which had anti delinquency 
programmes instead. The UK measures seemed to be marked by unresolved 
problems in management of the concierge schemes; and general lack of 
success including deliberate damage by residents. Much of the money seemed 
to have been wasted, as the schemes depended critically on a level of 
commitment to the schemes by the residents which was not forthcoming. It 
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may well be that on other estates these types of scheme work well - but not 
on these ones. 
- many estates still have problems with open spaces around estates; although 
the land near blocks in many UK estates has been made into private or 
restricted access space. This was not identified as a priority in the original 
programmes, but emerged as a continuing issue. 
- the general programme commitment to decentralised management and local 
control indicated that this was an accepted strategy, rather than an 
innovative approach. All estates except one now have a local management 
office. The continuing to promotion of the decentralised model did not 
present landlord organisations with a new approach, but one they would have 
most likely adopted in any case. 
- there is commonly a more socially oriented role promoted for caretakers 
in France; and this is seen as central to the new management approach. 
However the continuing level of antagonism and prejudice against tenants on 
the part of French estate staff was surprising. There were more specific 
programmes of training for these staff than in the UK, and this seemed to 
reflect a need. 
- the French estates all exhibited the programmes for provoking changes in 
the population structure which the DSQ method had suggested; and none of 
them had worked. These programmes were absent in the UK, except in 
Wandsworth and Wigan, which had initiated considerable tenure changes. This 
approach appeared to emerge as the only successful method of producing 
tenure mix. 
- the difficulties encouraging tenant participation were greater than would 
be suggested by the emphasis on this in the original programme structure. 
There was some evidence that concerted efforts would bring about some 
participation in discussions about improvements - though only where this was 
done by imaginative and flexible initiatives. The general participation levels 
in tenants associations following completion of works appeared to be either 
limited or declining, however. 
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- there is a high level of additional investment on certain estates, 
supplementing the main programme contributions; this results in some estates 
having considerably higher overall expenditureý sometimes due to longer term 
investment programmes. 
As a further summary measure, table 6.22 provides a summary of the main 
indicators at the end of the programmes. It is constructed on the basis of indicating 
whether there has been an improvement, or a deterioration, in the indicators. Again 
I have not tried to put a quantitative value on the change - rather to provide a 
general indication. This is based both on available figures and on my analysis of 
agent's views. Judgements on the indicators of image, crime, management, and 
participation are based on information from, and views of, key agents, and in some 
cases certain published reports. Some brief comments on each of the columns are 
below. Detailed figures to support the estimation of trends is to be found in the case 
studies themselves. 
Voids: generally this was a success area, with either improvements or significant 
improvements in 7 out of the 8 estates where this was a problem. 
Arrears: was also generally an area of success, with only 2 estates showing declines. 
Tumover: is a measure which partly represents the popularity of estates, partly the 
opportunities for mobility, and partly the development of a more stable community. 
Generally there were reductions in the rate of turnover, which many agents 
indicated had indeed lead to more stable communities. 
Image: in some cases appeared to be better - in the two UK cases the greatest 
changes in image were associated with the massive restructuring of tenure 
(Wandsworth) or of buildings (Wigan) on the estate; and in the French estates with 
extensive physical restructuring and the introduction of various changes of use. 
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Crime: The crime problems perceived to exist on estates were seldom much 
improved. Wandsworth and Wigan benefited from a change of image which extended 
to a reduced crime rate; equally Islington had concentrated entirely on this issues, 
and its improvement here is not surprising. Meaux did not start with much of a 
crime problem. Elsewhere the changes are not very positive, and the increasing 
crime on some of the estates is compounding the difficulties in making lasting 
improvements. 
Tenure: The changes here are mainly a reflection of the right to buy policy in the 
UK, although Grande Synthe encouraged some improvement for sale. 
Stock size: This column sets out the other most marked similarity of approach. The 
sizable reductions in stock - 25% and over in half of the estates - represents a 
concerted effort to reduce the density of population and the concentration of 
unpopular flats. 
Management: This columns presents a summary of whether effective changes to the 
general housing management arrangements have been made. The changes have been 
discussed already above. 
Participation: This represents an indication of whether there has been more or been 
less active participation in tenants associations or other community associations. It 
will be seen that, as discussed above, there are few estates where improvements 
have occurred. 
Overall: This is the least precise and well founded collum, representing an overall 
judgement and assessment on my part. It is intended to indicate whether most of the 
major aims of the programme have been achieved, and the general overall 
assessment of agents, although I have not resorted to any weighted formula to arrive 
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Concluding Discussion 
The case study estates illustrate how the Estate Action and DSQ programmes 
operated in practice; and the similarities and differences between countries. 
Some objectives were shared between countries, and generally achieved 
- focusing on estates with high levels of disadvantaged tenants 
- focusing on estates with physical problems. 
- planning and executing large programmes of physical works 
- providing a local management office 
- reducing voids 
- reducing arrears 
- reducing turnover 
Others were both shared and generally not achieved: 
- changing the population to produce social mix 
- continuing participation 
- environmental improvements in external peripheral areas 
- maintaining the improvements intact 
- reducing crime 
Certain shared objectives emerged as important and successful, which would not 
have been expected from the description of the national programmes. These 
included: 
- the unexpectedly high level of stock reductions 
- the large scale estate remodelling works 
- the attention to staircase and corridor improvements 
- certain small scale environmental works close to blocks 
There was also a striking similarity in the average expenditure patterns, and levels 
of additional contribution evident in some cases. 
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Certain measures were particular to one country, and in keeping with the different 
national objectives. In France the emphasis on partnership and comprehensive 
programmes was certainly evident and generally successful. The development of the 
caretaking role, fostering of associations for specific groups, and the introduction 
of offices and businesses to estates were also prominent and generally successful - 
despite the continuing hostile attitudes of some staff. 
Similarly in the UK the additional emphasis on crime prevention was evident, as 
were the unresolved problems with concierge schemes. The absence of successful 
joint working reflected the low Priority accorded this in the programme. 
Overall, the underlying similarity of actions and approaches at the estate level was 
striking. Despite differing national programmes and contexts, the actions taken and 
priorities of agents were more often similar and parallel than they were contrasting. 
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CbapLer Seven: Synthesis and Concludine Discussion 
This chapter draws together the material set out so far, in order to consider 
possible explanations for the various outcomes of the EA and DSQ programmes on 
difficult estates which have been set out in the preceding chapters; and to set out 
the overall conclusions of this thesis. 
Origins of problem 
There are considerable differences between the organisations which provide social 
housing in the UK and France: the HLMs make provision for a much wider section 
of the housing market; and are not subject to the same legal obligations to provide 
for slum dwellers or homeless people. They are also differently structured and 
financed, lacking rent pooling, direct cash subsidies, universal means tested housing 
benefits, and direct political control. My concern has not been with the general 
structure of provision, however, but rather with the phenomenon of the difficult 
estate; and in fact these general differences provide an essential context within 
which is located a more similar set of problems than the differences of context 
might suggest. 
The post war difficult estate is not really a product of the long and different 
traditions of social housing in France and the UK. Rather it is a product of the 
shared post war imperative to build quickly, cheaply, and in high numbers. 
Nonetheless the problems of difficult estates are not deterministicaly linked to 
estates of these types. In the UK there are inter war difficult estates, which share 
the general problem characteristics of the case study; equally there are many post 
war industrial construction estates which do not share the same difficulties. It is 
rather that there needs to be a combination of factors which come together to 
generate the problems of unpopularity, residualisation, and progressive decline which 
is seen in the case studies. These factors are similar in both countries. 
The first of these factors is the physical state of the estate itself, as has been 
identified by many commentators. These include estate layout, with corridors and 
walkways; disrepair and repair problems which are difficult to remedy; problems 
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with services such as rubbish collection; heating services which are expensive and 
inadequate - frequently aggravated by poor heating (and sound) insulation. 
Sometimes there are problems with concentrations of flat types in individual blocks; 
often there are problems with the entrance halls or basement areas; usually there 
are problems with land in and around the blocks. These problems are normally 
expensive to remedy. 
The second factor is the management of the estate. The post war building boom was 
not accompanied by an awareness of the need to manage the repair, maintenance, 
and social problems which were being created on the estates. This is not very 
surprising. In the UK the previous experience of slum clearance had not lead, in most 
cases, to major problems of housing management on new estates; equally in France 
there was little experience of management of mass housing of the scale being 
generated, and little anticipation of the problems. The new construction methods 
were generally untried, and the design and disrepair issues thrown up were not 
anticipated. This meant that the type of intensive management which was promoted 
in the DSQ/EA programmes was lacking, and problems were allowed to build up due 
to an initial lack of sensitivity to their presence. More than this, however, the case 
studies have shown that in many cases there was little effort made to take stock of 
the problems which arose, or to divert the necessary resources to tackle the 
problems. Rather it appeared that many HLMs, particularly, were content to leave 
the problems unattended. 
This insensitivity was reflected in the third factor, the failure to carry out the 
necessary infrastructural. works to accompany the construction of the homes 
themselves. This is particularly so in France, as the UK case study estates are 
mainly inner city; although the experience of the Glasgow overspill estates indicates 
that the problem was not confined to France. The isolation of estates from the 
mainstream of city opportunities for mobility, leisure activities, and indeed of travel 
to work or to shops, compounded the problems of estate unpopularity. 
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Equally important was a parallel policy initiative, the encouragement of low cost 
home ownership as the natural and desired tenure. In France this would often be 
done by some of the same personnel on HLM committees or staff, who were 
simultaneously promoting home ownership societies. In some cases they also moved 
certain of their more stable and better off households onto these new developments. 
In the UK there was the further impetus, in the 80s, of the right to buy, and 
although the problems of the difficult estates predate this policy, they were not 
made any easier by the reduction in choice of good council housing. 
This positive pull of better off households to owner occupation was paralleled by a 
tendency, undoubtedly deliberate in some cases, to "dump" certain types of 
households on the difficult estates. Sometimes this was explicit, as in Chanteloup; 
sometimes an inevitable consequence of other policies, as with homeless households 
in the UK, or due to the housing benefit [APL] problem in France; sometimes it 
reflected indirect racial discrimination as has been shown in certain UK estates. The 
consequence was the same, to build up high densities of households with certain 
specific needs or difficulties, but then fail to take action to resolve the difficulties 
or meet the needs. 
The final issue in many cases was the need to fill the empty properties with anyone 
who would pay rent. This is particularly so where there was a net surplus of housing 
in the area, such as in the provincial case study areas. It included the APL families 
in France, but also the same type of mobile young tenants as were frequently 
allocated homes in the UK. 
Together, then, these factors lead to an estate which was unpopular with tenants, 
and was therefore difficult to let to anyone who had the choice of better 
accommodation in another estate or tenure. The need to provide rental income lead 
to the letting to high concentrations of households who had little other choice, but 
who did not like living there any more than the households who had managed to 
avoid it. This lack of choice was usually economically based, with the majority of 
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tenants unemployed or in low paid unskilled jobs. It was also based on racial and 
cultural prejudice against recent immigrants. 
The presence of pockets of poor housing where there are high concentrations of low, 
skilled households, and immigrants, is not new. The inner city areas of many older 
town have always played this role, and the outer rings of third world cities continue 
to play this role in an explosive way. Neither is it a new phenomenon for landlord 
organisations to try to concentrate their problems in one place by "dumping" 
problems there. Why, then, was it considered necessary to take action to improve 
these estates? Why did the problems achieve the prominence they did? 
The Need to Respond 
The governmental response to pockets of housing deprivation in the UK has been 
through the inner cities programme, which is not restricted to council estates, and 
of which EA is a part. Equally the DSQ programme aims to treat problems as a 
whole in a defined neighbourhood, which mainly, but not exclusively, comprises HLM 
accommodation. This suggests, rightly, that the underlying impetus which Prompts 
the housing organisations to seek additional support lies beyond the housing 
management issues of arrears, voids, and disrepair. 
This impetus reflected the underlying problems on estates. Whereas previously poor 
inner city areas could be treated by clearance, and in any case could be expected 
to provide a level of mobility for their residents to move out to regular employment 
and housing after a period, this was not so with the new estates. They were not 
candidates for slum clearance; but the level of investment by their landlords could 
make was insufficient to make them generally acceptable to a range of tenants. 
More importantly the tenants on the estates were increasingly "excluded": the 
changing labour market meant that they very often did not have the type of skills 
necessary to take up job opportunities which presented themselves even in periods 
of economic growth; the changing housing market, with its reduced emphasis on 
providing social housing (particularly in the UK with right to buy) meant that there 
was more limited mobility opportunities unless they had a job which would enable 
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them to move to owner occupation; and the increasing heterogeneity of the 
population, and its increasing level of social problems, meant that the opportunities 
for a supportive community declined, further undermined by the mobility of those 
employed militant blue collar workers who previously provided community 
leadership, since they had now also moved to owner occupation. In France this was 
complemented by a cultural and generational gap between immigrant households and 
their adolescent boys, in a stark manner not similarly seen in the UK. In both 
countries the drugs problem was also an increasing factor during the 80s. The 
cumulative effect was to produce estates where the main impression was of people 
being trapped, economically and in housing terms, as well as being politically, 
educationally, and socially disenfranchised. The problem was also progressively 
worsening from the early 80s. 
Even this might not have been sufficient to divert resources from national and local 
budgets had it not been for the problems of crime and social unrest which drew 
attention to the estates. This was seen in the civil disturbances of the early 80s, and 
again in recent years, particularly in France where the urban problem has become 
one of the most pressing political issues. Equally in the UK there was the added 
dimension of reports suggesting that racial discrimination underlay certain of the 
allocations practices. The threat that the crime and disturbances on the difficult 
estates might spill over into other areas provoked action in the way the threat of 
cholera had stimulated a previous generation. The scale of the problems, and its 
depth and complexity, began to be understood'. 
The Programmes 
The longer history of the UK programmes has lead to a much wider variety of 
programmes and objectives compared to the multi-agency DSQ/DIV programmes. 
This is reflected also in the fact that a large part of the DSQ activity involves the 
1. Note in the UK during the 80s there was always a parallel 
high level governmental public presentation that the problems 
were not social and economic, but rather aspects of individual 
moral weakness, an attitude not presented in France. 
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coordination and unblocking of other programmes and funds; this role would naturallv 
be played by the Local Authority itself in the UK, but frequently is not. 
The programmes set out to tackle the key housing issues which have been set out 
above: estate condition were improved by substantial investment in physical 
rehabilitation, particularly in the common parts; new devolved management 
arrangements with better trained staff were introduced; better infrastructural 
provision and services were provided; attempts were made to tackle residualisation 
of the population by encouraging tenure mix or social engineering of allocations, as 
well as attempts to involve residents in the improvement works by participation 
exercises; and voids were tackled by a variety of imaginative solutions. These 
initiatives were increasingly linked to the underlying problems of crime and 
economic marginalisation: by security works in the UK, anti delinquency and youth 
work in France; and training and job linking initiatives in both countries. The 
underlying aims were to change the image of the estate (crucial if other residents 
were to be attracted to live there); animate the tenants (crucial if 
exclusion/ marginali sation was to be overcome); and effectively channel resources 
and support to the estate, combatting the contrary pull of resources away from the 
"sink" areas (where they would be "wasted"), and combatting the natural 
bureaucratic departmentalism that worked against a coordinated approach. But 
which of these initiatives worked, and why? 
The Positive Outcomes 
The physical works produced marked improvements in many cases. These 
improvements were very vulnerable to deterioration, however, particularly those 
made to entrances, stairwells, and corridors. The high levels of crime and vandalism 
meant that there needed to be a constant investment in high levels of maintenance 
if the standard of works achieved immediately post improvements were to be 
maintained - and this was frequently not budgeted for, or done. Equally although the 
physical image of the estate could be transformed, and often was, it proved much 
harder to change the social image unless more radical steps of estate and tenure 
restructuring were also undertaken, as is seen below. 
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Management changes were almost without exception successful. This is not 
surprising: the levels of management and commitment to quality management were 
almost totally lacking in most case studies, and so any kind of attention to 
management would be an improvement. The general recognition of the need for 
sensitive management of social housing was also a general phenomenon affecting 
most housing management, not just the difficult estates. Moreover the improvements 
made reflected the widespread move in the public services to both decentralisation 
and to a much greater level of consumer orientation. That these improvements were 
made owes as much to the change of general approach to public services and 
management as it does to the EA/DSQ processes. They brought considerable 
benefits, not least in making the estate more popular in that the level of services 
was improved. This particularly applied to improvements in the caretaking service 
made in France, where problems could be identified and resolved at the level of the 
block; and to improvements in the social services offered to tenants in dealing with 
their benefits and arrears problems. However the underlying problems of exclusion 
and residualisation could not be fundamentally changed by this new management 
approach. 
Infrastructural improvements were particularly important in France, where the 
problems had been most acute. These, like the physical improvements, have in many 
cases been achieved, and brought benefits in the form of new libraries, play areas, 
leisure facilities, social centres, health centres and so on. These have again gone a 
long way to reducing the difficulties in making the estate attractive to outsiders - 
although in themselves they are not sufficient either. Although provided, they have 
also had difficulties in operating successfully, due to a combination of vandalism, 
apathy, and sometimes underresourcing. 
These three aspects have been partial successes. They have, in both countries, 
tackled the starkest failings of management neglect. The solutions brought have not, 
however, been able to tackle the underlying problem of residualisation which has 
itself served to threaten the permanence of the solutions brought. This more 
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difficult area is therefore central to understanding the successes and failings of the 
programmes. 
Tle Heart of the Problem 
Central to the programmes were attempts to reduce the exclusion of the residents 
on estates, and the parallel attempts to make the estate more popular to a more 
mixed group of residents - and thereby reduce both voids and the density of problem 
households. There were clear links between the various activities of improvement 
of the image of the estate, reducing crime and vandalism, promoting various 
schemes to combat voids, the manipulation of allocations, the programmes of 
support for tenants and stimulation of their participation in the life of the estate. 
These initiatives were all directed at returning the estates to a less residualised 
place in the housing market, by making it acceptable to people who had a choice, 
and who would positively choose to live there. 
Several variations can be identified. The least successful were the simple attempts 
to restrict access to disadvantaged households, as practised in France. There was no 
evidence that this approach succeeded at all: unless the estate was made attractive 
in itself, this policy would not succeed - and if the estate was attractive, there was 
no need for this policy. The reason for this, I would suggest, is that unless there is 
a fundamental change in the attractiveness of the estates, then there is always 
sufficient flexibility and other opportunity in the housing market for more stable and 
better off households to have another option, which they will take up. Restriction 
of access simply produced voids, which had eventually to be filled by whoever would 
accept an offer. 
Equally unsuccessful were attempts to control the crime on estates by various 
controlled entry schemes. The various measures to improve estate layout by creating 
individual gardens, or additional landscaping and provision of well lit paths were 
generally successful. The concierge and entryphones schemes were not, partly due 
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to inadequacies in the management arrangements, but mainly due to a disinclination 
on the part of some tenants to cooperate, sufficient to make the scheme inoperable. 
As has clearly come out in the case studies, the estates are not being besieged by 
problems from outside their blocks and stairwells; they are besieged by problems 
from within. The second problem is prohibitive capital and revenue cost. Even if 
adequate management arrangements were in place, the prohibitive cost of revenue 
funding of the staff needed, plus the capital cost of installing and maintaining 
sufficient surveillance equipment, would restrict this solution to a very few blocks-, 
and in the context of increasing pressure on the budgets of housing organisations, 
and the failure to demonstrate clear benefits, would suggest that this was a highly 
questionable investment compared to alternative programmes of basic maintenance 
and repair. There is nothing in my research which would tend to counter that view. 
Participation in various residents associations and in the life of the estate was also 
generally disappointing. Some of the initiatives seemed to be more successful, 
particularly the regie de quartiers in France, which had direct paybacks for tenants 
in the form of skills and low cost improvements to their own properties. Certain 
participation exercised linked to the physical works seemed also to have been 
successful, generally directly linked to the amount of effort put in. These episodes 
of participation were seldom long lasting, however. The reasons for this have been 
discussed already: the reducing presence of community organisers; the increasing 
levels of isolation and exclusion, which cannot be simply reversed by calling tenants 
association meetings. The DSQ attempts to stimulate aid and assistance groups for 
specific needs on the estate were much more successful in providing focal points for 
community life, as they started from the assumption that the tenants needed basic 
assistance before they could identify their needs and capabilities, prior to organising 
themselves to make their voice heard, rather than thinking that they could voice 
their needs in an organised fashion at the start. 
The successful tenant diversity initiatives were those which undertook a fundamental 
restructuring of buildings and tenures on the estates. The only estates where a 
changed social mix was achieved, and the image changed, were those (like Wigan, 
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Wandsworth, Manchester, Grande Synthe or Meaux) where there was substantial 
demolition, newbuild, or tenure change. Wandsworth was able to attract neA- 
leaseholders due partly to the very high level of investment in the estate; Wigan 
attracted owners and housing association tenants by substantial demolition and new 
build; those parts of Manchester which were most successful (as was also the case 
with Salford) were the parts which were subject to decapitation. 
The parallel process of demolition was surprisingly common, and seemingly 
effective, and must be considered in parallel. The alternatives, keeping blocks void 
or filling them with anyone who was willing, sometimes by open advertising or flat 
sharing, each brought their ownproblems. Demolition removed the surplus stock, as 
well as reducing densities of difficult housing. 
This suggests, then, that the most effective way to reverse residualisation is to 
reduce the density of problem dwellings by substantial demolition, and introduce a 
higher quality product in the form of desirable rented or low cost ownership housing 
which will be sufficiently attractive to other stable, employed households to begin 
to recreate a mixed community. None of the other remedies appear to be sufficient 
without this, (although this is not to deny that each is valuable and essential). 
The question may be asked of where the tenants go who would otherwise have been 
housed in the demolished units. Part of the answer it that there is in fact no need 
for these units. They represent a surplus housing stock for which there is no need, 
in their current form. This is particularly true in the provincial towns, although in 
London and Paris it may be held that there are high levels of homelessness, and 
therefore this suggestion cannot be true. The answer is that although the flats 
represent housing units, they are generally unsuitable for homeless families or other 
homeless people; and that the problem of homelessness (which cannot be dealt with 
here) would not be resolved by simply putting all the homeless households in void 
tower blocks - this would be the type of "dumping" which has been shown to be at 
the root of some of the problems of the difficult estates. 
The homeless problem illustrates a very relevant point, however, and one which is 
currently being put to the test with the new French housing legislation, described 
in Chapter 5. If there is to be a reduction in the proportions of excluded households 
on difficult estates, there will need to be a corresponding increase in their dispersal 
to other estates and to different Parts of the housing market. Again I have shown 
that the growth of the low cost owner occupied sector which excluded these 
households was a contributory factor to the residualisation of the estates. To combat 
this would require that new (and existing) housing developments would need to be 
designed and allocated so that there was a fair dispersal of the excluded households 
throughout the community. It is exactly this which is proposed at present in France. 
It may also be objected that this solution does nothing to combat the exclusion, 
economic disadvantage, and cultural isolation of these households. Indeed it may be 
held that by dispersing them their problems will be compounded by removing them 
from the solidarity of their peers, and the concentrated assistance of the support 
services. I will not comment on this argument, except to note that the situation of 
household concentration it appears to propose in opposition seems to be exactly the 
problem which is being combatted by the EA and DSQ programmes. That is not, 
however, meant to represent a considered response to the argument. 
Relation to Programmes 
The main objectives of the EA/DSQ programmes were, in outline, to stimulate 
physical and social improvements on estates, with the close involvement of 
residents. The conclusion of this thesis suggests that a more radical approach is 
necessary - an approach which effectively destroys the present character of the 
estates as single tenure areas, and at the same time disperses the excluded 
households to other parts of the housing market, which must therefore be opened up 
to them. Again this does not mean that the approach adopted by the EA/DSQ is 
entirely ineffective; on the contrary there are many considerable benefits from the 
approach to management and improvements which have been introduced under these 
programmes. It is argued, however, that the solution is not sufficient in itself to deal 
with the worst estates, which must be physically broken up, and the problems 
dispersed. 
Comparative issues 
It only remains to consider briefly the benefits which have been shown by use of the 
France/UK comparisons. The principal advantage is in permitting a much wider 
range of estates and contexts to be examined, which has revealed underlying 
similarities. The fact that there has been a similar approach to voids and demolition, 
to rehabilitation of the common parts, to decentralised estate management, and to 
schemes for the institutional letting of voids, to take only some examples, has shown 
that not only are the problems similar, but also the solutions are on a similar range. 
The examination of the various different outcomes has made it possible to be more 
positive about the likely consequences of these policy initiatives. The fact that 
resident participation is very difficult in both countries, with a range of different 
strategies to stimulate it, is very useful. Equally however the differences have been 
useful in suggesting likely outcomes of policy options which have not been considered 
in the UK. The use of caretakers, while being based in a different tradition in 
France, is one; the development of regie de quariters another; and most importantly 
the failure of social engineering of allocations provides an important illustration of 
a policy which should not be followed. These are only examples; but they illustrate 
the benefits of the approach. 
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Case Studies Annex 
ne FuR Case Studies 
Zac de la Noe, Chanteloup les Vignes 
La Pierre Collinet, Meaux 
Mont Li6baut, Bethune 
Doddington Estate, Wandsworth 
Miles Platting, Manchester 
Precinct Estate, Salford 
Contracted Case Studies 
Le Clos Saint-Lazare, Stains 
Fort Nieulay, Calais 
Nouvelles Synthe, Grande Synthe 
Stonebridge Estate, Brent 
St Lukes, Islington 
Worsley Mesnes, Wigan 
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Zae de la Noü: Chanteloup les Vign 
Background and History 
Chanteloup les Vignes is in the Departement of Yvelines, in the outer ring of the 
Paris suburbs, and about 30 km west of Central Paris - which is 20 minutes by train 
from the station at the 
edge of the estate. It is 
on land surrounded by 
the large ox bow of the 
Seine known as the 
"Boucle de Chanteloup". 
The commune is a mix 
of agricultural and 
housing land, with a 
small industrial sector. 
The rural aspect of the 
village continues today: 
20% of the land is still 
commerciaIIy 
cultivated; a further 
20% is natural parkland. The village is of traditional construction, built on a North 
South axis around the 15th Century church and 1893 town hall in the central square. 
In 1968 the population of the village of Chanteloup was 2,082. Its population had 
doubled between 1945 and 1968, due to the construction of new individual homes. In 
1969 it was identified as one of the projects of the (then) Ile de France 
Departmental HLMbuilding projects, and Emile Ailland, the official architect to 
President Pompidou, was put in charge of its construction (along with the estates of 
Courtillieres at Pantin (1,700 units) and Gringy la Grande Bome in Essone (3,900 
units)). 
"Today these three great housing estates bringing innovation through their 
architectural aesthetics are becoming the three great ghettos in the Paris 
region (Veillard-Baron 1989) p92. 
By 1975 the population had risen to 4,720, and by 1982 to 10,360 - due to the 
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Box 1: Location 
implantation of the 2,223 units of the 
ZAC de la Noý during the period 
1971-74. Following the construction of 
the ZAC, the commune became known 
not as Chateloup les Vignes but as the 
"grapes of despair" 
Box 2: Population 
Sources: Roussel 
Vieillard-Baron 1989 
consent for the construction to take 
place, but the Prefect overruled this decision, and work started immediately in July 
197 1. A local pressure group of residents and local council members was set up to 
try to stop the construction works. Meantime, in September 1972, the revelations 
of Gabriel Aranda were first published, alleging that the construction companies who 
were building in Chanteloup and elsewhere were being given free reign because of 
their substantial contributions (one tenth of the contract value) to the presidential 
campaign funds of President Pompidou. Eventually, after protracted legal battles, 
the construction was limited to mainly 3 to 5 storey buildings, and the maximum size 
restricted to 3,100 units. There were numerous infringements of the building and 
planning regulations during construction, and many safety regulations covering 
construction were ignored. Complementary construction projects such as a school, 
a post office, links with the village, and the railway station were not completed due 
to the lack of funds. The original allocations were done in a manner more related 
to political pressures than to good management (Veillard-Baron (1989) Annex 2). 
The construction of the ZAC was 
surrounded by scandal (Aranda (1975)). 
Construction was started before the 
ZAC was legally constituted, and 
before all the land had been acquired. 
The original plan was for buildings of 
10 to 15 stories and for a total of 
4,700 units, including 1,600 homes of 
a higher standard for higher income 
19 88; households. The local council refused 
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Population 
The implanted population was mainly 
from the inner city Paris areas, and 
immigrants from abroad or the DOW 
TOM. This was not entirely new to the 
village as in 1968 10% of the 
population had been non French, 
mainly from Portugal - although by 
1982 many of them had moved on to 
home ownership in other communes. 
At the start many of the immigrants 
were single men, the proportion of 
female immigrant residents in 1975 
being only 27%. Between 1975 and 
1982, many of the immigrant workers 
were Moroccans, recruited directly to 
work in the Simca-Talbot-Peugot car 
factory at Poissy. By 1982,47% of 
immigrant households were of North 
African origin, half of these from Morocco. The table below illustrates an aspect of 
the life on the estate: the decline in employment in the car industry meant that 
many immigrant males became unemployed; and at the same time there was a strong 
tendency for immigrant women to stay at home. 
be in the construction industries of factories: 70% on the employed immigrant 
population in 1982, (compared with a national employed average of 38%). Pay in 
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Box 3: Estate Details 
Employment opportunities for immigrant households were more limited, tending to 
these industries was low, and job security limited. 
Original Problems 
The profile of the estate has set out some of the difficulties: a young population 
with a high degree of immigrant households of different ethnic backgrounds; high 
unemployment with low income from unskilled work. Part of this problem of 
population mix was due to what was seen to be the use of the estate as a dump 
estate for some of the worst families from the areas of inner Paris cleared for 
commercial development, including those cleared to make the new town centre at 
nearby Nanterre. Roussel (1988) considers that there was a pecking order for estates 
when decisions were made about where to put the best and worst tenants; and that 
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Box 4: Major Problems at Start 
three estates, the Zac de la Noý, at Chanteloup, La Val Fouree at Mantes, and 
Vallibou at Plaisir, were at the bottom of the list. Equally although there Was an 
unofficial "quota" system for immigrant households accepted by HLMs, certain of 
the larger interdepartemental HLMs operated by taking their total quota. but 
concentrating its "better" and non immigrant families in certain estates (such as 
Versailles, Saint Germain, or La Cele Saint Cloud) and putting other tenants, 
including immigrant households, elsewhere. On the ZAC, residents complained (at 
the start of the DSQprocess) of poor schools, lack of sports centres, of facilities for 
children, of local organisations or social activities. There were also tensions (though 
often covert) on the part of the white French residents that many of the problems 
were due to the black immigrant families. Vieillard Baron (1989) also provides useful 
information about the contrast between the tenure which movers off the estate end 
up in: one quarter of all movers in 1985-86 were immigrant households; and they 
moved almost exclusively to other HLM estates; but of the remaining 3/4 white 
French households, two thirds moved to owner occupation. 
The second main problem was in part responsible for the lack of facilities which 
made the estate unpopular. The commune was unable to adequately finance the 
necessary estate services, and by 1981 there was a deficit to the value of 43% of the 
total budget, one of the per capita highest in France (as reported in Le Courrier des 
Yvelines, 29 September 1983). There was an almost complete lack of any industrial 
base from which to raise local revenues, several adjacent industries had closed 
during the late 70s; despite this there was a pressing need to complete certain works 
irrespective of the lack of funds. 
The third main problem had been the management by the original HLM, the Office 
Interdepartemental. de la Region Parisienne (OIRP). There had been an almost total 
lack of management in the first two years of the estate's life, and very limited 
management thereafter until the transfer of the stock in 1982 to the HLM 
Interdepartemental de FEssone, Val d'Oise, Yvelines (OPEVOY). It should also be 
noted that one small part of the estate, comprising 268 homes of a higher quality, 
is managed by another HLM, the Societe la Lucete, which is a Societe Anonyme. 
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Few repairs had been done by OIRP, and there was no local management office. The 
arrears had been allowed to build up in an uncontrolled way, and the lack of proper 
rent accounting meant that on transfer it was difficult to establish the true state 
of many of the rent accounts - although the total arrears debt appeared to be in 
excess of FIO million, of which in only a quarter of the cases had any action been 
taken for recovery. 1986 figures showed some improvement, although 30% of 
families still were in arrears, with 9% owing over F30,000, and 50% less than 
F 10ý000.75 % of these debts, however, were owed by families of metropolitan French 
origin, the percentage of DOM-TOM or immigrant households in arrears being 
disproportionately lower. 
Fourth, the main employers, who had been the magnet for the immigration, 
underwent sharp reductions in their labour requirements. Peugot reduced it staff 
from 28,000 in 1970 to 15,800 in 1983, then to 8,000 in 1990. Equally Renault 
reduced its staff from 18,000 in 1982 to 13,400 in 1986. In each of both cases the 
reductions have been mainly of unskilled staff, the skilled workers being retained to 
run the new automated machinery. 
Finally the estate itself had physical problems. The stairwells were in a state of 
complete disrepair (there are stairwells for about each 10 dwellings). The part of the 
estate which had been built to the lowest standards, the PLR [Programme de Loyer 
R6duit] or reduced rent programme) homes, were particularly unpopular, and 
developed a serious voids problem very quickly. The estate had been designed to be 
vehicle free, with parking more than 200 meters from the flats - but this proved 
impractical. Limited circulation was then permitted, but this was difficult to 
manage safely. There were many places where emergency vehicles could not reach; 
and the absence of ramps made access by prams very difficult. The large areas of 
open space were not grassed, as Aillaud's plans had called for stone and rock 
"prairies" - Marie de Chanteloup (1983) quotes Aillaud, in reference to Chanteloup, 
as declaring that there are to be no "green spaces, because Le Corbousier one day 
invented the prairie, and prairies will be everywhere" (pl6). 
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Original Proposals and Objectives 
The estate was established as an "Hot Sensible" in 1983. There has been a constant 
pattern of difference of emphasis and priorities between the HLMand the City on 
what should be done, although both have been active in promoting improvement. The 
key objectives of the original programme are set out in the tables below. 
1. Arrears The new HLM 
introduced new accounting 
procedures and records. In 
addit ion an experimental 
association was set up by the 
HLMI the Region, the 
D6partement, and the CAF, to 
assist households with arrears under F10,000: the aim was to provide both advice and 
practical aid in the form of loans to tenants, over periods tailored to their individual 
needs. 
2. Improved Management The new HLM set up an office on the estate shortly after 
taking over, in 1983. This was to provide all local services of repairs, rent collection, 
arrears control, allocations requests, and general management. Additional training 
was provided to caretakers, who were all installed in new offices throughout the 
estate. They are the first line of contact with the HLMfor repairs, rent payments, 
and day to day problems; and are responsible for the supervision of a team of 
cleaners, who are employed on a contract basis to clean the stairs and common 
parts. 
3. Voids One key priority was to take action to reduce voids. There was a dispute 
between the HLM and the City on the question of the low quality (PLR) homes, in 
the Hippodrome crescents, where the major voids problems were concentrated. The 
city wished to demolish them all in order to construct owner occupied homes to 
change the tenure and population balance on the estate. The HLM wished to 
rehabilitate, in order to avoid the burden of debt charges remaining on demolished 
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Box 5: Objectives of Programme 
properties. The final decision was to rehabilitate, although with some of the units 
for sale. The City in fact aimed to have 50% social housing only in the commune if 
possible - though the proportion remains at 84%. 
4. Allocations Although the new HLMit is itself an interdepartmental HLM, and has 
taken a much greater interest in management on the estate, and has delegated most 
of the control of allocations to the local joint committee. As a result, the City has 
a large say in allocations. Vieillard Baron (1989) sets out the main criteria used: rent 
plus charges must be less than 25% of applicant's income before the addition of 
housing benefits - but there is no upper income limit; no foreign applicants are 
accepted, and the number of DOM-TOM residents is limited (which effectively 
means there is a racial barrier). This policy is not, however, having much effect: - 
certain applications are made by young white French males who then sublet to 
Mahgrebin households; and many of the white households who move in become 
quickly behind with the rent. In fact, as noted above, immigrant households on the 
estate have a much better rent payment record. 
This bias is reflected in the new allocations strategy adopted as part of the 1989-93 
programme (Marie de Chanteloup (1991)). The priorities set out there were first, 
children of families presently living on the estate (though it was recognised that 
they were primarily households of people under 25, and that there was a lack of both 
units of the right size and of social support for these new forming households); 
second, other residents of the commune (excluding lodgers, to avoid accepting 
immigrant households lodging with relatives, of which there were many); third people 
who had been lodging for over 5 years; and finally people whose access to the new 
Social Security benefit RMI had been conditional on their gaining a tenancy. There 
was, however, a continuing dispute about this policy, reported to me by the current 
DSQ project manager. The HLM was against it because the acceptance of children 
of current tenants meant that there was still a tenancy to accept black households, 
and the HLMwished to have a reduction in the number of black tenants as a whole. 
5. External image of the estate Extensive consultation was held on the programme 
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of rehabilitation and improvement works, resulting in animated and well attended 
meetings - over half of all households participating at some point. The estate has not 
suffered the major structural problems of certain similar estates, such as water 
penetration. Nonetheless it was decided to provide complete new outer shells to the 
buildings, to install thermal insulation and new, double glazed, PVC windows. The 
new panels were of varied colours, and included several features designed to 
transform the image of the estate such as the addition of several gable end roof 
lines - the idea being to "give, in total, the image of a large individual house to a 
communal block" (Vieillard-Baron 1989, p 103). The new panels were of different 
colours to break up and individually identify the buildings. In addition, the gable ends 
of the buildings which front one of the central open spaces, were decorated with 
enormous (5 storey) mosaic portraits of Victor Hugo, Nerval, Mallarme, Baudelaire, 
Rimbaud, and Valery. 
Works were also done to the entrances and stairwells, to renew and redecorate them, 
and to improve security of the entrances with new and heavier doors. In certain 
stairs, entryphones were also installed. The communal heating system had also been 
causing problems, being noisy, expensive, and ineffective, particularly in its delivery 
to each home. It was therefore improved. The basement areas had also proved to be 
little used, and the focus of rubbish and delinquency, and they were repaired and 
made secure, as well as being thermally insulated from the buildings above. 
No works were done to the Hippodrome buildings, pending the further decisions about 
whether to demolish or full rehabilitate them. 
6. Environmental problems A small number of works were done to improve the 
external spaces, mainly tree and shrub planting. 
7. Non Housing Programme It is also worth noting the following aspects of the non 
HLM programme: 
Economic Developmen This was a key issue for the city, both to provide 
employment for local residents and to expand its tax base. An industrial park was 
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set up on the other side of the railway 
line from the estate, and began 
operation in 1989; in addition an 
expected new exit from the nearby 
motorway (A14) is hoped to stimulate 
interest in the new units. 
Box 6: Non Housing Elements 
Community development a new sports centre was opened, and attempts were made 
to stimulate community associations. 
Integration of immigrants This was partly to be achieved by the social and cultural 
programmes, but also by the new allocations programme (set out above) which was 
aimed at preventing the arrival of any further new immigrant households. 
What Happened? 
Inroads were made to certain of the main problems. In particular the new HLM and 
its local office provided a major improvement to the management services 
Rehabilitation: The extensive external rehabilitation was centred on 1 400 homes. 
The effect of the new central heating and insulation works was a reduction of 
heating charges of some 50% between 1983 and 1988. The works to the basement 
areas were soon vandalised, however, and the stair repairs have not been a particular 
success: many of the entryphone systems were vandalised, and graffiti remains a 
problem. 
Improved Managemen : The new local office has tried to develop local policies and 
practices tailored to the needs of the estate, by working closely with many of the 
local organisations which have been set up. The extensive concentration on arrears 
has involved both considerable legal action against tenants, but also extensive 
counselling, mainly by specially appointed "tenant counsellors", whose job is to do 
individual casework and seek individual solutions for tenants who may have 
difficulties with claiming benefits or budgeting. This has produced considerable 
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3. tion: Extensive external rehabilitation involving 
as 
ýnt: New local office, local staff, 
', 'ers, extensive arrears counselling, 
lal associations 
Reduction of arrears to 12% compared to 
in number of I 
Box 7: Summary of Outcomes 
success, with a considerable reduction in arrears. 
; ociations 
Population Stability: Although there was never a great problem with turnover, it is 
now quite stable at about 3 %. Many of those moving are the residual moves from the 
abandoned blocks at the Hippodrome. The new allocations policies are designed to 
continue with the process of stabilising the population. The City see the problem as 
one of preventing any new large scale waves of immigration, and of concentrating 
on consolidating the family networks which are beginning to develop. The HLM, in 
contrast, has a fairly clearly racial view, seeking to reduce the number of black 
households, in simple numbers terms, and is therefore opposed to much of the thrust 
of allowing sons and daughters to remain in new tenancies. 
Local commitment to improvement: One key to the successes of parts of the project 
is the constant and continuing commitment of the local Mayor (who was the subject 
of a long profile in Le Quotidien de Paris on 28 May 1991, setting out his 
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achievements, and was elected to the 
National Assembly in March 1993, 
defeating a prominent Government 
minister). The Mayor has been very 
active in trying to take a global 
approach to the problems, and provide 
Housing Related Cost: E5.2 
million 
Cost per estate home 
affected: E7,000 
the industrial and infrastructural 
bases needed to make lasting 
improvements in estate life. 
Economic Stimulation: This Box 8: Summary of Expenditure 
commitment to reduction in unemployment on estate, and increase in number of 
local jobs and businesses has resulted in 44 firms opening up locally, creating 200 
new jobs and helping to slightly reduce the unemployment level on the estate. In 
addition, 700 people went through employment training and job counselling, resulting 
in 500 of them finding work. Partly as a result of all of these actions, the budget 
deficit was substantially reduced, to 25% of its former level by 1988. 
Community Involvement: Over 20 active associations have been created. These are 
set out in some detail in an evaluation of the DSQ programme carried out by the 
Interdisciplinary Research Centre of Vaucresson (Calogirou & Eyzat (1991)). This is 
a curious report: the first part sets out some of the context and the comments of 
the professionals working on the estate about the difficulties of their job; and the 
second part presents some details about a resident survey of their involvement in 
various activities and associations, but with no empirical drawing together of the 
data, or subsequent systematic conclusions. Nonetheless the report shows that there 
are now a wide variety of associations, particularly for immigrant households, set 
up and used on the estate. 
Comments and Assessment by Main Agents 
Range of Interviews: Interviews were held with all the main sections of housing staff 
(Director, Maintenance and Caretaking manager, Tenant Arrears and Support 
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counsellor, Caretaker, Allocations and Voids officer), and with the DSQ Project 
Manager, her Community Development Officer (with eight years experience on the 
estate) and the independent researcher from the Interdisciplinary Research Centre 
of Vaucresson. Themes which emerged are set out below. 
City/HLM disagreement There were clearly tensions between the HLMand the DSQ 
team, based mainly on the fact that the DSQ was located firmly in the Town Hall, 
both physically and in terms of policies, whereas the HLM suffered from being part 
of a much larger Interdepartemental HLM. Much joint working was undertaken, but 
it was made clear to me, by both sides, that the HLM was guided to a large extent 
by the needs of the larger organisation. The (somewhat cynical) community 
development officer in the DSQ team was of the view that in the eyes of the HLM, 
this was a "lost estate", and it was not prepared to put major resources into the 
estate. The DSQ general view was that certain of the works which had been done 
had not, despite consultation, been done with the needs of the residents fully taken 
into account - for example the works to install entryphones were done for a 
population who often could not read, and certainly forgot the combination to punch 
in to open the door - so no wonder they were vandalised. Equally the emphasis on 
rent arrears has been good for the HLM funds, but not central to the needs of the 
estate (in their view); and the HLM would do well to reinvest some of the funds in 
a better repairs service, or more environmental improvements. 
This difference spilled into the works which had been (or not been) done: the DSQ 
would have preferred more works to the common parts, and less expense on the 
architectural and external aspects; they would have preferred the creation of some 
larger units for the very large families; they wished the demolition of the 
Hippodrome blocks to provide a better tenure mix on the estate; - but the local HLM 
was bound by the decisions made in Versailles, where the HQ was. All of the major 
works planning and administration was done from HQ, with perhaps a seconded 
officer for a period if necessary. 
Nonetheless the DSQ staff felt that the local office worked well, and was a vast 
improvement. Generally the staff were well trained and carrying out a good Job. 
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There was, however, a certain 
amount of difficulty with the 
Director, mainly because of 
his ambivalent attitude to his 
black tenants. This was 
evident in discussion with 
him. He was, on my last visit, 
on the point of being moved 
sideways in the organisation, 
on account, it was said, of his 
five long years in the ZAC. 
This had clearly taken its toll. 
The last visit found him "tired and emotional" at 9 a. m. , which continued during both 
top ups from his whisky bottle under the desk into a paper cup, and at the rather 
lavish lunch to which I was treated, in the company of his son, who had been co- 
opted to drive him around (or mind him - it was not clear which). Previous visits had 
found him more lucid, but it was clear that he felt the problems of the estate were 
overwhelming, due to the problems of the people who lived there. Previous 
discussions had indicated that he felt that relations with the DSQ were fairly good, 
but complained also that one of the main problems was his being constrained by HQ. 
Resident difficulties: Almost everyone agreed that the main problem was the nature 
of the poor, unskilled, population. The HLM staff tended to add that the fact that 
they were immigrants was also a problem, expressed with more understanding by the 
DSQ staff who pointed to the difficulties in language, and cultural differences, as 
providing further barriers to their achieving jobs and good education. The Director 
was alarmist in his analysis, but some of it should be set out here. His view was that 
many of the tenants were armed; and that riots were inevitable when Caribbean 
tenants slept by day and kept everyone awake by night. Again this may have been 
influenced by his military background (his regimental flag and hat were in the 
corner), and his proclaimed respect for General de Gaulle. The reporting of this 
material is important, since it indicates that the HLM was prepared to permit a 
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Box 9: Main Issues from Interviews 
person with these views to be in charge of the organisation in such a sensitive 
estate; although it is also fair to note his impending transfer. 
Of his staff, the caretakers tended to share his views, but both the allocations and 
tenant counselling staff had a much more informed and sympathetic view, setting 
out in some detail the difficulties which they had to deal with in welcoming new 
tenants, or in assisting them in claiming benefits. The maintenance staff were firmly 
of the view that with less destruction of the buildings and property by residents, the 
funds would go much further. 
The DSQ shared the view of the City that the problems with the residents required 
that the population be stabilised, hence the allocations policy set out above. They 
were aware that many of the people on the estate had had little choice but to 
accept a flat there, and that they were effectively trapped. They were also 
concerned that in many cases the immigrant households were housed next to white 
French households from the Paris inner city clearance areas, who were often virulent 
racists. 
Delinquency and pohce problems: All reported poor relations between the policy and 
residents, as well as difficult relations with both the DSQ and HLM. The DSQ felt 
the police had given up trying to create good relations or be constructive - this was 
one of the worst aspects of the developing programme. A policy of fairly lenient 
sentences 6 years ago had been followed by a policy of stiff sentences for estate 
residents, but neither approach had succeeded in stemming the growing crime. 
Recently the drugs problem had begun to grow also. 
Crime continues to be a problem. Firstly, the estate has seen an increase in crime 
rates recently, despite an initial decline in 1987-88.1989 saw a 33% increase in the 
number of arrests on the estate for petty crimes, and an explosion in the number of 
burglaries. Vandalism was a particular problem, carried out by groups of youths aged 
between 8 and 14, who destroyed and defaced the interior common parts, the 
exteriors of buildings, plants, and open spaces. Dealing with these problems was 
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identified as one of the major issues for the 1989-93 programme (Marie de 
Chanteloup (1991)). In addition, the estate has experienced minor fiots in recent 
years. In the spring of 1990 nocturnal gatherings of gangs of Maghrebin youths lead 
to several disturbances, as a result of which the North African Association [Centre 
Culturel Maghrebin de Chanteloup] undertook to try to prevent this. More serious 
incidents occurred in 1991, as part of the national wave of estate rioting, however. 
On 12 June a gang of youths stoned the local police station, and any vehicles visiting 
it; and on 20 June there was a further incident where two Maghrebin youths were 
arrested trying to rob the estate supermarket, and a group of 30 youths clashed with 
police trying to carry out the arrest. Two nights later an incident involving a Turkish 
family and a Portuguese family, which lead to the police being called, escalated with 
the arrival of other members of the family armed with guns and knives, and lead to 
general rioting and stoning of the police on the part of local youth who had gathered 
observe and to participate. Order was eventually restored with the use of tear gas, 
and with a toll of two serious injuries and 15 arrests (most details from the report 
in Le Parisien, 24.6.91). All of this contributes to the continuing image of the estate 
as of a desolate, crime ridden environment. 
Transformed local management: Most of the HLM staff were proud of the new 
services which were offered on the estate, based in the local office. The least happy 
was the Maintenance and Caretaking Manager who felt that his budgets were 
inadequate, although the service was responsive within its limits. partly for this 
reason he refused to meet tenants, referring all enquiries through the caretakers. 
The caretakers tended to be long serving - they had originally been husband and wife 
teams, though now only one of them was employed as a sole caretaker (about half 
and half women and men). They were in the process of having computer terminals 
fitted in their offices, to provide better information to tenants on their rent 
accounts, and although they had no explicit social role, and no training in this, it was 
clear that many knew their blocks very well, and had excellent relations with 
tenants - this was seen in the way they dealt with callers to the office. The Director 
described that much of his time had been involved with trying to assist the DSQ in 
setting up the local associations, and that he had tried to represent their views at 
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HQ, even if sometimes this was not accepted. 
However the long term uncertainty about the fate of the Hippodrome crescents has 
contributed to the difficulties on the estate. These blocks are now completely empty 
and boarded, waiting for final decisions on works. The presence of this large expanse 
of desolation, frequently broken into for various criminal gatherings, drug taking and 
dealing, and so on, is a major problem, shortly to be dealt with. 
Continuing image problem: The early years of the estate had been marked by a 
political instability which lead to a series of short term mayors, and administrations 
of different parties, between 1974 and 1983. None of them had got to grips with the 
problems, and as a consequence little progress had been made. The arrival of the 
present mayor and administration in 1983 had marked the beginning of a systematic 
assault on the problems, but there had been a lot of ground to make up. The mayor 
had taken a global view, using all the resources of the DSQ and HLM, with the 
primary aims of creating new employment opportunities for estate residents, and of 
involving residents in estate and civil life. Some progress had been made, but the 
long term problems of the population, and the recent riots, had meant that the 
image of the estate remained poor, and that the self image of the residents 
remained low. This was a fairly shared view, with many agents feeling that despite 
the progress made, and the many aspects of the programmes, the estate remained 
a dense concentration of poverty and isolation. 
Summary and Evaluation 
This estate is one of the most difficult to deal with amongst the case studies for a 
number of reasons: 
- the HLM not fully local: its policies and procedures are determined from 
outside the Departement 
- it is physically isolated, and removed from jobs and leisure opportunities 
- the original infrastructural accompaniments were not provided because of 
the financial problems 
- the early years were marked by political instability and lack of political will 
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Voids: 
60% to 12% 
islo 
:C 
Box 10: State of Main Indicators Now 
to make improvements 
- it was used as a sink estate for a mix of the most deprived inner city 
residents and immigrants recruited to work in the car factories 
- continuing problems of crime and vandalism mean that there is a continuing 
image problem 
Many successes can be noted: there was extensive rehabilitation work; the arrears 
were reduced considerably; there is now a functioning local management unit 
providing a range of services; plans are in hand to rehabilitate the worst part of the 
estate; and there are now a number of thriving local associations. But the 
improvement have been quite long in coming to fruition, particularly the 
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improvements to the worst Hippodrome block; there has been a continuing conflict 
of priorities between the city and the HLM over priorities; and the allocations 
policies, while attempting to stabilise the population, will be a few years in bearing 
fruit. 
The programme continues on the estate, as noted above. The Priorities continue to 
be employment and training, combatting stigmatisation and isolation, housing 
rehabilitation, and encouraging social life. But there seems a long way to go before 
the fundamental problems of the estate will be reasonably dealt with. 
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U Pierre CoHinet at Meaux 
on rails around the estate). It was 
built as a "Ville d'Accuell" to cater 
both for the growing urban influx 
from surrounding rural areas, Paris 
overspill, and to cater for the 
repatriated families from Algeria. The 
flats all face south west, for 
Population 
The estate was the subject of a social survey, as part of the 1985 evaluation of the 
original (HVS) improvement programme on the estate (Acadie 1984,1985). The 
1 
14-43 
population profile led Acadie (1985, p30) to identify one of the main problems as 
"the existence, at the level of a city, of a neighbourhood populated by this type of 
person, socially marked out as deprived ["defavorise"]". This confirmed the 
conclusion of Toubon (Toubon 1980a) that "La Pierre Collinet has become a 
proletarian zone ... marked by.. a population who are very mobile, very young, with a 
very high proportion of immigrants". Most households had only one income, often 
family benefits (see Table 2). Very few elderly people lived on the estate (5% in 
1984; in 1980 over half the total population had been under 19 years). 
There were three main groups of 
immigrant households, all different 
from each other. The Portuguese had 
been arriving for 20 years, but in 
many cases quickly moved over to the 
higher quality flats at Beauval. 
Maghrebin households started arriving 
about 1976, and were originally single 
male workers , who increasingly 
brought their families to live with 
them (in 1984 16% of one bedroom 
flats were occupied by single North 
African males). Since 1981 there had 
been an increased flow of African 
families, in two main groups. First 
families from rural Mali had large, polygamous, households, which also provided long 
term temporary accommodation ["hebergement"] to relatives arriving in France. 
Often wives and children of these households would travel to and from Mali, the 
older wife returning with children when they reached teenage, to be replaced by a 
new younger wife 1. In contrast there were groups of rich urbanised African 
1 Information mainly from interview with the DSQ staff member who spent 
about half her time working with these families, particularly with the women 
and children. The families tended to be the focus of many complaints and have 
many problems because of their large households, and because in many case 
there were severe language and cultural problems. 
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Box 12: Population 
1983 Details. Source: Acadie, 
1984l 1985 
students from other countries who did not mix with the Malian households with 
whom they had little in common. The pattern of immigration can be seen from the 
following table: 
Arrival date Portuguese Maghrebin Afirican 
Pre 1972 11% 5% 0 
1972-75 36% 5% 0 
1976-1980 30% 36% 11% 
1980-83 23% 54% 88% 
'Fable 2a: Pattern of Amval of lmfmgrant Populations 
Notes: Figures show % of the December 1983 population surveyed who arrived in the 
period stated. Source: Acadie 1985 p7. 
Original Problems 
The problems facing the estate had 
been apparent since the mid 70s, and 
Meaux had successfully bid to be part 
of the original Habitat et Vie Sociale 
programme (participation lasting 
between 1978 and 1983). Much useful 
information on the history of 
intervention is contained in the 
evaluation of the original DSQ 
programme and 89-93 bid published by 
Meaux council (Meaux 1989). 
By 1980 the estate had a high 
turnover of tenancies - between 1978- 
849 65 % of the total population had 
moved away - the estate was 
functioning almost like a temporary 
housing estate [cite de transit] (Toubon 1980a). One room flats were most affected, 
with in 1983 29% changing tenancy (43% in one of the low rise blocks). The image 
of the estate was extremely poor, particularly since the HLMhad scored an own goal 
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Box 13: Estate Details 
by constructing Beauval alongside, leading all who could afford to to move over, 
leaving increasing numbers of deprived households. This was compounded by the fact 
that improvement works generated the housing benefit (APL) problem already 
described in the main text. 
Original Proposals and Objectives 
The HVSprogramme: This had three main objectives: to improve the image of the 
estate, and reduce its isolation from the city; physical rehabilitation; and creating 
better relations between the residents. Extensive internal and external works were 
done -one week was spent in each flat doing works "aimed primarily at a 
)f 4 bedroom. 315 empty 
Beauval also had voids) 
over F10,000 
rest would accept. 
) visit "Africa" 
I by river and canal 
le Corbousier. 
ocks, with dead 
E 
Box 14: Major Problems at Start 
Sources: Acadie 1984,1985; Meaux 1989; Toubon 1980a 
general increase in the level of comfort" (Acadie 1985 p17), including minor 
plumbing and electrical work, security doors, ventilation, and considerable sound 
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insulation. In addition, the corridors were improved with sound insulating and easilý- 
cleaned surfaces, and anti graffiti painted walls. There were also environmental 
works, improvements to the entrances, and a social programm aimed at setting up 
clubs and associations for groups of residents. The main achievement here was the 
creation of a Womans Association which played a significant part in later 
consultations. 
Only a qualified success was claimed for this programme. The main progress seems 
to have been (according to Acadie's evaluation (Acadie 1985)) the physical works 
which were done. These stopped the disrepair on the estate reaching "catastrophic" 
levels (Ville de Meaux 1989). One main difficulty was that the HLM was not fully 
engaged in the programme (OPAC de Meaux 1990) at this point, and pursued a 
continuing programme of promoting the adjacent Beauval estate, onto which it 
continued to move its best tenants. The longer term problems of long term 
maintenance, of management, of image, of voids (which continues to rise), and of 
social isolation, remained (Ville de Meaux 1989 p3). 
DSQ Programm : The HLM (Office Public until 1987, then OAPC de Meaux) became 
fully engaged in the process of estate renewal with the development of the DSQ 
programme in 1984 (initially as an "Illot Sensible"). The main objectives can be 
grouped together in relation to two main underlying themes: first, improving the 
everyday life for residents by better quality of services, and involving them in the 
management of the estate; and second combatting estate stigmatisation by 
integrating the estate into the wider city community, by a change of image and 
attitude [desenclavement de la citfl. 
Better Services: 1. The HLM This started at the level of the HLM who appointed an 
officer in 1985 with the responsibility to stimulate and manage the new programme. 
Her responsibility ranged from management of the local team on the estate to the 
primary responsibility for ensuring the HLM integrated its efforts into the wider 
DSQ programme. This was the first of such appointments to HLMs in France, and 
indicated a recognition of the new social role which would be necessary to deal with 
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Objectives: 
. wp. Luvt--u -. L-ej-jdnL bervices 
improved management 




the types of problems on 
difficult estates. An 
extensive staff training 
programme was introduced, 
resident associations were 
stimulated; there was a 
purge of rent arrears cases, 
with the introduction of new 
procedures and well 
publicised and widespread 
evictions carried out 
allocations policies were 
reviewed. 
2. Estate Cleanliness One 
Box 15: Objectives of Programme main approach to this was by Sources: Acadie 1984 f 85; Ville de Meaux 1989; Collinet Services 1989 the establishment in 1985 of 
discussion with local agents 
a "regie de quartier". This 
idea grew from an initial experiment in the Alma-Gare neighbourhood in Roubaix 
(near Lille). The Regie at Meaux was one of the earliest of the "second wave" of 
these organisations. Their general purpose is to set up an independent organisation, 
closely linked to the local statutory agencies (including HLMs) with the triple 
objectives of carrying out works of maintenance and cleaning; involving the residents 
in this work, thereby giving them income, work experience, and a sense of ownership 
of the conditions on the estate; and finally providing an intermediary organisation 
to develop better relations and communication between the various agents on the 
estate, and the residents (see Behar, D. (1987) and Behar, D. (1988) for additional 
details of history, purpose, and evaluation). 
In Meaux, its basis (set out in Collinet Services 1989) was 
- to mobilise the estate residents around the cleanliness and general 
appearance of their estate, by employing them on cleaning and repair work. 
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- thereby to increase incomes in those households through this part time work 
- to work with young people on a work experience project which would equip 
them for eventual employment 
- become one of the key estate organisations, capable of developing other 
projects as well 
Combattinp- StiRmatisation 
The change of image required was not 
the estate, but also to the image held 
plans involved a mixture of attracting 
devising programmes for tackling the 
residents. All this was done in concert 
are set out below. 
only to the external image held by people off 
by resident themselves. For this reason the 
outsiders onto the estate, and in parallel 
skills deficiencies, and poor self image, of 
with the main DSQ programme, and details 
What Happened? 
A considerable amount of coordinated work took place during the programme, (and 
still continues within the context of the 1989 -93 programme). 
Improved Tenant Services 
Improved management: The local office is now in the centre of the estate, with 
better trained staff providing increased services to tenants, including assistance with 
arrears problems and tenants associations. 
Allocations: There is also a new approach to allocations - essentially both the city 
and the HLMhave decided that no further immigrant households will be placed on 
the estate, and any new tenancies of people with social or economic problems will 
be avoided if possible. This is hard to sustain, for two main reason. First, the level 
of voids remains high, despite the reduction in the number of available units by 300. 
A sustained campaign of communication of the benefits of the estate, and its 
changed image, is intended to combat this. Second, however, the HLMhas difficulty 
placing black households in its more desirable estates, mainly in the city centre. 
Several attempts have been made to mix tenants on these estates, but the problem 
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of semi explicit racial prejudice has in several instances resulted in the black 
households demanding a transfer to La Pierre Collinet. The allocations coordinator 
found this one of the most difficult and intractable problems in her work. 
Better Caretakin: An increased 
importance was given to the role of 
caretakers. Additional training was 
given, and they were now expected to 
carry out a social role in relation to 
the tenants - helping them with day to 
day problems, and intervening to sort 
out disputes - as well as the more day 
to day duties of cleaning and minor 
repairs. There were 5 caretaking staff 
in the long blocks, and a caretakers 
office which had regular hours, and 
which was the first point of contact for tenants with any type of problem. 
Better maintenance: The establishment of Regie de Quartier had lead to a greatly 
improved service; tenants could call in and request minor works to be done; but more 
usefully they could borrow tools, and buy materials at virtually cost price, to do 
improvement of their own to their flats (such as install a new shower or heater). 
Advice and assistance was also available. This was helped by the extensive works 
which had been done to the interiors of the flats as part of the original HVS 
programme, which had dealt with the major plumbing and electrical problems. 
Improvements to common parts: Extensive works were carried out to stairs and 
entrances including remodelling all the entrance halls (entryphones were not 
installed). One major problem was dealt with by the creation of a new refuse 
disposal system, providing sufficient and accessible bins in remodelled bin rooms on 
all the landings. In addition, environmental works were carried out to the paths and 
green areas of the estate, including the play areas. 
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Box 16: Non Housing Elements 
Improv 
anant. Services 
magement: Retrained Staff; local office now in 
trained caretakers with a social role 
extensive works to interiors of flats; 
R6gie de Quartier, greatly improved 
rears: Extensive action taken (but arrears 
policy: to exclude immigrant and difficult 
atisation 
Box 17: Summary of Outcomes 
Tenant involvement in the estate: The level of participation was raised through not 
only the Regie de Quartier but also the active support by the HLM of the Social 
Centre and its many projects (see below). 
Reducing rent arrears: Following the purge which took place from 1986-7 a series 
of measures, both preventative and of enforcement, were taken. Despite this, 
arrears remain a problem. 
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Combatting Stigmatisation 
Changing the image of the estate: There are three main areas of development: first, 
the problem of voids was partly tackled by reducing the number of housing units. 
This was Dartlv achieved hv the IJ---- .1 ---- 
change of use of part of one building 
to create 2,400 M2 of offices -a 
business centre into which the HLM rnr- 
office moved, as well as attracting 
several important businesses (such as 
the Caisse d'Epargne, on of the main 
banks). Half of the space was intended 
ing Related Cost: E5 
6 million on homes, EO. 4 
ion on environ. & R6gie) 
per estate home: E2,700 
Contribution: E1.3 
Other Contributions: EO. 35 
million from Region 
for use by off estate businesses in the 
Non Housing Programme Cost: 
E1.5 million 
Meaux area -It was hoped that by 
forcing people from off the estate to 
Box 18: Summary of Expenditure 
come to work there, they would spread the word that the place was not as bad as its 
reputation suggested. 
Second, following much planning and a day festival of fairwell, one of the long 
blocks of 265 flats was demolished, and the land used for the construction of 
individual and low rise houses/flats. A video of this day was made, and is available 
from Collinet Services, which contains fascinating interviews - with not only the 
HLMand city representatives who explain the objectives of the demolition, but also 
with many local residents (who, it emerges from the film, have little clue what is 
going on or why). There is a certain amount of resentment and confusion on the 
estate about who these flats are for. Some will be used for estate residents, but the 
idea for most of them is to attract a different, more economically and socially 
stable population. 
Finally some of the flats are being used for special lets, as student hostels, or as 
business lets for firms who need immediate accommodation for new or transitory 
employee flats - workers on the nearby EuroDysney site were one group it was hoped 
to attract. 
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Supporting the wider DSO obiectives: From 1988 a special "Neighbourhood 
Committee" was set up to involve all of the local residents associations and the main 
statutory and other agencies in creating a coordinated approach to the impro'vement 
of life on the estate. The HLM cooperated with many projects, particularly bý, 
making available some of the housing accommodation for offices or other housing 
uses, and making available 60M2 of space in every building for youth centres. It is 
also heavily involved in the Social Centre. This centre provides a range of activities 
including youth clubs, "Third Age" clubs for elderly residents, a Portuguese school, 
literacy classes, and so on. It has several special projects (such as a linguist who 
works with the African families, and a youth sports worker). In addition a special 
"School and Neighbourhood" project was created around the three objectives of 
improving school achievement rates, improving communication between parents, 
children and schools, and involving parents and children together in projects of 
improvements to open spaces and play spaces on the estate. 
Little progress has been made in improving the shopping facilities, but it is proposed 
to tackle this as part of the DSQ 1989-93 programme 
Comments and Assessment by Main Agents 
Ranae of Interviews 
Interviews were held with all the main sections of housing staff (caretaking, 
allocations, communication, arrears and tenant welfare); with the HLM project 
supervisor (who had been appointed in 1985 and had an encyclopedic knowledge of 
the estate and its history); with three members of the DSQ team; and a Regie de 
Quartier manager. Themes which emerged are set out below. 
Slow progress: None of the agents (particularly the caretakers) had any illusions that 
the estate was yet transformed. It was certainly better than before, and there 
remained lots of hope, but changes were painfully slow to take root, and could be 
quickly reversed (e. g. the position on graffiti and vandalism). The Regie de Quartier 
was one of the stable improvements which had engaged the interest of tenants, and 
apparently there were no conflicts with caretaking staff who also were very 
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supportive. 
Resident difficulties: It was clear to 
all that many of the problems 
stemmed from the background, 
poverty, and general disadvantage of 
residents. Some, such as the Malian 
Transformed local management: The HLM had since 1985 taken seriously that there 
needed to be a different type of management on the estate, and the commitment to 
training, particularly caretaker training, showed this approach. The different local 
teams - DSQ, Regie, HLM now worked well together, complementing the services 
offered, and agents spoke supportively of their colleagues in other agencies. Again, 
the willingness to take a wider view on the allocations question was mentioned 
several times as an indication that the HLMnow looked at management in the round, 
rather than simply filling empties. 
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Diversification: Most agents mentioned the benefits of the changes of use of 
buildings, and the demolition and newbuild proposals. Destroying the monotonous 
density of concrete was a very positive step. The initiatives to bring transitory 
workers to the estate were also seen as bringing variety and on outside view, as 
were the proposals to use blocks for hostel accommodation for students and other 
young people. 
Repairs and improvements: Generally the services to tenants on repairs were good. 
The key here was the Reg ' ie - although the HLMhad a typically tight control over 
its maintenance budget, the availability of parts, tools, and assistance at a very 
cheap rate meant that many tenants felt that the repairs and improvements issue 
was taken seriously, and that the HLMwas making positive steps to help them. 
DSQ/City/HLM teamwork: There was little awareness of the totality of the 
programme except at the level of the Chef de Projet or the HLMproject supervisor. 
Other staff had little formal contact with the DSQ. There was a clear feeling 
amongst the HLMstaff, however, that the HLMitself was the driving force behind 
the programme. The fact that the Mayor was also the HLMpresident had quite a lot 
to do with this, for the continuing support of the city was clearly seen as a key to 
the steady progress. 
Summary and Evaluation 
Many changes were evident in the way the estate now operated. Despite this, 
considerable problems remained. This is indicated in the table below showing the 
main indicators. 
There has been little change in the general characteristics of the population: the 
estate retains the highest concentration of poverty, unemployment, and immigrant 
groups in Meaux. Little can be done to change the basic monotony of the estate 
without further large scale demolition. Voids remain a problem, as the allocations 
strategy of not filling vacancies with low income or immigrant households 
contributes to the difficulties of letting vacant units. 
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Box 20: State of Main Indicators Now 
Despite this apparent limited change in indicator, nonetheless major programmes 
have been implemented. There is every sign from the achievement of works and the 
opinions of the local agents that the partners to the improvement programme are 
working together to put in place some impressive improvements. The programme of 
demolition, new build, and changes of use is a long term, coordinated strategy, 
complemented by the new allocations strategy. The emphasis on tenant participation 
has made real inroads into the apathy and isolation of residents through the 
associations and Regie. The services offered by the DSQ sponsored groups, and the 
HLM, are clearly now better tailored to the needs of estate residents. 
The continuing will to improve the estate, and the continuing need for major 
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investment of resources, is also evident in the fact that the estate remains in the 
DSQ (DIV)programme for 1989 - 93. The main objectives of this new programme 
were : 
* building on the success of existing social projects 
" change of use of buildings 
" continuing integration with the city by attracting business and leisure, and 
insisting that problem families be integrated elsewhere in the city 
* public relations and publicity 
* creation of more formal management and monitoring of the programme 
With the continuing involvement of the DSQ (DIV) and HLM commitment, more 
progress will be made - but even then, lasting improvements are not guaranteed. 
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Mont Li6baut. 136thune 
Bethune is a mining city of 26,000 residents, but the centre of an urban area of some 
260,000 people in smaller towns and villages, and as a consequence is ranked by 
INSEE as amongst the 20 most important French agglomerations of over 250,000 
people. It has a medieval centre, with a historic belfry. 
The population 0f B6thune 
traditionally engaged in agriculturally 
based activities, then from the end of 
the 19th century developed as a 
mining community. The decline in 
mining began in the 50s and 60s. 
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Population 
The original population was drawn from workers who were attracted by the 
programmes of retraining and industrial reinvestment which were instigated to 
replace the declining mining industry in the 60s (details drawn from Mairie de 
Bethune (1984), (1987); (1989); and Van Acker (1988)). These included very few ethnic 
minority households, who still make up a negligible proportion of the estate 
population. By the mid to late 70's, however, the increasing availability of suburban 
or village homes, and the declining overall population, meant that the ZUP homes 
were less and less attractive, and the major and continuing problems of voids began 
to emerge. By 1980 over 30% of new tenants were unemployed; many of these were 
single parent families, and in the south sector in 1983,85 % of working heads of 
households were in skilled or unskilled manual jobs. 
Figures for the same year (Ville de 
Bethune 1984) show that about half 
the residents were children, and in the 
south sector 44% of households had 
more than 3 children. There was a 
polarisation of adult ages also: 70% of 
them were under 40; and 15 % over 60. 
The estate itself was split into zones: 
in the north part, with the more 
recent and smaller blocks, there was 
a high concentration of small families 
of employed, better off tenants, who tended to stay on the estate for a few years 
only before moving on to subsidised suburban owner occupation. In the south sector, 
there were buildings with high concentrations of large families without incomes from 
employment, (who were reported to be in frequent conflict with their elderly 
neighbours, and who were stuck on the estate). 
Original Problems 
The problems facing the estate are set out in Ville de Bethune 
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Box 22: Population 
1984. They began to develop during 
the 70's, when the estate found 
increasing difficulty attracting a mix 
of tenants, and began to develop 
problems of turnover, voids, and 
degradation. In 1980 the City made 
the first approach to the HI-Mwith a 
request that it draw up plans for 
dealing with 2 of the worst blocks, 
which had become notorious due to 
owner occupation. 
There was a clear acceptance that the management of the estate was inadequate: 
the 1984 report (Ville de Bethune 1984) sets out clearly that the HLM has not 
delivered a service which is tailored to meet the needs of the estate, but has up to 
that point simply been concerned to collect rents and do minimal repairs. 
The problems were summarised as being of two types: first the external problem of 
the unbalancing of the local housing market -a net surplus of housing due to 
population decline and shifting pattern of housing concentrated in the countryside. 
Second an internal problem of unbalancing of the estate population, and the 
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Ads: This was most serious problem with 30% void, with 
?% of voids empty over 3 years 
management of the tenants and stock - due partly to the malfunctioning of the HLM, 
and partly to the social and other problems of the residents. 
There were physical problems with the stock, mainly in terms of the thermal and 
acoustic insulation of the dwellings; the basements were derelict and disused; lack 
of proper maintenance had lead to general degradations, particularly in the 
entrances halls and stairwells. The spaces between blocks caused problems also, 
again mainly due to neglect and absence of proper maintenance and care 
programmes. 
There was, in addition, a wider problem which was being tackled by the City, that 
of the physical and social separation of the estate from the rest of Bethune. The 
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estate had become seen as a dumping ground for problem families, and due to the 
physical separation and isolation from the rest of the city, they were in fact cut off 
from many of the City's services and opportunities. This lead to feelings of isolation, 
helplessness, shame of living on the estate, and entrapment, which were expressed 
clearly in the first series of meetings held in 1983 following the initiation of 
improvement proposals. This was reflected not only in the high levels of 
unemployment, but also in high levels of scholastic failure, low levels of skill 
training amongst the young people, and increasing incidents of serious neighbour 
disputes. There was also an almost total absence of any organised social life of 
estate associations. The City regarded this polarisation of the estate as a major city 
wide problem to be tackled and overcome - the estate was to be reintegrated to the 
life of Bethune (the problem and proposal on a city wide basis are set out in detail 
in Van Acker 1988). 
Original Proposals and Objectives 
The initial planning to tackle the problems of the city (conceived at the start in 
terms of the polarisation of the three sectors) started in 1979, leading to the 
publication of a planning and renewal strategy in 1981. This plan aimed to revitalise 
the city centre; to create a means of linking the estate to this centre, to 
rehabilitate the estate, and to restore a coherence and quality of life to the city as 
a whole. This was to be achieved partly by the rehabilitation of a large old railway 
shed, and the construction of a large commercial centre on the land previously 
occupied by sidings. There was also a programme to carry out rehabilitation of 
certain of the blocks, to build some new, individual homes on the estate, to create 
jobs on or near the estate, and to provide better public facilities, particularly 
sporting and leisure facilities. 
The DSQ programme itself was initiated in 1984, and followed on from these original 
objectives. It was coordinated by the mandatory local commission, but in addition 
was administered by a local team consisting of the DSQ project manager, the HLM 
manager, the Bethune city architect, a local official from the Health and Social 
Affairs ministry, and an official of Developpement Culturel. Four working groups 
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were developed, on housing and urban development, on youth training and 
development, on families and work, and on the development of social relations. The 
programme was driven and coordinated by the Deputy Mayor, who was a moving 
force throughout. 
The key objectives of the programme were: 
- changing the image of the estate, its physical isolation, and a 
diversification of its functions 
- improvement of the living conditions, the infrastructure and services, and 
an improvement in the social, management, and technical services 
- as better social dynamic 
The HLM objectives were divided into the categories of physical and management 
changes. 
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Box 25: Housing Objectives of Programme 
Physical Improvements: These were aimed at the twin problems of vacancies, and 
of disrepair. The main method was by means of an extensive programme of 
improvements, changes of use, and demolitions, which had started prior to the DSQ 
programme. The initial work was brought forward in 1983, apparently, by the 
accidental death of two young children in one of the worst void blocks (though I was 
unable to establish the exact details). This lead to the decanting and demolition of 
two blocks on the periphery of the estate, 217 homes in all, as a mark of the City's 
commitment to initiate a programme of works. 
The subsequent DSQ programme set out to reduce the density of residential 
accommodation, by the subsequent demolition of 60 further homes of the same type. 
In addition, there was a change of use of one entire street of three blocks (177 
homes) into offices, including a local office for the HLM, and several offices of the 
city administration and other public bodies. This was intended not only to deal with 
voids, but to lead to a much more mixed and less densely residential estate, to 
provide local jobs, and to provide local services. Finally, 70 new houses were 
constructed, of which 59 were for rent, with a view to providing a better mix of 
accommodation types. 
The remaining homes were also targeted for improvements, with a view to trying to 
make life more tolerable for residents and encourage them to stay on the estate. 
This work included thermal and acoustic insulation, improvements in the heating and 
hot water system, external painting and decoration to change the appearance of the 
estate, renovation of the stairwells, new letter boxes in the entrance halls, new 
electricity supplies, and a small amount of work to be done in the interiors of the 
flats, at the discretion of the residents. In addition the basement areas were sealed 
off. The final element to this was a commitment to the better maintenance of the 
stock following the improvements. Lack of attention to disrepair and degradations 
had been identified as one of the contributory factors in the poor image of the 
estate leading to the voids problem, and a commitment was made to maintaining the 
new standards to be achieved. 
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Box 26: Non Housing Elements 
The environmental and traffic arrangements were also to be improved, providing a 
set of pedestrian routes, road closures and sleeping policemen, the improvement and 
landscaping of large open spaces, and the provision of sports and play areas under 
that part of the main programme. 
Management Improvements 
There was also a very clearly set out programme of objectives for housing 
management improvements, stated at the start and in detail, unusually for a French 
case study. Measures included 
- better allocations procedures: this included setting up a local allocations 
committee, whose first job was to define the objectives of a different 
approach to new tenancies. The underlying objectives were firstly to try to 
stabilise the population, and secondly to try to produce a more balanced 
population, with fewer poor and at risk households. This was partly to be done 
by means of computerisation of the waiting lists; partly by better information 
on applicants; and partly by better trained allocations staff. 
- stabilising housing costs for tenants. This was to be partly achieved 
by 
investment of management time in assisting them to claim benefits; and 
partly by trying to keep rent and service charges to a minimum, by better 
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servicing and control of heating, hot water, and other installations. 
- reducing problems of arrears and other income losses, by better control of 
arrears and former tenants accounts, a commission for rent arrears, better 
control of transfers, and more inspections prior to tenants leaving flats (to 
ensure the flat was left in good condition and reduce relet times and costs) 
- providing a local service from an estate office, whose response would be 
fast and excellent. This included clarifying the role of the caretakers, giving 
them a more interventionist and more social role; providing a better 
complaints procedure, and a more responsive and proactive repairs service 
- providing a wider range of services to tenants; including a handbook for new 
tenants; assisting to resolve, and monitoring, neighbour disputes; a series of 
investigations to get a better knowledge of tenants and their problems. 
- trying to promote tenant participation 
- contributing to DSQ aims of social improvements 
What Happened? 
The overall general plan of linking the estate to the city has been achieved with the 
construction of a large and attractive commercial centre on the site of the old 
railway sidings. In addition, most of the major programme of physical improvements 
and new building projects were achieved on site. The demolition and change of use 
programme was vigorously pursued, and is now being supplemented by a programme 
of specialist lets of certain parts of blocks to students and other groups. The 
environmental and traffic management schemes were also put into place. 
Despite these extensive works, however, there remains considerable degradation and 
disrepair on the estate. Many of the entrance halls which were renewed became 
quickly vandalised; and although the commercial centre was improved, there remain 
many empty shops, and it continues to have an atmosphere of desolation. Certain 
aspects of the improvements are flourishing: the new Maison de Communication, 
providing employment and training, is a conspicuous success, buzzing with activity. 
The new offices, in the converted blocks, are mainly let and well maintained, also 
giving a feel of progress and stability. 
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Improvements 
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The intended involvement of the population in the programme of works, and in 
associations on the estate, was not, however, achieved. Latterly a Regie de Quartier 
was started (for more details on this see the Meaux case study), which involved the 
tenants in minor repairs, and painting works, mainly in the entrance halls and 
common parts. This was often linked to the new RMI minimum income benefit 
(which required a programme of work or training to qualify). 
The intended stabilising of the population and balancing of its mix had also not been 
achieved. Allocations were carefully vetted: although there was a functioning 
allocations committee, the main recommendations were made locally by the staff, 
and tended to be accepted. Contrary to what has been intended, the new tenants 
tended to be low income, and by 1989 25 % of heads of households were unemployed 
unskilled workers - the pool of applicants left few "middle income" households to fill 
the voids. Nevertheless there were strenuous efforts made to week out "problem" 
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households, on the part of the allocations officers. Extensive checking was done. 
including visiting all possible new tenants. This visit looked for evidence of problems, 
such as neighbour problems, and tenants who had dirty homes, or who were found to 
be in bed in the morning at the time the officer called, were likely to be marked 
down and recommended for refusal. The allocations visiting officer clearly identified 
the need for tenants who had the motivation to keep clean and out looking for work 
as evidence of suitability to assist in improving the estate, in contrast to the 
previous policy of housing anyone who would take a flat. There was in fact no 
written allocations priorities or policy to guide her in determining housing need 
priorities. (I was rather surprised to find this attitude, reminiscent of local authority 
attitudes in the UK 30 years ago. ) 
The measures to deal with what was one of the main problems at the start, the 
voids, were successful, however. This was, it is clear, mainly by virtue of demolition 
and change of use reducing the available units to a more manageable level in 
relation to the real level of demand; although considerable management effort had 
of them are still being fully 
implemented. The caretaking staff 
were retrained and given a more 
social role - but many of them still 
regarded their new role with some 
suspicion. Local caretaking offices 
were now open on a regular basis, 
though, unlike on other case study 
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estates, the opening hours were in the evening, and the offices were not very 
welcoming. Extensive computerisation had taken place; and extensive retraining of 
staff to understand their new roles in the decentralised, local structure. All this was 
to produce the new, appropriate, services. This was being slowly done, although at 
the time of the case study it was clear that many of the staff were old hands at 
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their jobs, and that the change to a new way of regarding tenants was proving 
difficult. 
Comments and Assessment by Main Agents 
Interviews were held with all the main sections of the housing staff (arrears officer, 
allocations officer and visiting officer, improvements officer, caretaking supervisor, 
caretaker, and female cleaner [femme de menage], tenant advisor on debt and social 
issues, and local manager); and with the DSQ project manager. The themes which 
emerged are set out below. 
Cooperation and reflection 
The key coordinators and managers of 
the project were clear that one of the 
main positive aspects of the 
programme had been the coordinated 
and thought out programmes which 
had formed the basis for the action 
taken. Starting with the original City 
programme in 198 1, the Mayor and 
deputy Mayor had been insistent that 
working groups of all partners should 
take careful stock of the problems prior to making full plans for the improvements. 
The continuity of support by the Mayor, and his insistence that he and his deputies 
be fully involved in the programme had been one of the key factors in the success 
of the programme. Since a large part of the city revenues was being invested in the 
estate, this had to be explained and justified to electors in the north and centre of 
Bethune; but this had been done. All these aspects had lead to cooperation and good 
working relations between the HLM, City, and other agents 
Chanp-ed imap-e and reduced isolation 
Although the programme still had some way to go, it was generally agreed, amongst 
all the different people I spoke to, that the estate was now clearly seen as an 
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Interviews 
integral part of the city, to which a commitment had been made and was being 
fulfilled. It no longer carried the stigma of the forgotten part of the city. 
Failure of resident involvement 
Although much had been achieved, particularly in the way of physical works, there 
had been a marked lack of resident participation in the programme. Even now there 
was not any properly operating residents association, despite some effort by the 
HLM. The problems this had caused had become apparent over the life of the 
programme, however, and the HLMwas now fully committed to a series of social 
measures envisaged in the 1989-93 programme. 
The importance of the social dimension 
Many of the agents stressed that although the physical works had ben done, it was 
more and more realised that the problems were with the tenants social isolation, and 
lack of training and education. The need to provide places where they could meet, 
and programmes to assist in training tenants and preparing them for work, were now 
better realised. This was being tackled by the next (89-93) programme, which was 
almost entirely concentrating on social and economic actions, to assist the residents 
to integrate and become full members of the estate, town, and society. It was also 
part of the reason for the establishment of a Regie de Quartiers. 
Rapid degradation of improvements 
Perhaps partly as a result of the failure to involve residents, the common parts of 
the estate had suffered a rapid decline following the improvements. There was a 
failure to involve the residents in any sense of ownership or pride in the estate, even 
although the feelings of general isolation from the City appeared to be lessening. 
Improved housing management 
The HLM staff were clearly better trained than at the start of the programme, 
judging from the accounts of retraining given by many of them. The administrative 
procedures were also clearly better: new procedures for arrears recovery, new 
advisory and assistance services to help with problems of benefits and arrears, 
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extensive interviewing and vetting of allocations (instead of the prior system of 
taking anyone who applied), and a general commitment to providing services to 
tenants. 
Amongst the front line staff - caretakers, arrears officers, allocations staff, there 
was a greater general level of awareness of the DSQthan was generally present in 
other French case study estates, many of them noting that it had lead to better 
working relations with other agencies, and an injection of welcome funds. They 
tended to be very experienced staff, who had worked with the HLM for some time. 
This meant, however, that many of them had attitudes about the tenants which were 
difficult to change - for example the caretaking supervisor spent time discussing 
with me the problems of people from mining communities who did not know how to 
live in modem houses: they needed educating on how to use the bath, and other 
facilities. He described as his burden of responsibility the task of educating them, 
from a practical and moral perspective, on how to live together in flats. This may 
indeed reflect aspects of problems experienced by tenants, but its presentation 
seemed, as with the allocations supervisor described above, curiously out dated in 
its paternalism. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This is a programme which has already achieved many of its original aims, mainly 
in terms of physical works being carried out and management changes being put into 
place. The more people oriented aspects - tenant involvement, change of social mix 
on the estate- have not yet been achieved. There is now a greater realisation that 
these problems will have to be directly tackled with the tenants themselves. This is 
shown, for example, in the allocations policy. It was hoped at the start to attract 
more middle income employed households. This has now changed to a decision that 
the best that can be hoped is to weed out some of the more troublesome of the 
traditional tenant population of the estate - poor, large families. More importantly, 
the HLM and DSQ have realised that it is necessary to work with the existing 
residents in order to provide a less socially isolated population. 
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Local Manaqement: Considerable improvements from local 
Certain aspects have been particularly successful. The eradication of voids was done 
by both better management and by an imaginative use of disposal, change of use, and 
now sales. Arrears have been successfully controlled; staff have been well trained, 
and are committed to the programme. The HLM is well organised, using good 
procedures backed up by extensive computerisation. 
The importance of the previous programme, which was already in place in the city, 
is an aspect not often so clear in France as in the UK. The city had decided to carry 
out certain physical and social work on the estate, and at that point the DSQ come 
along and provided both the framework and the money. It does not seem likely that 
the DSQ was the inspiration for the programme, and indeed the fact that one of the 
DSQ main objectives was not attained - resident involvement - suggests that it may 
have been incidental except for the provision of resources. 
4-73 
The additional important aspect of this is to note that in fact the problem was 
manageable in a town the size of 13,6thune. The estate was not so disproportionatelý- 
large in relation to the surrounding urban area as to swamp it (as for example in 
Chanteloup) and the resources of the city, both monetary, political, and skills, could 
be successfully brought to bear to bring about successful improvements. 
Finally the programme continues into the next programme. The Mayor and 
programme team have attempted to learn from the successes and failures of the 84- 
88 programme, and to launch a new, adapted, and imaginative programme for the 
continuing improvement of the estate, which shows every sign of slowly and steadily 
respon ing. 
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Doddinciton Estate, Wandsworth 
INA 
Doddinaton Estate. Wandsworth 
Background and History 
Doddington Estate lies in the London Borough of Wandsworth, one of the inner 
London boroughs. The location of the estate was described in a French urbanism text 
(Chalaine 1972) as an example of a typical English inner city estate whose infill 
location causes problems: 
"between a major circulation route 
and a railway axis, as well as beneath 
the line of the main take off path for 
Heathrow Airport - despite the wish 
to avoid the lack of open space, doubt 
is thrown on the possibility of 
creating truly 
communal space" (p122). 
Wandsworth Council itself has been 
for some years a "flagship" borough 
for conservative local government 
practices, and has promoted 
privatisation, the sale of council 
homes and estates, and other radical 
developments. This is reflected also in 
the housing management and 
development policies also. 
The estate was completed in 1969 and built to the Jesperson system of mass 
construction, with concrete frames and factory made cladding panels. There is a 
commercial centre in the middle of the estate, which was also built with two large 
areas of underground garages. 
Population 
Unemployment levels were high at the start of the project, and continue to be high. 
No details were available on the population breakdown on the estate, nor of the 
educational and training profile of the residents. There had, for example, been no 
skills survey completed as part of the project. The impression of the main housing L- 
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manager, however, who had been on 
the estate for over 7 years, was that 
there was a high proportion of single 
parents, many West Indian, at the 
start of the scheme. This had been 
because the estate had been a 
"dumping ground" for homeless 
families, (up to 90% of allocations at 
one stage) who were in many 
instances from these groups. 
Box 32: Population 
Source: Wandsworth 1988 
Original Problems 
The estate had declined since it was 
built, and by the late 70s was subject 
to many incidents of flat wrecking, 
widespread vandalism and crime, 
including on one occasion the 
impounding of a cache of arms, and 
tenants being forced to leave. The 
first report setting out the difficulties 
on the estate was produced for the 
Housing Committee in 1984 
forced to accept homes. 
Despite this, voids remained high; there were also high levels of crime and 
vandalism. There were numerous problems of repair, particularly to rotting wooden 
bedroom windows and unsafe and uncleanable metal living room windows, which had 
been tackled by a programme prior to 1984. Some corridor refurbishment had also 
been carried out with the aid of IAP funding. The major problems remained, 
however, of the image and general conditions of life on the estate, which the council 
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decided to tackle in 1984. 
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Box 34: Major Problems at Start 
Sources: Wandsworth 1984,1985,1985a, 1988 
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Original Proposals and Objectives 
The original proposal for the estate was demolition. This was subsequently 
considered too costly, and a Special Estates Policy was created, with clear 
objectives, as set out below. 
Diversifying Tenure: 
This was seen as the first priority. Several initiatives were instituted to promote 
sales: targets were set for specific parts of the estate, and tenants were offered 
transfers in order to create additional voids for sale; all casual vacancies were sold; 
a show flat was opened, and publicly advertised; the flats which needed major work 
due to fire escape problems were sold following completion of the works. 
This policy complemented the homeless initiatives, as sales priority is given in 
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Wandsworth to those tenants 
who will release a large 
family unit (for homeless 
use) and move into a smaller 
flat. 
Balanced Comm unity: 
Lettings t0 homeless 
households were halted 
Local Management: Part of an unused commercial property on the estate was 
changed into a local office, which opened in September 1985. It was staffed by one 
Special Estates Officer, who had overall responsibility for the estate, two housing 
management assistants, two technical assistants, and a technical clerk, with a 
housing sales officer and an arrears officer on the estate part time. The duties 
covered in the local office included rent arrears and control (though not Housing 
Benefit administration which in Wandsworth is handled by the Treasurers 
Department), repairs, registration of transfer requests, local lettings, monitoring of 
(contracted out) careuddng and cleaning, advice on purchase, tenant involvement, 
and general tenancy matters. 
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Improved Image: Explicit attention was paid to the public relations aspect of the 
works on the estate, with a view to combatting the previous bad press. Frequent 
public relations events were held, to which the local and ethnic press were invited, 
to mark various stages in the completion of works. A tenants newsletter was 
created, and a community broadsheet distributed by the housing department. 
Tenant Consultation and Involvement: There were many problems to overcome, as 
prior to the new initiative there had been many promises made to tenants, but little 
improvement work, and tenants were generally disillusioned. Creating a good level 
of involvement in the plans was considered essential, however, and positive attempts 
were made to stimulate neighbourhood tenants associations, with the assistance of 
community workers based at the community association on the estate. The 
architects commissioned to develop plans for the estate were also given a clear brief 
to have extensive consultation, and a practice with considerable experience in 
working with local communities was chosen. A tenants hall was provided as part of 
the new office, as a means to promote tenants associations. 
Creating 4 Estate Zones ("Neighbourhoodan: The overall plan developed involved 
splitting up the estate into four distinct parts, not only be demolishing certain of the 
walkways that linked the estate blocks to each other, but also by the creation of a 
completely new circulation route for cars and pedestrians - there was a new central 
access road, then cul de sacs to each neighbourhood. The environmental 
improvements were also planned to reinforce this local neighbourhood identity. 
Environmental Works: A large landscaped grassed area was created in the centre 
of the estate. Low rise blocks had the surrounding land turned into a mix of 
individual gardens for ground floor flats and a locked communal garden, with 
children's play equipment, for the other flats. This provided a series of clearly 
identifiable and secure garden areas for small numbers of residents. For residents 
of high rise blocks, where they overlooked car parking roofs which were being 
retained, these areas were turned into patio gardens for the ground floor flats. An 
extensive programme of tree planting was undertaken throughout the estate. 
9-80 2 
Entrances and Corridors: Many of the walkways were demolished to create individual 
secure blocks. All of the entrance halls were refurbished and a number had major 
refurbishment undertaken, increasing their size and improving their orientation. A 
number of new lifts were provided. New entryphone systems were provided, including 
internal systems for each corridor. Walkways which remained were extensively 
improved by being roofed over with attractive pitched roofs painted in bright 
primary colours. 
New refuse facilities were also provided, and because many tenants used larger bags 
than would fit in chute hoppers, additional facilities for large bags were provided 
close to each entrance. 
Multi Agency Approach: Developing a 
plan which went beyond housing issues 
was seen as an essential element of 
the strategy. Improved services to the 
estate were encouraged from a 
number of local agencies and services. 
The police set up a weekly evening 
surgery; the Area Health Authority 
developed plans for a drop in centre, 
a nursery, and a Family Centre, 
British Rail developed plans for the 
arches and viaducts adjoining the 
estate; a local traders association was set up to provide their input to the 
improvements; and a brewery agreed to provided a new pub garden for its premises 
as part of the environmental works. The Economic Development Department was 
charged with the task of attracting a major supermarket to the estate (as this was 
one of the key wishes of tenants). The Leisure and Amenities Department aimed to 
provide a purpose youth and sports centre with a one o'clock club, and sports 
organiser for the school holidays, plus specialist equipment for the under fives. 
Physical Refurbishment Works: The main works done were to the external 
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appearance of the estate, including the walkways, and to the entrances described 
above. No internal works were done except for the top floor maisonettes of the low 
rise blocks. These all had problems of fire escape access - that this was through the 
next door flat, which made either personal security and fire escape access 
impossible, depending on whether the resident decided to lock this fire door. These 
flats were extensively remodelled to make flats on one level. 
The programme of window renewal continued throughout the programme. This 
included the option, put to all residents and available free to tenants (charged to 
leaseholders), to have a bay window constructed on the front elevation - resulting 
in the totally random pattern of bays on the blocks. The facades of the blocks were 
also recovered and repainted. 
What Happened? 
Tenure Diversification: This estate achieved a pronounced transformation of its 
tenure pattern from totally council owned to a current level of 35 % leasehold, and 
rising. The vigourous programme of promoting sales has been very successful, at 
least up to the point of the collapse of the housing market in 1990/91, with many 
sales going to local or estate residents. The main plank of the programme of both 
sales and local lettings has been that only those who positively wish to live on the 
estate should be allocated or sold flats - and this policy has generated sufficient 
demand to leave the estate with currently an effective nil void rate, with only relet 
voids remaining. The transfers notice board in the local office shows that even some 
elderly tenants with houses and gardens are now willing to move onto the estate. No 
tenant cooperatives or management boards have emerged, partly because 
Wandsworth have concentrated on sales as a means of tenure diversification on this 
estate. 
Ima2e, Layout, and Environmental Works: The change to being a high demand estate 
from a hard to let estate indicates that at one level the image has changed 
considerably. The physical image has certainly changed, with the multi coloured 
building features and diverse new layout, including a spectacular new entrance arch, 
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Box 37: Summary of Outcomes 
presenting a very positive and striking image to visitors, as well as to residents. One 
of the most striking features is the use of the previous communal space for the 
gardens, both the private gardens at the rear of blocks and the patio gardens in the 
centre of the estate. 
The sharp reduction in crime, resulting partly from the increased security measures, 
partly from the increased sense of community, partly from the removal of the 
underground garages as a haven for criminal activity and gathering of young vandals, 
has also improved the image. These garages were either demolished, turned in to 
secure individual lock up garages, or transformed for use as workshops or in one case 
as resident clubrooms. 
Consultation and Resident Involvement: Following a vigorous programme of 
meetings, leaflets, day festivals, and surgeries, 32% of tenants partIcipated In the 
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discussion of proposals. There are now three residents associations and a community 
association, and apparently a high degree of participation in estate life. 
Entrances and Corridors: The creation of new entrances seems to have been 
successful. They are well maintained and generally in good working order. 
Multi Agency Approach: Generally the services on the estate (caretaking, cleaning, 
repairs, green services) have been privatised, and are carried out be contractors 
whose work is inspected by the estate staff. Other council departments seem to 
work well with the estate staff. 
Rehabilitation: Original discussions on improving the estate had been started in 1980. 
It was therefore felt important that at the point that the full new Special Estate 
Initiative took off, works should start with a bang. 
The initial works were therefore of - 
demolition of some of the walkways, Total Housing Cost: F- 23 
million (to completion) 
and of one set of underground 
garages, to show that the council now 
Cost per estate home: E23900 
meant business. In due course 
EA Contribution: E3309 
Million (1986 -89) 
extensive works were carried out, at Other Contributions: 
costs set out in the table below. It Significant funds were from 
sales of homes on the estate 
should be noted that income from the 
sales programme accounts for a large Box 38: Summary of Expenditure 
part of the capital investment 
resources available to Wandsworth. The extensive borough wide sales programme 
has resulted in the generation of sufficient capital resources not only to do major 
renovation works on certain estates (sometimes prior to disposal) but also to reach 
a position where within about 2 years all housing debt will be paid off. The 
investment in Doddington represented a major part of the total capital investment 
of the Housing Department, with in 1988 the Doddington investment making up by 
itself 25% of the total housing capital programme. 
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Comments and Assessment by Main Agents 
Range of Interviews In all seven local agents were interviewed in depth, representing 
all the main management functions, including the project manager, allocations 
officer, estate manager, arrears and benefits officer, and district manager. I decided 
not to interview any of the contract staff, however (as they were not directly 
employed by the estate management team, and were liable to change at any point) 
so no caretakers of cleaners are represented in the discussion. It was both unusual 
and useful that two of the main players had been between them working on the 
estate for in total eighteen years. 
Local Office and Manap-ement 
The atmosphere in the local office is 
very relaxed and friendly. it is clear 
that the local staff are well known 
and respected, and trips around the 
estate inevitably involve stopping 
frequently to exchange information or 
greetings tenants. The repairs service 
appears responsive, and despite the 
absence of a dedicated repairs team, 
the contractor has ceratin operatives 
virtually full time on the estate, who 
as a consequence know the buildings 
and the tenants well. 
The local team is stable, and are all 
experienced officers. One key to this had been at the start of the project, an since, 
only experienced volunteers who wished to take up the challenge of Doddington had 
been transferred onto the estate. The main local manager appears content to be on 
the estate, and takes a pride in the changes which have taken place over the last 
few years. The estate receives many visitors whom the Borough seeks to impress 
with the success of its approach. The District Manager, who works in the District 
Office one mile away, is also clear that the estate has improved. Both long serving 
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Interviews 
officers attribute the changes to a combination of altering the population, and 
effective physical and environmental works. Relations with other agencies - for 
example police and health visitors - were generally good, with many regular contacts 
over tenants. There was a certain dissatisfaction over the perceived limited control 
over the privatised services, but even here the staff worked hard to generate good 
relations. In particular, caretaking is felt to be a problem by the local staff - more 
in terms of the fact that there is not really enough cleaning in the contract, and 
despite a reasonable performance from the contractor it is not really enough to 
maintain a high standard (although the estate is by no means dirty or litter strewn). 
Physical Works 
One key element of the programme was felt to be the involvement of residents and 
willingness to change as the programme proceeded. For example it had become clear 
after the first set of improvements to entrances that a double set of security doors 
would be necessary, which was the model for subsequent installations. Equally the 
need for communal meeting space and provision for play schemes and nurseries had 
been recognised and catered for following consultation. Local staff now know the 
buildings well and are able to order repairs, and determine priorities of jobs, quickly 
and effectively. 
Allocations and Residents 
All interviewed were clear that one key to the success of the project had been the 
policy of only allowing onto the estate those people who positively wished to live 
there. There were plenty of them - children or relations of existing residents, or 
others who wished to buy in the revitalised and conveniently located estate. 
Impact of EA Programme 
Generally it was felt that the programme of improvements, and the direction of 
policy on the estate, had been initiated by the Borough itself; and that the main 
input of Estates Action had been to provide some cash (but by no means most of it). 
No advice was received from the associated agencies (e. g. PEP), although the City 
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Action Team had visited at one point in connection with the workshop and 
employment initiatives. The Estates Action personnel had "tagged along behind 
Wandsworth", and their main activity now was sending delegations to look at the 
estate and claim it was a success for the EA programme. 
Summary and Evaluation 
Generally it is clear that the estate is now much more successful, popular, and well 
managed than previously. This appears due to the significant expenditure on the 
estate, made possible more by virtue of the general sales policy than by the presence 
of Estates Action funding, which accounts for a small part of the total investment. 
Equally the development of the initiatives on the estate appears to have been based 
on the general policy lines of the borough as a whole, which helpfully coincided with 
the line advocated by Estates Action. All the major indicators suggest 
improvements, and the estate appears now to be in a fairly good state of repair and 
"habitability". The local office also has a positive and busy atmosphere. The main 
difference from other case studies, however, is the importance given to individual 
ownership of leaseholds, and the success of that policy. 
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Miles Plattinq. Manchester 
Mil ýs Platting Estate in Manchester 
Miles Platting estate is part of inner city Manchester, to the north east of the city 
centre. The estate is a mix of maisonettes, terraced houses, and high rise flats, 
constructed in the early 1960s. 
comprising some 3,500 homes in all, 
plus an area of 800 older terraced 
homes in the adjacent streets which 
form a separate renewal area. The 
estate is built around the site of a 
now abandoned factory, which 
dominates the centre of the estate, 
together with part of the Rochdale 
Canal and the entrances to a number 
of abandoned small mines. There are 
good connections to the city centre by 
bus and rail, but the general facilities 
on the estate are restricted to a small 
shopping centre, a public baths and washouse, and a branch library, as well as the 
housing office and branch office (apparently appropriately) of the probation service. 
The original problems have been evident on the estate since the late 1970s, and the 
programme for improvements began in 1982 
Population 
The estate was originally studied in 1981 as part of the preparation for the original 
Community Refurbishment Programme. Later information from the 1981 census 
indicated that the estate suffered from a range of social and economic deprivations. 
The unemployment rate was high, and there was a high proportion of semi skilled and 
unskilled workers. There was a high proportion of single parents, and young children. 
The total density on the estate was double the city average. There was also a high 
proportion of lone pensioners. The main problem, however, was that the population 
was becoming severely eroded, with very high levels of voids. There was a fear at 
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Box 41: Location 
the start of the project that the 
Incomes: High proportion 
(details not supplied) on 
community was on the brink of total 
benefits only disintegration as it was becoming so In 
Employment: Male unemployment isolated and fragmented, with the 
of 36%; higher than average 
semi- skilled and unskilled only new residents willing to move on 
Households: Twice city 
being transient young homeless 
average of single parents; people. 
higher than average 0-4 year 
olds; higher than average 
lone pensioners; twice city Original Problems average density of population 
Ethnic: Vietnamese population 
The disintegration of the community 
(2%); and Afro-caribbean had been mainly caused by the 
community (2%) 
unpopularity of the estate due to its 
Box 42: Population (1981 Census poor conditions. There were a variety 
and other local information) 
of housing types, each with its own 
set of physical problems. The double decker maisonettes suffered from water 




irnover: Particularly high in towers which were let to 
Repairs: considerable general disrepair; towers suffered 
from extensive penetration; all communal entrances 
Box 44: Original Problems at Start 
The high rise flats formed a separate problem. Of the thirteen, one had been already 
turned into a block entirely for elderly people, with its own warden. Many structural 
problems affected the blocks: the windows suffered from rotting wood and draughty 
gaps; roofs were flat and suffered from rain penetration and high maintenance costs; 
the ground floor suffered from problems of dampness due to defective soil stacks, 
as well as some rain penetration and rising damp. Heating was mainly by expensive 
and inefficient electric underfloor heating, much of which was also failing; there was 
water penetration to the cavity walls throughout the building, and through the 
balconies and cladding due to inadequate or failed cavity trays, poor drainage, 
shoddy initial workmanship in fixing the walls, and high wind pressure; the lifts were 
subject to frequent breakdown; and there were problems with the refuse chutes. 
There were other issues about the towers: there was a very high rate of turnover, 
I 
6-91 
which itself lead to the creation of a bad reputation for certain of the blocks. In 
fact there was a hierarchy of quality of blocks, with certain having reasonably stable 
populations and fewer problems, but a hard core of four which were notorious in the 
city as problems. Security was also a problem, with a high crime and burglary rate 
in the towers, with in certain cases during the later 80s an increasing incidence of 
drug use and dealing. 
The problem of the general environment of the estate was also recognised as being 
central to the difficulties. The main problem was the lack of private space around 
buildings, which lead in turn to a problems of large areas of unkept open space. This 
problem extended to the disused adjacent industrial land as well. 
Ofiginal Proposals and Objectives 
The original programme, to which Estates Action eventually contributed, was 
launched on 12 October 1981 by the City council. The aims were to: 
- establish a stable inner city community in Miles Platting 
- establish a dwelling density and dwelling quality comparable to the most 
successful low rise estates, surrounded by a high quality external environment 
which is both practical and economical to maintain 
- encourage the maximum number of existing original tenants to remain in 
the new environment to act as a nucleus for the new community by enlisting 
their help in planning the improved estate. 
The scheme was launched by a public meeting, and the opening of a multi 
disciplinary Project Team office and information centre on the estate. The project 
was managed by the Chief Executives Office. 
The problems required a radical approach, and this was taken. There were two main 
phases of the development, first dealing with the flats and maisonettes; and 
subsequently (via Estate Action) dealing with the Towers. The maisonettes were to 
be dealt with by the radical process of "decapitation": the entire two upper floors, 
which previously constituted the upper maisonette, were to be removed, leaving only 
the lower two floors. These were then to be reroofed and rehabilitated forming 
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individual terraced houses in small blocks. The space left by what was originally the 
stairwell was incorporated into the adjacent homes as additional rooms, or in some 
cases made into a small one bedroom, two storey, house. This was an ambitious 
programme, as there were 101 blocks of maisonettes on the estate. 
The problems of the towers were 
resolved differently. They problems of 
water penetration were tackled by a 
programme of remedial works. The 
main initiative however, under Estate 
Action, was a security programme. 
This involved the installation of a 
series of linked closed circuit TV 
cameras in blocks, linked to a central 
control centre. The accommodation 
for caretakers was also improved, and 
their position as managers of the 
blocks strengthened. 
The environment was the third area 
for planning. The project team realised at an early stage that the poor environment 
was one of the main contributors to the discontent and dissatisfaction of local 
residents, particularly in terms of their lack of security and privacy. Tenant 
consultation reinforced this view, with the lack of private space immediately outside 
the dwelling a particular cause of complaint. There were numerous walkways and 
pathways which often ran very close to windows. Fencing was also low, and provided 
a poor physical an psychological barrier. The need to improve the environment was 
extended to the industrial and other adjacent land. This was included In a wider 
programme called the East Manchester Initiative, which involved both the purchase 
and demolition of derelict buildings and the implementation of environmental 
schemes. 
Community involvement was also seen as a key part of the programme. It was 
6-93 
Box 45: Housing Objectives of 
Programme 
stake in their home and area, 
Box 46: Non Housing Elements 
encouraging a long term attitude of 
care and protection of the improvements. The consultation process was also seen as 
bringing the tenants together in a positive situation, sharing experiences and 
activities - this could be a basis for further community development and tenant 
involvement in their area. 
What Happened 
The full programme of conversion of maisonettes, which was the largest element of 
the scheme, continued for nine years in all, closing in 1991 after the decapitation 
of blocks to create 769 new terraced homes. In addition, further modernisation work 
was completed in the terraced houses, and in the multi storey flats, affecting in all 
2,259 homes at a total cost of some f48 million. 
The decapitation works were carried out on a rolling programme basis, starting with 
the worst blocks first. At the start a considerable number of tenants indicated they 
wished to move off the estate. As the programme developed, however, increasing 
numbers of residents decided to stay, reaching levels of 85% in some blocks (which 
lead to some problems in accommodating everyone together). Efforts were made 
wherever possible to move neighbours together, where this had been requested, and 
to preserve local communities already living together in blocks. Equally the 
opportunity was taken to move, for example, elderly tenants nearer to their families 
where this was useful and requested. The whole process proceeded by a labour 
intensive process of consultation in detail about the plans and proposals, and meeting 
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of block representatives and individual blocks, as well as individual visits. This part 
of the programme worked extremely well. There was a process of continual feedback 
from people who had just gone through the removal and improvement process, and 
as a result improvements were constantly made to how the process was managed. 
These surveys showed high satisfaction levels. 
Modernisation works were also carried out to many of the houses. This involved 
modernisation of the heating and wiring, provision of new damp courses, and repairs 
to windows, roofs, and doors. 
The provision of the security system in the towers is probably the least effective 
element of the improvements. The system is managed from a central control room 
which monitors all the TV screens. There have been several attempts to engage 
firms of private security guards to staff the system, but at the point of my visit of 
the four who had been employed all had been subsequently removed. The system had 
been kept going for the two years of its operation by the goodwill of the caretaking 
staff who provided occasional cover for evenings and weekends, and in fact provided 
total cover in periods where there was no security firm in place. 
I spent about two hours in this control room, viewing the system and discussing the 
problems and advantages with the various caretaking staff who passed through in 
that time. It was clear that there were many problems, both technical and 
management, with the system. Certain of the cameras are badly placed. The system 
was elaborately set up with a series of screens and optional enlargement screens 
for 
any of the small pictures on display. It demanded that there was at least one person 
on duty at all times, but often there was only one and that person was unable to go 
out to patrol where there appeared to be an incident brewing. 
The caretakers knew people in the blocks very well, in many cases. This 
included 
certain drug dealers, and it was clearly put to me that where there was the 
possibility of trouble for the caretakers or their families if they took preventative 




malsonette Blocks: 9 year programme producing 769 new homes in terraced units with gardens 
Houses: Extensive renovation programme 
Towers: Water penetration and roofing works; extensive CCTV 
securitv svstem ingtAllpH 
)cks on windows and doors in many homes; 
rdens 
footpaths and pa 
--- -C -- --c -11 and for garden or play area space 
Minimal maintenance landscaping 
Box 47: Summary of Outcomes 
caretakers had to survive on the estate on a day to day basis, and personal security 
came first. The local housing office had an elaborate security checking system by 
which they could check whether the key fobs had been used for any of the flats - 
this was designed to identify those flats where the residents only used them as giro 
drops, or where there were unauthorised occupants. The caretakers knew, however, 
of households who had lost their fobs and who could not reasonably afford the f 15 
replacement charge per unit for each member of the family, and who they regularly 
let through the door. There was also apparently a considerable amount of crime 
(such as burglary) which took place within the blocks, and which was not monitored 
at all. 
My conclusion was that it was not so much that the system was fundamentally 
flawed, although it seemed rather centralised, patchy, and remote. Rather it was 
clear that there was little in the way of adequate and organised management of the 
facility, and that for this reason it was rather wasted. 
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Few general management changes took place. The local office continued as usual, 
operating from a dingy office at the edge of the commercial centre. The office is 
very unwelcoming, with a small glazed enquiry hatch, surrounded by an 
uncomfortable and cold waiting area offering few concessions to customer service. 
No major management initiatives had been taken. The whole of the organisation of 
services in Manchester was decentralised, and the local office which covered Miles 
Platting also covered some other adjacent estates - 6,000 homes in all. There was 
no special initiative for the estate, or dedicated estate office, though the services 
were locally available on the estate (a model which is common in many decentralised 
UK housing departments). There were no local allocations schemes or initiatives for 
selecting tenants or allowing local moves. There is, however, a scheme whereby any 
property which has been letable for over 6 weeks and refused twice is put on an 
"instant let" programme, whereby it can be let to anyone willing to take it. This 
originally operated in 1988 on the basis of advertising in the local press. Several bad 
experiences with anti social tenants who came from this route, particularly in the 
towers. lead to the suspension of open advertising, however. It is now mainly people 
known to estate residents who apply through the scheme. 
Considerable environmental improvements also took place. These were partly 
security works, where new front and back door locks, and new window locks were 
provided to vulnerable flats; and secure garden areas were provided around ground 
floor flats to prevent intruders coming right up to the blocks. The footpaths and 
walkways through the estate were also rearranged, to avoid approaches to the rear 
or insecure areas of blocks and discourage possible burglary. Fences were provided 
to break up the open areas, where possible providing a use for any open space with 
either clear landscaping or provision of play equipment. Additional landscaping of 
the more industrial peripheral areas was also undertaken, with the provision of a 
town park in the site of some demolished industrial buildings, the creation of a BMX 
track for children, following requests for one, and the demolition and landscaping 
of further buildings along the canal bank. 
Other special initiatives were set up on the estate. A special cleansing team (eight 
operatives and a supervisor) works within the estate and surrounding area, clearing 
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land, dealing with litter, collecting 
bulk refuse, and ensuring that the 
place is clean and tidy. This is seen as 
a major improvement, and tenants can 
report problems to the local office, 
which are promptly dealt with. A dog 
warden service which operates widely 
Housing Related Cost: E48 
million 
Cost per estate home: E 17,10 0 
Estate Action Contribution: 
E7.4 million 
Other Programme Cost: E2 
million Urban Programme 
throughout the city has been given a Box 48: Summary of Expenditure 
special brief to deal promptly with 
problems on the estate. During the period of works, a special voids team operated, 
which stripped out flats immediately a development void was created by the 
decanting of a tenant to a new flat - this was widely recognised as having prevented 
extensive vandalism. There were also special steps taken to enable better grounds 
maintenance to be achieved easily, such as the removal of low fencing and other 
barriers to cutting and other grounds maintenance. 
The question remains about the extent to which the estate has improved. There 
remain problems: crime on the estate remains high. The newly opened supermarket 
experienced a devastating spate of breakins on its opening, and only remained in 
business due to high security measures which had to be introduced. Certain streets 
on the estate remain derelict, despite the improvements. Now that the special voids 
team has gone, any new void flats are almost immediately stripped out, and in 
certain blocks the presence of several such voids has lead to a general deterioration 
of the block and area. Equally in the houses there is at least one street which is, 
apparently, the notorious locus of many types of crime both on and off the estate. 
Much of the on estate crime consist of crimes against vehicles, which are extremely 
common. The tower blocks retain their mixed reputation, with certain of them now 
fairly stable and well maintained while a hard core of two or three remain plagued 
with high turnover and poor reputations. Generally the reputation of the estate, 
although better locally amongst those who remain on the estate, is not markedly 
better in the city as a whole, where it is still seen as a sink estate. 
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Comments and Assessment by Main Agents 
Interviews were held with the main housing staff, and members of the project team 
responsible for the decanting and improvement programme. These included the Local 
Housing Manager, Deputy Housing Manager, two local Housing Officers, a Lettings 
Officer, a Repairs supervisor, a Project coordinator and administrator. a the 
Caretaking supervisor, several local caretakers, and an arrears supervisor. 
Excellent Dhysical improvements: There was no doubt that there had been a 
considerable improvement to the physical structure of the estate, and the homes 
that had been created were much better and more desirable for tenants. The impact 
of the works was significant although given the total expense this was hardly 
surprising. Nonetheless the estate had been changed from one of poor, uncomfortable 
dwellings to one of modern quality homes. 
Cont inuinp- Problems: crime, 
vandalism, drugs and squatters: 
Despite these physical changes, the 
main issues raised by almost all of the 
agents concerned the levels of crime 
Excellent physical 
improvements 
Continuing Problems: crime, 
vandalism, drugs and 
squatters: 
Patchwork estate 
and social problems on the estate. 
The caretaking staff particularly 
noted the growing problems of anti 
social tenants; and problems of 
physical violence and intimidation. 
They are possibly most aware of this 
because they are resident, with their 
Stabilisation of the 
community 
Important role of caretaking 
Problems with management of 
concierge 
Box 49 Main Issues From 
Interviews 
families; and also because they have a responsibility for the video security system 
which gives them a 24 hour awareness of what is really going on the estate. The last 
year had seem many incidents of attacks against the security system - mainly by 
people painting out the camera vision points. It had also seen the stabbing of one of 
the private security guards. 
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Patchwork estate: Many agents recounted stories about the more notorious parts of 
the estate, and indeed took me on tours of some of the more garish bum out sites. 
These problems were not spread evenly around the estate. Certain of the streets of 
houses were, apparently no go areas. Other streets were models of harmony and 
respectability. Certain towers were "little palaces". Others had a city wide 
reputation for crime and drugs. 
Stabilisation of the communit y: This issue had two facets. Many of the agents 
described and illustrated how the improvement programme had worked hard to 
involve the remaining tenants on the estate, and to preserve and enhance the 
community life by planning mo ves in line with their wishes. This was clearly a very 
positive element, and had worked well. On the other hand the poor parts of the 
estate suffered from the exact opposite problem: they were undesirable parts of the 
estate and the city's housing stock which nonetheless had to be let, to keep down 
void levels and to keep up rent income. This was a major sources of problems in 
turnover of tenancies and the arrival of often young transient populations with little 
commitment to the estate. There was no way, however, to avoid this problem - for 
example simply by removing the excess unstable housing stock from the estate. The 
levels of housing demand in Manchester, and the already high decline in available 
units following decapitation, precluded any such radical steps, or any fundamental 
changes of use. The problem had to remain a housing management problem to be 
dealt with. 
important role of caretaking: There was a general acceptance of the importance of 
the role of caretakers in the improvement of the management of the towers. At the 
point of my visit this role was about to be enhanced with an increasing role being 
given to the social dimension of their job, with additional training to be introduced. 
One of the caretakers to whom I spoke already had a very clear idea of his social 
role, recounting how he regularly did shopping for elderly tenants if they were 
unwell, or assisted others with minor problems. 
Problems with management of concierge: As with other UK case studies, there were 
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clear problems with the management of the concierge system. These were not 
universally felt - for example the deputy housing manager felt that by and large the 
system worked to achieve its main deterrent and stabilising goals, despite the 
undoubted problems. Nonetheless it seemed clear to most that the perfect solution 
had not yet been found, either in terms of the technical specification of the system 
or in terms of the management arrangements. 
Summary and Evaluation 
Considerable improvements have been made to this estate, which has experienced 
a profound physical transformation from unpopular double decker maisonette blocks 
to modern terraced homes. The persistence of the programme, its humane alld 
consultative progression by stages of preserving and nurturing local communities 
seems to have been a model of sensitive management. There are a wide range of 
problems on the estate, and imaginative solutions have been sought to each of them, 
including concierges in the towers, and substantive environmental improvements. 
Despite this considerable work there remain clear problems on the estate. The 
underlying difficulties of crime, unemployment, and the estate's poor image have not 
been resolved, and indeed have worsened throughout the progress of the project. 
These continue to blight certain parts of the estate. The possible solution adopted 
in may other of the case study estates - widespread demolition and change of use - 
has not been pursued with the towers. They remain pockets of instability, 
welcoming mainly young and poor households who are new to the estate and in many 
cases may be new householders. 
The improvements to the towers, as in a number of other case study estates, have 
suffered from an absence of a coherent programme for the management of the high 
technology concierge system, which seems only partially e ective. 
The general management arrangements are also not specifically directed at the 
problems of the estate. This is not to say that they are inappropriate; however it is 
noticeable that the general Manchester approach has been applied to the estate with 
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Voids: 3.5% 
19.3% (56% of tenants are in arrears) 
High in towers; low in decapitated blocks 
in of Improvements: Decapitated blocks generally 
uses patchy; towers very patchy and generally poor 
, ittle change of image city wide; seen as centre of 
No major changes; 2,800 units left 
Participation: Remains low 
Box 50: State of Main Indicators Now 
no apparent concession to its specific problems and issues. There also is not much 
evidence of any more corporate approach to the problems and issues. 
In conclusion, a project which has achieved much, but which still is struggling to 
cope with the weight of problems produced by the concentration of residents in 
difficulty on the estate. 
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Precinct Estate. Salford 
Box 52: Population 
Population 
There is a polarised age structure, with (in 1989) 35 % pensioners (compared to a city 
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Background and History 
wide average of 19 %), and a slightly higher percentage of 16-24 year olds (16.2 % 
compared to 14.9%). Although the estate was originally constructed for slum 
clearance homes for families, severaJ years of a rehousing policy which gave 
preference to families wishing to move off high rise estates to low rise blocks has 
resulted in a predominately single population, and very low percentage of families 
(though this is not quantified in any of the reports). Other aspects of the residents 
cited in City of Salford 1989 include high unemployment (23.1%, double the city 
average), and low car ownership (14%, lowest for any area in the city). 
For historical reasons, there is a very 
low proportion of ethnic minority 
households on the estate - virtually 
the only ones being foreign students in 
flats rented to Salford University. 
This was explained as being due to the 
tradition of immigration to nearby 
Manchester, including Moss Side, 
which concentrated black households 
there. Salford concentrated on 
rehousing traditional white families 
from slum clearance sites, and had 
little immigration - the 1981 census shows 3.1 % of heads of households born outside 
the UK or Eire, with 1.3% from the New Commonwealth and Pakistan. T his has 
continued, apparently, even despite the open access to the stock which will be set 
out below. It is possible that there is in fact a high level of racial intolerance on the 
estate also partly responsible: I was told of a recent incident where a black family 
had moved onto the estate, but had to be moved off about a month later due to 
intolerable harassment. 
Looking at Salford more generally, in comparison to the Greater Manchester area 
as a whole, there are many problems: 39% of the housing stock is local authority, 
with 44% social renting when Housing Associations are included; 40% of 
economically active households are in partially or unskilled occupations; 33.5% are 
304 
Box 53: Estate Details 
in manual skilled occupations, with only 1.2 %in professional occupations-, five of the 
Regions top ten wards for long term unemployment are in Salford; perinatal 
mortality 1984-86 was 11.7, compared with the North West average of 10.0 and the 
national average of 9.5; and 1991 figures show Salford has the second highest rate 
of people out of work for more than one year compared with other authorities in the 
Region, at 32.6%, of whom 19% have been out of work for over 22 years (details in 
City of Salford 1991). 
Original Problems 
Salford's general housing problems stemmed from a post war legacy of slum housing- 
which lead to massive clearance and rebuilding programmes, of which the Precinct 
estate is one example. The slums of Salford, according to the current Deputy 
Director of Housing, were famed as the worst in the region. The process of 
clearance and rebuilding has been so successful, however, that there is now a surplus 
of accommodation, and as will be illustrated below filling the voids in the less 
popular properties is a major problem. This is reflected on the Precinct estate, 
whose key problems are listed below. They are: 
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Voids: 19% (1989) (c. f. 4.7-0. city average) 22% in towers 
19% (double city average) 
ritified by police as one of worst two areas in 
UctiL 
Box 54: Major Problems at Start 
Voids: In 1989, prior to the "High Rise Initiative", 19% of the PrecInct stock was 
void, compared with 4.7% in the city as a whole. Of high rise flats, 22% were 
vacant. Certain blocks were particular problems: for example 74% of low rise voids 
were concentrated in one of the blocks (Rowan Close, subsequently recommended 
for structural alteration). The general problem is explained in the City of Salford 
(1989) report as follows: 
"For quite some time now it has been generally accepted that high-rise blocks 
are unsuitable for a family lifestyle. The City Council's own transfer policy 
has recognised this and a good many families have moved to traditional 
houses as a result. Unfortunately there has not been a ready demand from 
other client groups to move in and take the place the families have left 
behind ..... 
Apart from the traditional problems of impersonality, lack of 
defensible space, and the general common aversion to lifts, high rise living 
has many associated social problems; fear of crime, vandalism, graffiti, lack 
of security. These all contribute to making multi-storeys low on the list of 
preferred options for most currently registered applicants" (p 3) 
Turnover: High turnover was an associated problem. Often the only people who were 
willing to take homes on the estate were young people, or groups of young people, 
who had little commitment to the estate, and quickly moved on, sometimes letting 
the flat to friends. Equally some families moved on to the estate as a last resort 
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option, moving off as soon as something better came up. 
Crime: The Police judged the estate to be one of the two worst areas of the city, 
with a very high crime rate, particularly for burglary, shoplifting, car theft, and 
criminal damage. 
Lack of Secudt3L The high rates of crime and theft served to increase the 
difficulties of letting properties which were completely lacking in any type of 
security or surveillance system. 
Tenant Attitudes: The mix of new, younger, transient tenants on the one hand, and 
older (often original) tenants on the other meant that "the polarisation of age ranges 
[lead] to clashes of lifestyles in the particular blocks where the old and they very 
young [had] mixed" (City of Salford (1989) p). Certain other tenants of blocks with 
high voids had problems of the oppressive atmosphere of a half empty block. There 
was little participation in associations. 
Local Management: The management of the estate was done originally (pre 1989) 
from two offices, both o f which dealt with a wider area than the estate itself, and 
both of which dealt with different services - one with voids, allocations and estate 
management, the other with repairs and housing benefit. 
Environment: The estate is dominated by the scale and visual appearance of the high 
rise towers. There were large areas of unused green space, and the a system of 
separation of vehicles and pedestrians was unpopular with residents as it increased 
the risk of personal attack. 
Image: The conjunction of all of these factors had lead to a very poor image for the 
estate, with a reputation for crime and as a sink estate. 
Positive Aspects: 
It should be noted on a more positive note that certain things were not problems: the 
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estate had excellent transportation links with the rest of the area, the shopping 
centre and market provided good access to commercial services, and many amenities 
and services were within easy walking distance, including schools, pubs., churches, 
a library, a health centre, a police station, a park, and a theatre, in addition it was 
a short bus ride to the full facilities of Central Manchester. 
Original Proposals and Objectives 
Improvement works have been underway on the estate since 1986, when the first 
successful estates action bid was made. Continuing major improvement works were 
part of the city's 3 year strategic plan 1989-91 (set out in City of Salford (1989)). 
This is an impressive document which goes through the estate block by block, setting 
out the specific management and physical problems of the block, and proposing 
options for change. It is followed up by a further progress report considering further 
options (City of Salford (1990)). The main aspects of this plan, which provided details 
of both work undertaken since 1986 and planned work for the future, are set out 
below. 
Local Management Office: This opened in June 1989, in a former church at the 
centre of the estate. The office was funded by Estate Action, at a capital cost of 
f, 275,900, plus a contribution to the running costs. These costs were estimated at an 
extra E84,000 a year. The additional cost is due to the need for more intensive 
management in the high rise dwellings, and other parts of the estate. There was also 
lower income due to high voids, arrears, and former tenants arrears. A 
comprehensive housing service is provided from the office, 
including caretaking, arrears, allocations, void control, rent collection, housing 
benefits, and day to day repairs. The office manages in total 4,726 properties 
(including a few off the estate itself). The office comprises an Area Housing 
Manager, supported by an assistant, three housing officer teams, a maintenance 
team, a caretaking team, and two wardens. 
Increased Security for the Blocks: The bulk of the Estates Action expenditure was 





of use, including 
)n 
1986, at a cost of 07,500, but 
without any assistance from Estates 
Action. This provided a 24 hour cover 
concierge system. 
Chanaes of use and demolition, many attempts were made to make other use of the 
void stock. One 14 storey 112 unit block was transformed for use as a "young 
singles" block, with fitted furniture in each flat, communal facilities including 
television, laundry, lounge, gymnasium and a games room, a walk in hostel for 
homeless people, and on site management. This was provided partly from Estates 
Action funding, and partly from a special Central Government allocation to alleviate 
homelessness. 
Leasing to University students was also tried in two blocks, as well as attempts to 
lease units through the Health authority. Two further blocks originally used for 
student lets were eventually demolished, and the land used for extending the 
commercial centre at the north edge of the estate. Two blocks, empty at the time 
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of my fieldwork on the estate, were being proposed for demolition. Two further 
blocks were sold off to Salford College of Technology. 
The policy pursued by the City was to try to concentrate its tenants in certain 
viable blocks; then to seek offers from any other appropriate source to use the 
remaining blocks; and where the state of the property, or reputation of the block 
became too difficult to manage, to try to dispose of either the block or the land. 
Intensive Allocations Marketing The voids problem, which increased steadily during 
late 1988 and early 1989, was finally tackled by developing a "High Rise Initiative", 
launched in June 1989. This followed the realisation that in January 1989 there were 
999 vacancies in high rise Precinct flats, but only a total of 306 applicants on the 
waiting list prepared to even consider a high rise offer - and of the 193 applicants 
registered for the Precinct area, only 32 indicated they were prepared to consider 
high rise. 
To tackle these problems, the Initiative opened a show flat in one of the blocks, with 
a view to tenanting both that block and its neighbour. Individual flats were 
refurbished with new kitchens, bathrooms, and full redecoration. Advertisements 
were placed in the local press, and a brochure was produced ("Joint the High Life"). 
The initiative was generally successful; for example in relation to one advertisement 
placed in the Manchester Evening News, there were 156 replies, resulting in 28 lets 
and a further 28 offers. Between June 1989 and May 1990 a total of 155 lets were 
made, with a further 49 people accepted and awaiting completed flats. Of these 155 
lets, 125 were from the Manchester/Salford area, but some were from as far afield 
as London or Scotland. The policy also allowed an offer to be made there and then 
to a casual enquirer at the office - subject to checks. 
The allocations criteria were implemented by local officers who also did the 
interviewing and made decisions about lettings. The criteria were not written down, 
and the interviewing officers were generally looking for potential tenants who would 
pay the rent regularly and would not be problems. No distinction was made between 
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employed or unemployed applicants, but previous tenancies would be checked for any 
record of arrears of tenancy problems. A key element, according to one officer 
interviewed, who was responsible for making these allocations, was the "gut feeling" 
when talking to these applicants. 
Physical regeneration Extensive rehabilitation has also been carried out on the 
estate. A programme of works totalling 14.3 million was planned and undertaken, 
whose details are set out briefly below. 
It is evident from the list below that some of the works were not specifically related 
to the Estate Action programme (particularly, for example, the pre-painting repairs), 
but it is difficult to make a precise division between those works which are part of 
the special initiative and those which are related to regular maintenance of the 
estate. 
Works Cost (000s) 
Security 29220 
Conversion to singles block 11287 
Environmental 21224 
Local management office 276 
Podium demolition 17 
Heating replacement 766 
Structural repairs 93 
Maisonette conversion 5,136 
Pre paint repairs 19956 
Roofing 89 
Other miscellaneous 276 
AL 14.3 
Total Estate Expenditure Programme: Source: City of Salford (1989) 
The very first improvements to the estate were concentrated on a group of 186 low 
rise four storey maisonette blocks at the edge of the estate. These flats were 
transformed into terraced houses by a process of conversion known as "decapitation" 
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whereby the top stories were removed, leaving the bottom two stories to be turned 
into a house by the addition of a pitched roof. Following further landscaping and 
environmental works, this pocket of previously unlettable units was changed into a 
sought after pocket of homes with gardens. The table Illustrates, however, that this 
was, at over f5 million, a very expensive process, which when added to the 
environmental cost of f-862,000 lead to a cost of about 02,000 per unit provided. 
The second wave of works was the security and environmental works, which it caii 
be seen from the table account for over f2 million each. 
Corporate Service DeliveLy: This initiative involved environmental, planning, refuse 
collection and street cleaning, grounds maintenance, and arrangements to fund the 
work. it had been decided that a 
corporate planning approach was 
needed to the design of the 
landscaped areas, so that it could be 
adequately and affordable maintained 
in future and contribute to residents 
safety and enjoyment of the estate. 
On refuse, the problem was that the 
Housing Department cleaned the 
internal areas; the environmental 
health department cleared away the 
rubbish and swept the roads; while the 
recreation department cleared rubbish from the grasses areas and cut and 
maintained them. To tackle these problems an interdepartmental group was set up 
to provide a corporate response, and take a wide view of the needs of the area, and 
to "develop the "image" of the Precinct" (City of Salford (1991a)). This has three 
main subgroups, dealing with community development and support, with the funding 
and implementation of environmental maintenance including the problems set out 
above, and with the general physical redevelopment of the area. In addition, there 
is continuing work to coordinate services provided to tenants who are also social 
12 
Box 56: Non Housing Elements 
services clients. Beyond these, however, there were no special emploYment or 
training initiatives. 
What Happened? 
Local Area Office: The move to a new area office, and the introduction of a system 
of generic management appears to have been successful, in the view of all of the 
agents interviewed. Staff recruitment was good, many housing officers wishing to 
spend time on the estate due to the good teamwork, better training, and experience 
of difficult problems which it offered. Housing officers have on average 400 
properties. There were also residential caretakers, with about 100 units each. Thev 
are encouraged to get to know their tenants, and to provide a link with the local 
office. Their job had moved away from cleaning, and more to minor maintenance 
duties such as changing bulbs and checking lifts. There has been extensive promotion 
of tenants associations as well, and they continue to thrive, with an estate wide 
forum linking them together. There has been a high degree on involvement in the 
discussion of the improvement works, including public meetings, open days, a tenant 
questionnaire, and representatives on working parties. 
Voids: The total void rate on the estate, including development voids, was still at 
14.5% in January 1991; but the true void rate of properties available for reletting 
was down to 3.2 %. Officers reported that the estate was now reasonable in demand 
for allocations. Turnover remained high, however, at a rate of 21 % of the stock 
annually. 
Arrears: The position here was less promising. Details for December 1990 (City of 
Salford 1991a) indicated that arrears had climbed significantly in the previous 9 
months, reaching f 1.2 million, or about MO for every tenant. Recovery action was 
being taken promptly, but the problem was reported to be continuing because of high 
levels of tenants absconding - 93 in the period April to November 1990; because of 
residual problems prior to the establishment of the local office; because of the high 
turnover, leading to many former tenant arrews; and because many tenants continue 
to think of the estate as their last and worst option, and that there was nowhere 
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Development Plan: Continuing plans for future 
Box 57: Summary of Outcomes 
worse they could be moved to. 
Allocations: The "High Rise Initiative" has been generally very successful. There is 
now a waiting list for high rise properties, and the voids level is down to 3.2% for 
these properties, a complete turnround. The main problem continues to the 
instability of the population, however, since the type of people attracted by the 
adverts, and by the properties, tend to by young and mobile, seldom staying more 
that a year or so. They also tend to bring many management problems (of noise and 
disruption). 
Security and Security Guards: One of the main problems was that of the 
management of the security guards. There were continual complaints about their 
performance, concerning guards being rude and abusive to tenants, asleep on duty, 
failing to prevent access of unauthorised visitors, and failing to prevent continuing 
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problems of burglaries. These 
problems were set out in various 
Housing Related Cost: E14.3 
million 
committee reports (City of Salford 
(1991a) (1990a)). The guards 
themselves were located in locked 
rooms, out of sight of tenants, and 
spent their time either looking at 
video screens, or perhaps going on a 
patrol of the patch. 
Cost per Estate Home: E4,746 
(using 3013 remaining units 
of council let) 
BUT: unit expenditure 
excluding decapitated homes 
= E31 254 
Estates Action contribution: 
E3.58 million 
Other contributions: Salford 
HIP; tenant rent increase f or 
security guards 
The problem arose partly because 
there are 15 guards from a total of Box 58: Summary of Expenditure 
three separate companies (at January 1991). The companies were apparently 
responsive to complaints about replacing certain guards who caused particular 
problems, but the same problems seemed to continue with the new staff. The guards 
were untrained, being used to guarding commercial premises; had little commitment 
to the estate, or to the job; viewed the prospect of courting trouble by challenging 
"difficult" looking callers without enthusiasm, and generally felt that it was a low 
paid, low status job which they would just as soon be moved off to a quieter, safer, 
site. Only in two of the blocks is there a "concierge" type arrangement, with a 
permanent member of staff behind a counter permanently. This worked much better. 
The option of either in house staff running the other systems, or of a Precinct wide 
contract being tendered were under examination at the time of fieldwork, as this 
was seen as one of the major unsolved difficulties. 
Comments and Assessment by Main Agents 
Range of Interviews Interviews were held with all the main sections of staff on the 
estate, including the assistant district manager, a senior housing officer who had 
been on or around the estate for 20 years, the caretaking super-visor and a caretaker, 
a secunty guard, housing officers and an arrears officer, as well as the Assistant 
Director of Housing who provided an overview and full details of the corporate 
issues. 
3 15 
Rapid Pace Of IMDrovement Those who had been on the estate a long time - 
including the caretaking staff I talked to - all remarked on the extensive changes 
which had taken place; these involved mainly the environmental improvements, the 
decapitation works, the demolition and disposal of blocks, and the filling of the 
voids. It was clear that the improvement initiatives were having a beneficial effect. 
The estate still retained many problems, but the general view was that effective 
coordinated action was visible. 
InlDroved Manap-ement Most staff now 
Box 59: Main issues from 
interviews felt that the management of the 
estate was under control, and the 
training, approach, and organisation structures were beginning to bear fruit. 
Caretakers felt that they were undervalued, and that much of the information they 
had about tenants, as well as about problems and issues on the estate, was not 
sought or attended to by housing officers; and that they did not really have enough 
training to deal with the more complex and sympathetic role they were expected to 
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carry. The housing officers, in contrast, felt the caretakers were given an 
appropriate role and were adequately trained. 
Problems of Security Staff It was clear that this was a serious unsolved problem. 
There was antagonism between the caretakers and the security guards, the former 
resenting the idleness and intrusion of the latter. The security guards whom I met 
were totally unmotivated, drinking beer and reading the paper in the video rooms, 
and refusing to patrol certain blocks because of threats from intruders. Their vieW 
was quite clearly that they were not interested. Housing officers, who had to try to 
both manage the problem and provide a good service for the tenants, were vcrý, 
frustrated at the lack of investment in the key management structures needed to 
make the physical improvements, and 0 the technology, work. The overwhelming 
view was that more thought and resources should have been devoted to the 
management issues of the security improvements, in addition to the technical and 
technological aspects. 
Failure of Estates Action Commitment: The Estates Action Bid for 1989-90 had 
failed, due to lack of consultation with tenants, the authority were apparently told. 
The 1990-91 bid had been carefully researched and prepared; extensive consultation 
had been undertaken with residents, who had approved and amended the plans for the 
conversion of further flats in maisonette blocks to houses. The bid was important 
because the need for houses was the highest priority in Salford, which had a surplus 
of flats. This second bid was, however, also turned down, this time because there 
was not sufficient commitment to diversifying tenure on the estate, or 
encouragement of home ownership. It was widely felt that the approach of estates 
action was inconsistent and fairly impenetrable; and that different reasons seemed 
to be being found to justify refusals for money which were based on the increasing 
popularity of the programme amongst other authorities in the region (particularly 
Manchester); and that this see-saw of encouragement to bid then refusal was very 
difficult for the estates staff to manage, in their attempt to create an involved, 
committed, and stable community on the basis of long term planning. This feeling 
was shared from the Assistant Director level (though he was more circumspect and 
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sanguine) to the housing officers and, to some extent, the caretakers. However the 
approach was to be, now, to invite housing associations and private developers to 
contribute a bit to the bid. 
Unusual problems: Unlike many similar estates, there was no particular probleni of 
homelessness, or of housing homeless people on the estate. Nor was there any hlLgh 
concentration of black or immigrant households who may have special needs or 
problems. Rather, there was too much stock, and the disposal or conversion of it was 
the main problem. 
Summary and Evaluation 
This is an estate which has major management problems relatIng mainly to vold and 
undesirable stock. It has adopted a range of 
)rovements: Generally well maintained, 
Box 60: State of Main Indicators Now 
initiatives to combat there problems, including attention to both housing L- 
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management, allocations, staff training, and environmental issues. Some of the 
physical transformations have had a significant effect on the image and appearance 
of the estate. It has also shown a commitment to talcing a corporate approach to its 
problems. 
The main difficulties relate to some of the solutions which have been brought to 
bear. The security solution of video surveillance has clearly not worked, as 
insufficient attention was paid to its management aspects. The allocations initiatiVes 
have worked in that they have filled the voids, by and large, but the instability of 
population consequent on permitting all and any transient person seeking shelter 
have lead to difficulties in managing the blocks and continuing problems with rent 
arrears. Neither tenure and ownership diversification, nor employment related 
projects have been prominent in the forward plans, and this has resulted in 
withdrawal of estates action support. This lack of continuity of support has had a 
significant negative effect on the attempts to construct networks of tenant 
involvement, although these continue despite this. 
The flexibility of the authority in responding to changing problems, however, and its 
willingness to try new and radical solutions, suggest that steady progress will 
continue to be made on the estate. 
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O. P. I. R.. 
Population 
Issues in ORGECO (1980), ORGECO 
Original Problems 
By 1974,4 years after last block built, major problems recognised. Mainly water 
penetration, heat loss in external cladding panels, leaking woodwork, poor sound 
insulation; few social activities to develop local networks for families and young 
people. Basements delinquent meeting places; prostitution and alcoholism; ether 
inhalation (70s) becoming 80s drug abuse. Estate has large windswept open spaces, 
21 
Incomes: generally below minimum wage level; 37-0. population 
economically active (c. f. 45% for commune) 
.:, Employment: 47% unskilled; 15% commune unemployment, 
concentrated on estate (details n/a) 
o H useholds: Young: 50% under 20 years; 80% under 40 (1975) 
Large families (37% over 5 people) 
but little greenery or play areas. Cars circulated at high speed, into garages 
adjacent to entrances. Problems often focused in towers (BETBERIM 1990). Estate 
cold, unwelcoming, monotonous. Stairwells dirty, rubbish strewn, with minor fires 
common. Insufficient lifts. Interiors 
had small roms, particularly some 
bathrooms. Despite this, rents high - 
third to half of incomes (Tanter and 
Toubon 1983), partly due to high 
service charges. OIRP management 
and maintenance inadequate. Stains 
council equally uncoordinated and 
uncommitted to tackle problems. 
Original Proposals and Objectives 
In both HVS and DSQ programmes; 
now DIV site. 1974 initial 
agreements; then 1977 HVS "pre- 
dossier" study ORGECO (1980), 
assisted by architect, J. M. Lyonet 
(who continued as architect 
throughout the project, and was 
3A 
A. 
Box 63: Estate Detai s 
interviewed). HVS dossier 1983; ZEP 1982; "Illot Sensible" 1983. 
High: 2 
mts high 
it i ng, 
f or ci 
Poor 
-ent to deal with major problems 
basements centres for petty 
)or, and no on site 
No associations or groups 
Box 64: Major Problems at Start 
General Objectives: These reports (and Ville de Stains 1991) list: 
- social restructuring including allocations policy and physically restructuring 
some family flats to smaller units 
- "desenclavement": better links with city 
- dealing with technical problems, including lowering heating charges by 
insulation 
- "insertion" of specific populations, particularly adolescents and immigrants 
- development of social relations amongst tenants, 
- improvement of open spaces and layout 
HLM Objectives: New HLM 1983. First objective was local office under manager 
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responsible for finance, repairs, housing management, and rent collection (but not 
allocations). Considerable effort 
to establish better tenant 
new allocations policy 
rent and benefit advice 
tion exercise 
tl improvements 
relations and tenant services - 
based on ne %A, caret aki ncy 
services: new responsibilities in 
relation to graffiti and small 
repairs. More importantly given 
special training in tenant 
relations and service delivery, 
personnel skills, dealing with 
drugs, and minor repai rs. 
ResidentIaI caretakers 
Tenants encouraged to have respect for common parts; regular campaigns were 
organised: key words were "environment" and "cleanliness [proprete]". New tenants 
visited by HLM staff to establish housing benefit (APL) entitlement rent payment 
explained. 
New allocations policy was important objective. Considerable HLM/city discussion, 
and local allocations sub-committee established (1982). Aim was restoration of social 
and ethnic balance, by selective allocations of voids seeking balanced family sizes, 
and ethnic groups. Policy decreed average 35 %I or 2 person households; 40 %3 or 
4 person, only 10% over 6 people, in each building. Priority to local (Stains) 
361-4 
local management office 
residents, or those with job locally. 
Major improvement works planned in 450 consultative meetings over ten years. 
including large tent with major exhibition of models and plans, and meeting with 
children as emissaries to parents. Also evaluative and retrospective meetings once 
initial stairs done. 
What Happened? 
Rehabilitation Works 
Seven tranches of rehabilitation. Two 
new links to outside, one through 
spectacular arch formed bydemolition 
of some lower floors of circular block. 
Radical changes in external contours 
of low blocks, each now different in 
colour, cladding material, windows, 
and with added roofline gable features 
(see photos). Also thermal insulation 
(50% reduction in heat loss). 
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Box 67: Summary of Outcomes 
Key idea to identify each building, each stairwell, as being different - diversity, 
colour, and varied and more traditional architectural style (see Lyonet interviewed 
in "Stains Information October 1985"). Each entrance made distinctive, improved, 
and protected. Easy to clean and maintain materials were used, and solid security 
doors. Basements divided made secure, managed by tenants themselves. 
Internal works included double glazed PVC windows, providing heat and noise 
insulation; mechanical ventilation; treatment of water penetration damage. 
Externally parking areas, roads and pavements improved; new circulation routes; 
some roads closed: trees and bushes planted; play areas and sports areas created; 
murals created by local children, and sculptures erected. 
Improved Management 
Improved management securely established; many new staff; much staff training, 
particularly for caretakers. Estate cleaner although graffiti and minor vandalism 
remained growing problem. Rent increases tempered by reduced service charges due 
,e Physical Improvements including: 
external appearance 
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to the lower heating bills. 
Turnover down, (perhaps due to 
difficulties moving out) Allocations Housing Related Cost: E22 
million 
policy unsuccessful, with little change 
in the ethnic or social make up; young 
Cost per estate home: E 10,0 00 
unemployed and unemployed single 
DSQ Contribution: E5.2 
million 
parents continued to arrive: "The Other Contributions: E3.5 
perverseeffects0f million from Region 
4conventionnement' providing access other programme cost: E1-4 
to APL [Housing Benefit] are clearly million 
shown on the estate" (Ville de Stains Box 68: summary of Expenditure 
199 1, p7). 
Tenant problems and problems between tenants, rising, and increasing demands oil 
social services and HLM. Drugs problem; alcoholism rife. 
Wider Prop-ramme 
Wider programme of DSQ initiatives saw less progress. Fewer shops; scholastic 
underachievement particularlY for non-Francophones. Lack of participation. Estate 
in 89-93 DIV. 
Comments and Assessment by Main Agents 
Slow progress Disillusion amongst tenants prior to the work starting meant 
participation slow. 
Extensive physical works: Estate physically transformed. 
helped. Architect had commitment to participation 
standards - visionary, open, professional approach. 
Consultation process had 
and highest architectural 
Improved Management Estate management now better. HLM Director fired with a 
mission, of trained, aware, staff. Caretaker training one aspect, and caretakers 
enthusiastic, uncynical - thought that despite social problems their efforts were 
important. 
3,27 
Fundamental problem social Overwhelming view was problems were social; partly 
due to all large dwellings for social renting in Stains on estate; also HLNI felt 
obliged, for financial reasons, to accept poorer tenants receiving APL, to reduce 
voids. 
Problems of adolescents Specific 
problem of adolescent boys (not girls). 
Not gangs, or inter-ethnic rivalries or 
conflicts. The problem, particularly 
second generation immigrants, was 
youth could not identify with parents 
values and attitudes. Parents had 
lead lives of docile factory labOUr, 
now unemployed, lacked rnea_ns and 
ability to control adolescent children. 
Main problem now drugs - estimated 
500g of heroin arrived on estate daily, 
for dealers. Marketing of drugs seen 
Box 69: Main 
Interviews 
ineffectual. 
Issues from as better than low paid work. Police 
and j udicial response seen as 
Commitment of the City, and partners Constant commitment city and HLM. Mayor 
or deputies chair consultation meetings, to show tenants city backing programme. 
HLM had cold feet about costs; criticisms of HLM by DSQ team who felt they were 
too absorbed with their need to fulfil targets for arrears and voids (confirmed by 
HLM)Nonetheless generally good partnership. 
Fragile Improvements Despite improvements, little change overall in problems. 
Physical isolation and desolation gone, but not social isolation and desolation. 
considerable assistance still needed. Many noted improvements to entrances and 
stairs in good condition for one to two years, then degraded. Associations lasted a 
year or so, then collapsed. Slide halted, but little forward progress. 
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Absence of voids and squatters New tenants still disadvantaged, but no lack of them. 
Summary and Evaluation 
Physical transformations impressively carried out; architect's vision of partIcIpat'Ve 
design made to work by hard work and repeated meetings and discussions. 
ents: Generally good; though 
intenance leading to creeping 
-ansf ormed; 2 new entrances to city; 
of crime and drugs, worse 
roblems of drugs and petty 
Box 70: State of Main Indicators Now 
But progress fragile: social exclusion remains; and financial necessities of HLM 
policy undermined the improvements. Allocations initiative not achieved as HI-Mhad 
to fill voids; initiatives envisaged at the start to provide changes of use to create 
offices, or flat type mixes didn't take place. Small repairs budget meant Insufficient 
fast maintenance of creeping degradation. Training and new management not 










Fort Nieulay at Calais 
HLM stock: sheltered block, 173 
individual homes, 858 flats. 200 flats 
constructed 1958, rest 1962-1967. 
Remainder of neighbourhood poor 
quality owner occupied terraced housing - also in DSQ (some data is 
for 
"neighbourhood" not "estate") 
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Box 71: Location 
Box 72: Population 
1989 figures. Sources: Ville de Calais 1989; Jacquier 1991. 
Population 
Over half adults have alcohol problem (including underage drinkers). Many residents 
previously in cites provisoires - problems settling in. Malnutrition amongst children 
under 3 (Medical Centre/1985); poor eating habits continue. 
Original Problems 
Ville de Calais (1985), is original 
statement of problems; consultation 
document (Ville de Calais (1986)) - 
both followed local working parties 
(1984/1985). 
Problem areas: children and 
adolescents; housing and quality of 
life; health and social life; sports and 
cultural development. Buildings 
problems: rubbish disposal, basements 
used as tips and by delinquents and 
under-age drinkers. Estate layout in 
state of disrepair and degradation. 
Thermal insulation cladding works, 
and window replacements, already done to 450 units (Constantine blocks, 1983). 
Repairs seldom done; sound insulation. Four blocks (the Orleans blocks) were 
particularly unpopular -lower construction standards - high turnover and 
high voids 
rate (60%). Otherwise population relatively stable. No local management except 
demoralised caretakers. Arrears high, particularly in unpopular block; poor arrears 
service. Little participation; youth most disaffected. 
Original Proposals and Objectives 
Convention de Plan (Region Nord Pas de Calais (1986)), and HLM coordinator's 
report (OPHLMde Calais 1986) list: 
Reducing isolation, improving image: including reducing isolation from City, and 
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Box 73: Estate Details 
and little 
partici 
Box 74: Major Problems at Start 
environmental improvements; general theme in Jacquier (1991): 
"the struggle against exclusion of all kinds. Struggle against exclusion from 
the City in weaving links between the neighbourhood and the city and in 
improving the quality of its image (organisation of shows and exhibitions), 
struggle against exclusion in economic life and the labour market by the 
setting up of training tailored to the low level of qualification of the 
residents, struggle against exclusion from social and healthy well-being in 
developing an active preventative programme" (p36) 
Environmental works: Extensive works to estate and surrounding areas; design and 
construction by celebrated Francois Morellet, of huge mosaic of airborne Bleriot 
based on early C20th lace handkerchief; children's play space, planfing beds, trees. 
Resident Involvement/ adoption of DSQ method: To follow original DSQ model; HLM 
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to set up residents associations. 
- Improving the image of the 
neighbourhood 
Rehabilitation works: Immediate Environmental works 
problems was unpopular Orleans 
- Adopting the participative 
ive rehabilitation 
ng a local office 
proved and adapted 
ýment arrangements 
. er allocations 
Box 75: Housing Objectives of 
Programme 
clubrooms /drinking dens. No internal works. 
blocks: participative study produced 
demolition, plus newbuild - 27 houses, 
78 flats, on estate edge. High rise 
entrances and refuse disposal systems 
improved - new front doors, better 
bin storage - but not interior 
stairwells, nor external security 
system. Basements boarded, though 
adolescents still used as infornial 
Local office: Planned; DSQ team, unusually, had office on site, next to caretaking 
team (though teams seldom spoke). Little planning to achieve management office, 
and none opened. 
Improved management arrangements: HLMplanned "tailored management" [gestion 
adapte]. Specifically to include two local housing welfare officers [agents soclaux] 
for assistance with coping on low incomes/ rent arrears; developing local caretaking 
office; training for estate staff. 
Better allocations: Local lettings panel planned, for better estate social mix. 
Wider Non Housing Programme: Included reducing social exclusion by work 
experience and cultural activities; health issues; training and educational facilities 
and performance; development of commercial and economic opportunities. 
What Happened? 
Generally agreed by local DSQ team and HLM team to have failed to achieve iiiost 
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Box 76: Non Housing Elements 
housing objectives; but wider DSQ 
programme, particularlv health and 
educational programme, presented by 
DIV as examples of good practice, 
despite continuing problems (see e. cy 
DIV (1989)). Not e non- housi n cy 
spending 150% housing spend. Impetus 
(Ville de Calais (1989)) was interim 
reassessment focusing on social issues. 
Little change apparent from visiting 
estate: problems of disrepair, physical 
degradation, environmental desolation 
remain prominent. Reassessment did 
not extend to housing management 
programme. 
Rehabilitation: Original cladding works brittle panels replaced with brick cladding 
coordii 
. ge c 
Box 77: Summary of Outcomes 
to above stone throwing height. Evidence of vandalism prevalent. New entrances and 
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doors adequate, but continuing open access meant problems of rubbish dumping and 
vandalism remained. Little physical impact from rehabilitation transformation 
common on other case study estates missing. Little resident participation, in 
planning or execution of works - little organised by HLM, and no pressure froni 
tenants. 
Reduced Isolation and Improved Image: Mosaic appears incongruous, DSQ say wanted 
by no-one. Tree planting and pavement flowers present pockets of improvement, but 
windy spaces and overgrown surrounding waste lands remain. Estate feel is of despair 
and violence (only estate where I have been physically pursued by aggressive 
residents intent on violence). Commercial centre remains poor; bus service sporadic. 
Local Office and Improved Management: Few planned changes effected: no local 
office, specialist arrears staff, local allocations policy, or special training for estate 
team. Initial plans, and gradual retreat to failure, set out in frank series HLM 
coordinator reports (OPHLMde Calais (1986,1987,1988,1989)). New homes built 
too close together, without regard for tenants needs. 
"Errors" set out in 1989 final project 
report (OPHLM 1989), confirmed in 
discussion: rehabilitation had been 
considered "finished" though main 
problems of common parts and 
environment not been addressed; no 
integrated plan to coordinate the 
different aspects of works; various 
times during programme where HLM 
realised things going wrong not 
matched by understanding or financial 
Box 78: Summary of Expenditure 
support from the city to correct them - leading to meeting of all parties in 
1988 
which, lead to semi-complete breakdown of relations. HLMManagement Committee 
not interested in the estate (still dumping ground), and had not intervened to restore 
relations. As no proper consultation, many projects met with apathy or opposition-, 
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and often changed because of lack of commitment to funding. Repairs service 
regarded the estate as sink, leading to worst service continuing unchecked. 
Comments and Assessment of Main Agents 
Inaftuate Analysis at Start: DSQ and HLM coordinators felt inadequate 
consultation and consideration residents needs. Scale of malnourishment and social 
isolation quickly become apparent, provoking reassessment. External thermal 
cladding meant HLMhad almost exhausted resources for new rehabi incy spendi 
- but tenants had derived little positive benefit. 
Failure of City to Provide Leadership: Frequently identified as key problem. HLM 
committee Presidency changed roughly every 18 months during programme, echoing 
changes in political balance of PS/PC coalition. City had taken little interest, and 
frequently changed project management arrangements. 
Absence of Coordination and Commitment: City and HLM both retained 
compartmentalised inflexible working practices - seen from discussing how HLM 
staff tackled their jobs. Only Project Coordinator, had clear notion of DSQ 
programme; estate procedures in relation repairs, allocations, arrears control, or 
caretaking, were identical to HLMwide approach; no evidence of attempt to educate 
staff into estate needs; nor of team working, or development of special and 
specialist approaches. Rather, very negative, hostile, dismissive attitudes to estate 
were evident. Remained universally perceived as sink estate. 
Only case study where antagonisms between partners, and within HLM, openly 
presented as elements contributing to failure. Caretakers blamed DSQ staff, 
management committee, and tenants; DSQblamed city politicians and HLMteam-, 
HLM staff blamed tenants and Region; HLM coordinator, if he blamed anyone, 
tended to blame himself, which was sad. 
This antagonism evident between DSQ and caretakers, who seldom spoke despite 
adjacent offices. Caretakers felt contrast between white collar thinkers and blue 
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collar doers. 
madequate Analysis at Start 
'ailure_ Of City to Provide 
Poor Allocations and Management of 
Transfers: Use of estate by city as 
dumping ground keenly impressed on 
me by several caretak-ing and repairs 
staff - especially removal of tenants 
to newbuild ownership. Neighbour 
problems developed, encouraging more 
tenants to leave. Allocat ions 
procedure still on date order basis for 
next available property, and no regard 
paid to suitability of these lettings, or 
type of tenant on estate list (Only 
poorest will apply). 
Tenant problems: alcoholism, and apathy: Most suggested social problems were key 
to strategy for development and transformation. Participation was difficult: one 
DSQ view was people preferred to remain indoors drinking than come to a meeting. 




facilities for adolescents: Little done for youth was frequent view. 
Adolescents problems were often not immediately apparent due to teenage 
alcoholism hidden behind closed doors. 
Summary and Evaluation 
Case study pervaded by inadequate response and failure, aggravated by underlYing 
hostility and intolerance between partners. The problems in fact not great, compared 
to other case studies; and clear opportunities for changes. Social aspects revitallsed 
during 1987 by new project manager assessment of underlying social problems. The 
fundamental lack of will by city and HLM, lead to failure to execute coordinated 
action to improve estate management. 
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Box 79: Main Issues from 
Interviews 
This seen in: actions not coordinated, but proceeded independently; funding not been 
provided timeously; little pressure exerted by DSQ/city to make HLMtake real steps 
to improve management. "DSQ Method" had not touched HLM; well intentioned 
plans to improve training and management not come about, so type and quality of 
management on estate remained poor. Throughout, residents lacked any effective 
voice to put pressure on agents. 
The HLM claimed to have learned lessons, and was intending to apply them in the 
new DSQ project. Also intended to continue with improvements in quality of service 
on estate, particularly repairs. New HLM director had already introduced training 
programme. 
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Nouvelles Synthe, Grande Synthe 
Nouvelle Synthe it Qmde Synthe 
Grande Synthe is in Dunkerque conurbation which houses 260,1000 people. 500 homes 
in original village destroyed to build 
Estate Name: Nouvelles Synthe 
new town - ZUP of 6,000 homes, 3.650 
Region: Nord Pas de Calais HLM rented, including part of ZUP 
Community: Grande Synthe originally administratively part of 
Community Population: 26,000 Dunkerque, Quartier Albeck - ceded 
Estate Population: 11,000 to Grande Synthe in 1981, following 
Politics: Socialist (PS) 
referendum. Third estate built in mid 
throughout; very supportive 70's, ZAC of Courghain (. 21,000 homes). 
Location Aspects: forms a In total 5,000 HI-Mof 8,000 homes in 
large section of the city city, 4,000 are in blocks. 3,745 owned 
External Reports: OMINOR by Office D6partemental du Nord 
(urban research group); also 
chapter in "Banlieues (ODN), based in Lille and one of 
Fragile" (Grimaud (1984)) largest in France (35,000+hoiiies). 9 
Box 81: Location other small HI-Ms. 
Box 82: Population 
Figures for Grande Synthe 
Huge USINOR steelworks constructed 
1958 provided rationale for ZUP, and 
employment - still provides bulk of 
municipal revenue. ZUP was blocks on 
wide boulevards plus commercial 
sectors but no shops or local facilities 
in housing areas, and few leisure 
facilities. 
Although DSQ was for Nouvelle 
Synthe, citywide programme 
developed. Some data only available 
for city. DSQ one of first national 
sites, launched March 1992at meeting 
which sprang from previous HVS programme, which haa resuitea in ininai 
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rehabilitation of 300 properties. First DSQ commission attended by founding DSQ 




and 1982, mainly from North Africa. 
Full details Population mobile - in 1982 41% 
ýd throughout; 
-y large units 
complete 
Box 83: Estate Details 
through 80s. 
Original Problems 
moved. Steelworks norninat ions 
prominent - 1,600 reserved flats in 
1982, some empty If no employees to 
fill. Decline in steel made major 
impact on employment. 1977-1982 
3,000 jobs lost; trend continued 
See OMINOR(1988b) (pl2): 
"In 1981, the community was confronted with two specific problems. First, 
the integration of the Albeck neighbourhood, .... 
9,000 residents, being more 
than a third of the population: ..... itstrongly accentuated the working class 
character of the population and the weight of the ZUPin relation to the total 
housing stock. Then, a brutal increase in the vacancies in the ZUP, essentially 
a result of the rapid decline in reservations of homes by USINOR its 
preference for the new HLM homes in the area which had been offered for 
rent: the voids grew rapidly to over a thousand homes, .... and the 
development of voids was accompanied by a pauperization of the population 
housed. " 
Voids problem shown in minutes of 20/9/82 local DSQ committee: 
2% (80 flats) 1977 
I 1% (642 flats) 1980 
29% (1093 flats) January 19821 
34% (1294 flats) July 1982. 
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oids: This was the most critical problem, with 34% (1294) lats void in 1982 
Arrears: 46% in arrears, of whom 25% owed over 3 months 
in 1982 
image: Estate very unpopular locally; complete lack of 
a problem; more a problem of vastness of the 
Management: Head office in Lille; no on site office; 
generally poor service, not geared to estate 
Tenant attitudes: Lack of participation and association 
Box 84: Main Problems at Start 
Turnover high, paralleled by indiscriminate allocations: HLM desperate for anyone 
willing. Few locals willing, 15/12/82 local DSQ minutes show 3,000 transfer requests 
in city, 13 % willing to take ZUP. 
Arrears also problem. Education problems (ZEP 1984); ill health and alcoholism; 
integration of various populations living on estate: many were isolated and devoid 
of contacts with city's social services or social activities on estate - sometimes 
because of their North African traditions and religion. 
Original Proposals and Objectives 
See "40 Mesures Pour Mieux Vivre a Grande Synthe" (Commune de Grande Synthe 
1982)) - product of resident/officer working groups around 
Housing and Living 
Conditions; Children; Adolescents; and Social, Cultural, and Health Action for 
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Families. DSQ Local Programme published February 1985 (Commission Locale de 
DSQ de Grande Synthe (1985)). 
Context for actions was city decentralisation to three neighbourhoods, each ýkith 
local committee and priorities. Two neighbourhoods covered ZUP, (one was Albeck). 
General objectives: 
- urban reconstruction, including new city centre 
- social programme 
- health programme 
- programme for young people covering schools 
- cultural programme 
- economic programme. 
Also extensive evaluation built in, by independent agency OMINOR. Considerable 
attention to environment. Administration by large DSQ team in town hall. 
HLMprogramme based on rolling programme of demolitions, rehabilitations, and ne'A 
building of individual homes to create more balanced community. Objectives: 
- reduce voids 
- integrate ZUP into general rented market, not just as USINOR dormitory 
- create more variety in relation to housing stock, allocations, and social mix 
To be achieved by physical programme and socially oriented programme of changed 
allocations priorities and social assistance General plan for better management, 
more adapted to estate problems. Included decentralised management, and vigorous 
pursuit of arrears. 
New city centre built breaking divisions between neighbourhoods; changes of use, 
mainly creating offices in some housing units; some blocks were rehabilitated for 
home ownership. 
What Happened? 
Major changes in layout and appearance of ZUP, and town. OMINOR reports (I 988a, 





problem alcoholism. Increasing decentralisation to locally administered arrears as 
successful - 
Comments and Assessment by Main Agents 
Details also from records of local DSQ committee meetings. 
HLMprografnme issues: 
Extensive works have transformed 
imap- : works had transformed city for 
the better; for outsiders it was 
eyeopener. 
The importance of the demolition in 
this transformation - reduced voids, 
opened city up by reducing density, 
space for environmental and leisure 
facilities and new houses. 
The allocations POLC-Y Refusal to 
accept additional large or problein 
families welcomed by staff and 
residents - problem has been 
prevented from growing. 
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indicating greater stability. Estate now has feel of enormous garden lego set. 
Allocations committee aimed to limit additional problem household. mainly by 
restricting North African families, a fact clearly stated in discussion with HLM. Also 
aimed to provide better and larger homes for Maghrebin families already present. 
Equally emphasis offers to employed households to reduce percentage of unemployed 
households. Nonetheless social mix (city wide) remained fairly stable, with no 
marked increase in of employed middle class households moving in (partly because 
of continuing absence of suitable employment opportunities). 
Voids and other Housing Management 
Issues 
Decentralised office 1981, part of 
general HLM restructuring - highly 
computerised. Caretakers managing 
teams of cleaners provide front line 
tenant service. 
Housing Related Cost: E14.2 
million 
Cost per estate home: E5,000 
DSQ Contribution: E3.37m 
Other contributions: EO. 87 
million from Region 
Voids reduced to 13 % city wide in 
1988. OMINOR show this closely 
r Programme 
ion 
cost: E 7.9 
linked to rehabilitation, where new popular and voids 7%. Also due to demolltion 
which reduced stock by 1/4. Pockets of high voids remain in unimproved blocks - 
mainly owned by other HLMs. Concern that some original rehabilitated blocks now 
becoming dilapidated and void levels there creeping up. To combat this, local 
advertising launched to attract applications from employed and stable households. 
Arrears improved, particularly those administered locally - followed considerable 
attention and training. Arrears Commission jointly with City, HLM and CAF: 
considers cases of very high arrears where risk of eviction. Where hardship caused 
by factors such as unemployment or illness, can provide loans or grants conditional 
on repayment package. Also can offer smaller or cheaper home as alternative. 
Intensive work to assist sticking to arrangements. 30 evictions only in 1989-90 - root 
346 
Box 88: Summary ot Expenditure 
Note: Total city wide 
expenditure included 
bedroom flats into five bedroom flat, with own entrance. Works mainly with tenants 
in residence, although some moved to rehabilitated units first. 
Tenant reaction positive (OMI NOR studies). Concerns about lack of consultation and 
breakup of communities in blocks demolished. High demand for local transfers to 
rehabilitated blocks. 
oblem resolved (partly be reduction of size of 
Transformation of Image and Social Mix 
Decentralisation, redevelopment, demolition, rehabilitation, newbuilding, and 
environmental works made noticeable change. Some new businesses although 
unemployment problem not removed: wider diversity of opportunities - although still 
mainly blue collar. Flats easier to let. Proportion of owner occupation 1988, 
increased to 34%; and city wide mobility reduced to 17% turnover annually, 
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has rehabilitation been 
successful? 
- has ZUP become mixed 
Their answer is a qualified yes to all 




Between 1982 and 1988,1132 homes 
Town Planning: 
reconstruction of city 
centre 
Economic: action 
committee with aid to 
new business and rented 
commercial units 
estate with better image" L- * 
were demolished; also 1056 new homes 
Educational: ZEP set 
up; new libraries; 
constructed incity, 645rented. ByNovember special projects 
1989,1979 homes rehabilitated, in 32 blocks, Health: action on 
Internally flats fitted with new windows, ne 
drugs, alcoholism, 
w diet, and for disabled 
sinks, WC, fuse box, doors, and ventilation. people 
New individual heating systems. Externally 
new facings, many in different colours to 
destroy drab uniformity. New entrances with 
entryphones and considerable work to 
entrance halls and stairs. Environmental works 
all over town, leading to national award. 
flowers and plants ("Ville Fleurie" 3 star). 
2 and Sport: 
ieque; local TV; 
festivals; 
workshops; 
ocial: committees for 
vouth work 
structural works to create larger family flats 
at the ends of blocks, by converting two 
Box 86: Non Housing 
Elements 
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Box 85: Housinq objectives of 
Proqramine 
encountered hostile and overtly racist attitudes about the North African and other 
tenants. 
DSQ Programme issues: 
Importance of the wide range of DSODrojects: new commercial centre: employment 
and commercial initiatives; sporting facilities; clubs and advice services 
Good city support and general partnersWs: DSQ functioned as part of town hall 
administration, like a department there. Committees for allocations and rent arrears 
worked well; regular and constructive meetings of local DSQ committee; relations 
DSQ/HLM frank, cooperative, and productive. City appreciated FILM had invested 
considerable resources on improvement and demolition: continuing cost of mortgages 
and lost rents on demolished flats led to annual deficit of f 1.7 million which had to 
be met by ODN from more profitable parts of stock. 
Need for better evaluation: OMINORstudies were backed up by local observatories 
on housing and population; but intention in next programme (1989-93) was to provide 
better regular statistics. 
The work was planned to take place anyway -: 
DSQ and HLM indicated work would 
have been done in any case, although on slower timescale. 
Other general issues: 
Previous and continuing dominance of USINOR.: Factory dominated the town and 
estate - conditions in town had risen and 
fallen with factory. 
Population "in difficulty!, Main problem remaining seen as unemployment and lack 
of skills - emphasis on education and training 
in DSQ regarded as very important. 
Recent closure of naval dockyard in Dunkerque made problem even worse. 
Problems to involve residents: Partly as result of social isolation, partly 
due to 
language and cultural differences, partly alcoholism and growing 
drug abuse, great 
348 
problems with involving residents in programmes or associations. HLM trying to 
approach through youth groups, and youth committees. 
Remaining "Illots sensible" Still major problems to tackle. 
Summary and Evaluation 
Differences from other case studies: estate forms two thirds of a city, dominated 
by steel works. 
part of DSQ; 13% overall 
der 3 month halved to 471; those over 3 
11% (1988) 
(11% in 1987) 
Bett h still difficulties in attracting 
; formed: estate opened up by 
newbuild provided variety; and 
ubs a special attribute of 
in 
unemployed, high North African 
a particular problem 
a, and new services, but 
initiatives in next 
Box 90: State of Main Indicators Now 
Extensive physical rehabilitation achieved, and many major housing management 
objectives attained - particularly the reductions in voids and arrears- Doubt about 
lasting impact - disquiet about continuing maintenance; voids levels and turnover 
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vulnerable, already started to fluctuate up and down from best achievements in 
1997; popularity with new tenants not yet fully established. Of concern is general 
attitude of HLM. Although provided local services, little attention to changing 
attitudes and approaches to tenant services, with little new training. Social 
dimension of HLMprogramme mainly collecting arrears and keeping out any further 
problem families. 
Emphasis on economic and commercial progress; new programme 89- 93 includes a 
Regie de Quartier aimed at young people particularly, and other training, and 
"insertion" programmes. 
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Stonebridqe Estate, Brent 
Ston Brent 
Background and History 
Estate is in outer London Borough of Brent, some distance frorn commercial and 





: 'ting: Labour, then hung, then Conservative; 
seen as Loony (whichever party in power) 
Box 91: Location 
southern half. 
One of three large, notorious, system built estates in the Borough. Deck access 
prefabricated wall frame buildings; also 171 town houses (original Stonebridge Park 
estate). Overhead walkway spans Harrow Road to link two parts of estate. When 
built, estate accessible by external walkways linking flats, giving complete 
unimpeded ac cess. Large windswept grass areas separate blocks; little landscaping 
except cris-crossing paths. 
Small commercial centre and pub; abandoned underground garages - central 
I wi L- pedestrian entrance to them locked off, but used as rubbish dump, ith plague of 
rats infesting garages. Only UK case study were I was denied access to original Forril 
A and Form B applications; on grounds that since there had been few improvements 
on the estate, to disclose details of original problems would simply pro-vide evidence 
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Incomes: Low 
Employment: High unemployment; high levels of manual workers; extensive criminal activity and drugs dealing 
Households: High concentrations of single parents; of 
children under 5; and of young single people. 
. fications: no information 
_c: 36-0. Black Afro-Caribbean; 14% Asian 
Box 92: Population 
Note: No reliable data as Council unsure of occupancy 
that project had not succeeded as intended, and further funding would be prejudiced. 
No external general reports; reports on security (SNU(1988) and racial harassment 
(PSI (1988)). Committee reports and cooperative staff available. 
Population 
Estate never been popular, because of size, structure, and location. Also couticil's 
previous policy of not rehousing 
families with children above 5th floor 
(10th from August 1989) meant many 
lets to single people and flat shares. 
Council admit flats have passed on to 
unknown others, and no audit done to 
establish residence. SNU(SNU(1988)) 
survey indicated population structure. 
Cluster analysis of 1981 census 
indicates high levels of deprivation. 
Also sizable population ex-patients 
from closing Shenley Mental Hospital. 
Allegedly sizable population of drugs 
dealers moved from Broadwater Farni 
following riot there, especially in one 
now unmanageable block - part of 
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Box 93: Estate Details 
severe problem of presence of drugs dealers and other criminals. 
Original Problems 
Unpopularity compounded by problems of crime and security, latterly drugs problem. 
Originally badly lit, residents vulnerable, many muggings and sexual attacks in lifts, 
and dark comers of walkways. Now no deliveries of DSS giros, or commercial 
hostility to improvements on part 
aimed to reduce crime; otherwise 
Box 94: Major Problems at Start 
deliveries. Indiscriminate allocations at start, to flat shares and single people, lead 
to high turnover, and loss of control; high persistent voids; high arrears; difficulties 
for tenants seeking employment due to immediate bias because of address. 
Lighting and walkway problems have identified by tenants as one of key ISSLIeS. 
Towers heating system also unsatisfactory - expensive storage heaters, prone to 
breakdown, asbestos lined. Flats themselves spacious, well laid out, generally 
comfortable. 
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General sense of isolation and despair on the estate. Only new tenants were 
homeless households with young children who had no choice, or young single people, 
many of whom made a minimal or negative contribution to estate life. 
Original Proposals and Objectives 
Additional security measures a] so 
planned: connecting walkways 
demolished, permitting block 
isolation. New, stronger, flat front 
doors, with high security multi-locks. 
New entryphone systems following 
failure of original systems; 
experimental concierge towers. 
Box 95: Housing objectives of 
Programme Hoped that by combatting crime, 
estate become more attractive, then 
voids problem and illegal occupancy reduced - although there were no specific 
initiatives to tackle those problems. General management improvements including 
additional estate office to north half of estate, to 
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cover all housing management aspects of North. 
What Happened? 
Lighting improvements installed, and highly successful and popular; new front doors 
also well received. Entryphones on low rise blocks worked reasonably, but failed on 
high rise - due to presence of many illegal occupants opposed to controlled access. 
Box 96: Non Housing Elements 
nate resident groups 
First concierge scheme tried in worst block - failed, partly for technical reasons 
Second concierge scheme designed and installed; worked better, although there 
remain considerable problems in making them fully effective. New schemes designed 
with much more input from tenants, and involving higher level of manageinent inpLit 
(concierge from 7am to I Ipm, and security guards at the other times). Served 
e management group 
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Box 97 Summary of Outcomes 
partly to divert crime to the commercial centre and neighbouring pub, and reduced 
worst personal crime in estate interior. Tenant participation extremelly patch. N 
throughout; various associations, but generally unrepresentative, with active 
members mainly elderly white tenants. Umbrella community organisation 
coordinated by full time Community Services worker, set up 1979. Forum was to 
stimulate tenant involvement, and facilitate effective coordinated service delivery. 
Latter objective to be via interdepartmental middle management group - but not 
regarded seriously by departments. 
Both estate offices now fully functioning. Estate officers manage arrears :! S; f 1,000 
(specialist arrears staff in District office for fl, 000-0,000, then HQ). Estate 
officers also deal with most housing management duties, except repairs (central 
number for all repairs). Allocations and transfers also dealt centrally a computerised 
system - except transfers between blocks, particularly if large flat released. 
Initiative tied to arrears where if tenant kept to agreement to reduce, and agree to 
move to non-family flat, f 1,000 reduction in arrear. Housing benefit administered 
centrally. 
No inroads into voids and illegal Housing Related 
Cost: E2.2 
occupancy. Caretaking service ceased cost per estate home: E1,294 
to be residential in 1989 - new system Estate Action contribution: 
E1.1 million 
of six resident Area Officers 
supervising teams of "chargehands" Box 98: Summary of Expenditure 
and specialist cleaners. Chargehands 
jobs predominantly cleaning and rubbish removal, with little contact with the 
tenants. Further changes removing residential area officers imminent. 
Failure of programme clearly indicated by development of new plans to totally 
revitalise estate. These involved long term plan with complete redesign, and wide 
objectives: 
to redesign and improve the quality of housing 
to improve employment and training prospects 
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- to give a greater say to tenants in running the estate 
to revive the local economy around the estate 
Proposals included demolition of 6 medium rise blocks and 636 newbuild for sale arid 
rent, in open spaces. Development to be coordinated by specially created company, 
Estates Action participation in funding improvements to existing homes -improved 
lighting, improved concierge and security measures, sound proofing and new lifts. 
Low rise blocks to get cladding for heating insulation, new windows and new doors. 
External lighting also to be improved. Housing management changes encouraged by 
Estate Management Board. Also improvements to commercial centre, and 
conversion of underground garages to small business units-, linked employment 
initiatives, jobs surveys and skills audits. Tenants initiative manager claimed that 
part of the push for this large scale programme was from the Home Office, 
concerned about the extent of drugs and other estate crime, following police failLires 
and high level meetings with Borough's councillors. Extensive consultation lead, 
however, to rejection of proposals. Now planned to introduce Housing Action TrList, 
with similar radical redevelopment (ballot pending) 
Comments and Assessment by Main Agents 
Little improvement Although new local office generally viewed positively, this was 
only real improvement. General feeling of continuing decline recently; increasing 
levels of criminal activity; image unchanged, unpopular. 
Tenant apathy and distrust General agreement on difficulty to involve tenants', 
recent plans for complete revitalisation provoked more interest than for several 
years, but prior to that involvement in tenant associations, or in Stonebridge Forum, 
was very low. 
Overwhelming physical problems Noted that improvement works had done 
little to 
improve disrepair, or make major improvements to dwellings. Demolition ot 








that few positive improvements, as 
most of other works secuntv related. 
Wasted money on security systems 
Considerable comment on money 
spent on security measures-, onginallN, 
considered installation would have 
marked effect, but soon shown they 
needed support and participation of 
Box 99: Main Issues f rom tenants, which was difficult to get. L- Interviews More, would not work without the 
ability to control or evict the criminal minority who wished to frustrate tile security 
systems. Often stated that lessons not learned, and same mi stakes repeated. New 
concierge schemes (which reflected models pioneered in Brent amongst other places) 
seemed to be working better. 
Poor general services General borough services poor. Repairs service being L- 
overhauled, due to complaints; caretaking service restructured, although many 
agents felt quality of service had declined since abolition of resident caretaker 
posts. Housing benefit service poor; little sense of interdepartmental working. 
Problems were therefore compounded by being placed in context of generally poor 
level of Borough services. 
Continuing image of crime Despite success of walkways removal and new front doors 
in reducing burglaries, alleged presence of criminals and drug dealers on the estate, 
and problems from commercial centre and adjacent pub, had led to an increasing 
image of criminality. 
Summary and Evaluation 
Main work of improvement is still to be done, if HAT happens. To date conceiltratioli 
on security works at expense of most other aspects of improvement. Managerilelit 
changes introduced, and general level of housing management services given higher 
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Voids: Not high, though high levels of unauthorised 
occupancy. 
xrears: Figures not revealed, but believed to remain high 
mage: Worsening; perceived as haven for unemployable and 
demolished; otherwise unchanged 
Participation: Extremely limited, though new comprehensive 
proposals have exited more interest 
Box 100: State of Main Indicators Now 
profile. Despite this, general level of indicators of voids, arrears, and unauthorised 
occupancy remain high, repairs, caretaking, and housing benefit services remain 
poor, and coordination of regular services and improvements remains limited. 
Generally mood of agents is that some major initiative will be needed to make any 
significant improvements. 
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St Lukes, Islinctto 
rib 
11 71 "M 
St Lukes. Islineon 
On southern edge of London Borough of Islington, a mile from City of London. Built 
by GLC, transferred April 1982'. Small 
Estate name : St Lukes estate of homogeneous slab block 
Region: Lon don construction, Interconnected 
Community: Islington maisonette blocks, forming Z shape. 
community pop.: 166,100 Access via half mile corr-idors on 4 
(1981) levels and interconnectinc, walkwavs. 
Estate Pop: 950 50% (39,089 units in 1990/91) of the 
Politics: Long term left borough's housing stock IS COUTICII 
rule; "progressivellauthority; 
supportive of participation owned, and a further 10% owned bv I inc. coops; often rate capped housinp- associations. 90% of tile 
! cts: Inner city, 
road at south 
other estates 
office for St Lukes (Finsbury) opened 1985. 
Benef it 
council stock is flats and maisonettes, 
and over 80% is on estates. Also 
pioneer of decentrallsed services, 
including housing, social services, 
environmental health, building works, 
welfare rights, and community 
development. The neighbourhood 
2% unskilled manual, 30% 
ars; many extended families: 
ative"; 10% households with 
)rtion (30%) skilled manual; 
Box 102: Population 
1; 4% SE Asian; 7% African. 
16-1 
Population 
Estate constructed for slum clearance families; "white stronghold", 
"community traditionally "close knit", "working class" and comparatiý'ely 
affluent" (Accent 1991, p79). 
This gradually change)d during 1970-80s, with local economic decline and dechrle of 
immediate environment. 
Further extensive consultation and review of options (L B Islington 1986a) accepted 
SNU (1985) report which stressed need for technical solutions, intensive 
management strategy (concierges), and prompt maintenance. Borough intended 
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Box 104: Major Problems at Start 
upgrading security in 1985/6 capital programme, and had set aside money. Decided 
this be insufficient, and became early UHRU applicant. 1985 application rejected. 
Reasons given understood to relate to management arrangements (lack of dedicated 
estate office, despite Neighbourhood Office), and inadequate consultation (LB 
Islington 1987). Scheme repackaged and accepted following year. (This, like the 
Salford illustrates uncertainties and changing priorities regional offices in choosing 
schemes, and explaining refusals coherently). 
Original Proposals and Objectives 
New scheme based on "reception" not security: aimed to provide friendly, welcoming 
service at entrance. They operate door entry monitor surveillance equipment and 
carry out housing management functions such as taking repair requests and 
L- I responding to emergencies. Idea was to present image of helping, not policing 
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Entrances carpeted and soft fumished; entrance lobby ceiling dropped to provide 
more human and friendlier atmosphere. Blocks isolated from each other, and all 
access via reception areas. 
Improved security Further works: landscaping, 
Reduced crime improvements to the play areas, 
Experimental system for blocking up unused doors, new 
evaluation boundary wall, new street furniture, 
Environmental improvements new lighting. Improvements made to 
minor physical improvements fire escapes; additional car parking; 
Note: Extensive local new bin stores. Extensive tenant 
management arrangements 
already in place as part of consultation - 40% participation 
total decentralisation estimated. 
Box 105: Housing objectives of Little management initiatives to 
Prograimime create a local housing office: Islington 
a pioneer of fully decentralised local authority services - not following not PEP 
model but more radical, not incompatible, model of local service delivery of most 
services from integrated local Neighbourhood Office. 
One neighbourhood housing officer 
Better Police Liaison covered the St Lukes estate. 
Note : Decentralised Allocations centralised. 
neighbourhood structure is 
intended to provide corporate 
improvements Mut Happened? 
- Box 106: non Housing Elements Works were carried out as planned, at 
a total cost of f2.38 million. The 
security system was provided as designed. 
Evaluation in Home Office funded Accent 1991. Objectives to establish views and 
satisfaction levels of tenants with the system, identify remaining problems, and 
asses the effect on other housing management costs - vandalism, major repairs, 
voids, squatting, arrears, right to buy. New system considerably reduced residents 







XX areas .......... 
Box 107: Summary of Outcomes 
anticipated that scheme be wound down due to financial pressures, and expected 
Neighbourhood Office be unable to sustain good management of project. Also 
believed other tenants were responsible for significant proportion of crime. Many not 
sure of receptionists role. 
Definite conclusions on volume of 
crime not possible due to absence of Housing Related Cost: E2.38 million 
consistent and comparative data; also 
Cost per Estate Home: E6,670 
more crime reported after 
Estate Action Contribution: improvements. Indications were levels 1.2m 
of burglary had increased, but of other contributions: El p. w. 
drug abuse decreased. vandalism revenue contribution from , , tenants 
Better communication needed 
between Neighbourhood office and Box 108 Summary of Expenditure 
receptionists; problem of receptionist 
hours was particularly acute: tenants survey indicated they unwilling but prepared 
to contribute additional rent for this. One problem for tenants was felt social 
embarrassment of closing the doors on people waiting outside - even to strangers-, 
also problem for receptionists. 
General improvements welcomed: as were reception facilities and controlled access, 
lighting, landscaping, and changed layout. Levels of tenant satisfaction: over 75% 
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happy living on estate; fewer transfer requests (though this perhaps related to 
tighter transfer criteria); increased right to buy (though evidence for this unreliable). 
Residents felt repairs improved; but negative attitude neighbourhood office. 
Few conclusions drawn on main housing management indicators: voids remained 
good, at 2.8%; arrears information not made available to survey-, no major repairs 
expenditure information was available; repairs to communal areas reduced by 161C. 
The most important aspect of evaluation is of use of the concierge system. Noted 
that solution cannot readily be transferred to other estates, as the layout and size 
of the estate is critical in determining design and staffing issues. The greatest 
benefits appeared to accrue to tower block residents. Surveillance problenis 
continue: citing of cameras, and their performance; reception staff unskilled in use 
of equipment. Some benefits due to population of the estate being homogeneous, and 
stable extended households. Even so, scheme attracted adolescents to its 
comfortable attractive. Noted consultation essential as scheme unworkable without 
their cooperation - but they continued to undermine it by using fire escapes. 
Reception staff management, and their relation to neighbourhood office were 
unresolved problems. Staff changes resulted in communication failures; monitoring 
arrangements ineffective unsatisfactory information on key indicators prior to 
system installation, so savings not demonstrable. 
Note scheme is "hybrid" between high technology security system and friendly 
reception system (based on Skilton's ideal types of "security based", which emphasise 
surveillance and patrolling, and an overriding security objective, often involving 
uniformed staff; as against "reception based" schemes which give a high emphasis 
to service delivery and community development (Skilton 1987)). Accent note original 
security guards, in place for four months before the council receptionists, were 
better received by many tenants: apparently unclarity amongst tenants and 
receptionists about patrolling, and what to do when incidents blew up. Often success 
relied on certain receptionists developing better approaches to the job and relations 
with tenants. 
3 
Comments and Assessment by Main Agents 
I was denied consent to speak to caretakers (the only case study estate where I had 
this problem) as gatekeeper Union rep believed I would report back to 
"management", who would use this to attack caretakers further. 
Lack of team working: and lack of 
clear roles for local agents. 
Receptionists and caretakers at odds-, 
reception staff seen as usurping many 
caretaking roles, and paid more for 
"sitting on their bums all day long". 
Emergency procedures confused. 
Confused management arrangements 
compounded problems. 
Concern over continUing revenue 
funding: widespread concern about 
impact of withdrawal of DOErevenue 
funding. Not likely to be HRA priority 
c. f. roofing repairs in other estates, 
esPecially as no hard evidence of benefits. 
Criticism of reception staff: Weak identification with neighbourhood office - 
blaming "the office" or "them in the council" for problems; partly because original 
equipment inadequate - e. g. no telephone, no lists of tenants. Job was clearly 
completely tedious, and the motivation low: better to enjoy a quiet life that become 
embroiled in disputes. This a disappointment to tenants. 
Estate stability: Estate population remained stable. Several agents therefore 
questioned whether investment was best use of resources, given the other pressing 
problems in neighbouring estates. 
Low level participation: Frustration on the part of the tenants representatives over 
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Box 109: Main issues from 
Interviews 
Voids: Minimal (1%) 
Arrears: Stable 
, er: Transfer requests reduced 
ge 
ý: Generally reduced 
Box 110: State of Main Indicators Now 
failures of neighbourhood office to respond. 
Summary and Evaluation 
In depth illustration of concierge programme - contrasts with Manchester, and 
Salford. Additional element is recent detailed evaluation of the scheme - one of few 
full scale evaluations of such projects. Its conclusions give a very mixed assessment 
of the investment - some improvements noted, but general standards of management 
unchanged, the expectations of tenants remain low, and continuing problems of 
managing reception staffing unresolved. Accent also note very limited general 
conclusions can be drawn about the usefulness of study for other schemes. They also 
note the general lack of hard information, and of proper systems to monitor the 
scheme. Clear uncertainty about the value of the scheme amongst main agents. 
371() 
Worsley mopnps, Wigan 
AmiLz ;ý- 'e"'. ;. "1. t 
Worsley Mesnes. Witzan 
Wigan is in Greater Manchester, built on now declined cotton and coal. Estate two 
miles south of centre, built using 
system building techniques which have 
Estate Name: Worsley Mesnes produced unpopular and problematic 
Region: North West dwellings - three towers using Bison 
Community: Wigan Wallframe method. 19822-1986 (pre 
Community Population: 308f000 
EA) spent f 1.3 million on maintenance 
and improvement projects including 
Estate Population: 3,200 
painting; tall block heating, security 
Politics: Solid moderate with new front doors, entryphones Labour , 
communal lighting; reroofing, and Location Aspects: No major 
problems environmental works. Rent office and 
External Reports: None full time Estate Management Officer 
established since 1978. Despite these 
Box 111: Location 
measures, estate continued to decline. 
Population 
Details in Wigan Metropolitan Borough (1985) & (1987), based on 1981 census and 
Housing Management information, compare Borough's estates. Comparative 
unemployment and low income very high, with double unemployment c. f. Borough, 
and fourth highest of all estates; 1981 information, and likely that increased since. 
4% single parenthood, high compared to Wigan's 2%, though low compared to 
elsewhere. 23 % single non pensioner reflects unpopularity for families, and fact flats 
only lettable to single people. Low black and ethnic minority reflects curiosity that 
some NE towns historically did not attract black immigration, despite high presence 
in neighbouring towns. 
Original Problems 
Poverty; stresses also showed in other ways: 
"Whilst there is a lack of hard data available, the experience of both Housing 
and Social Workers involved on the estate confirms that the incidence of 
anti-social behaviour, vandalism and neighbour disputes, are much higher on 
this estate than elsewhere in the Borough" (Wigan Metropolitan Borough 
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ýonstructed: 1965-68 
Potal Units: 1573 
Box 112: Estate Details 
(1987), pl) 
Crime rates high, Wigan Probation 
Office indicating 12% of all its 
clients on estate; 88% of breakins in 
the Ashton area (of which it made up 
27% of the properties), and 16% of 
Wigan area, (estate is 5% of 
properties). Turnover, transfer 
requests, weeks lost through voids, 
arrears, all high c. f. boroughwide-, 
voids empty longer, fourth lowest 
house sales. 
Public services and facilities are in shortest supply, and deprivation affects 
availability of private sector services. Also affects health and general welfare. 
Report advocated better understanding by extensive consultation; clear local 
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Foids: 4 
, 1P-*V'ifl =% 10- C- - 
(c. f. 1.8% Boroughwide). Long relet times. 
of tenants in arrears (c. f. 18% boroughwide) 
(c. f. 8% boroughwide) 
- estate very dif f icult to let. Households also 
re prone to neighbour disputes and vandalism. 
)n edge of Wigan, but not a particular problem 
fic problems 
t: One management officer for estate, since 1978 
Tenant Attitudes: Apathetic 
Box 4: Major Problems at Start 
authority interdepartmental services; willingness to provide responsive services; and 
investment in physical structure. 
Note these problems although comparatively severe c. f. Boroughwide were not 
particularly severe c. f. similar estates elsewhere. Nonetheless EA programme 
executed. 
Original Proposals and Objectives 
Resident involvement and a Community Refurbishment Scheme: Previous Priority 
Estates Project used as model. Also Community Refurbishment Scheme - common 
in EA projects, involves using Urban Programme funding, Community Programme 
labour (scheme for unemployed people providing temporary work and training), 
Housing Investment Programme allocations. Alms to use local unemployed people to 
do mainly environmental improvements and internal insulation works, as part of 
comprehensive redevelopment. 
Worksincluded private garden spaces to combat burglaries; shrubs and trees; disused 
garages and store sheds demolished; footpaths diverted and improved; iniproved 
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security locks to flats, insulation and 
e diversitv: sale of 
of estate and buildings 
Box 115: Housing Objectives of 
Programme 
energy conservation measures. 
Original aim af0.86 million 
programme throughout 30 months, 
employing 45 f/t 66 p/t and 10 
supervisors. 
Neip-hbourhood service: Locally based 
team essential; proposed to convert 
unpopular maisonettes in to 
Neighbourhood Service Centre, with 
full range of housing services; team 
also responsible for ensuring close 
cooperation with statutory and non 
statutory agencies. Neighbourhood 
Manager had role of developing and 
coordinating local services. 
of windows and window frame panels 
particularly where extensive heat loss. 
Inadequate heating systems, to be 
replaced with individual central 
heating systems. Over roofing with 
pitched aluminium/zlnc alloy decking 
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Physical improvements: 
Additional insulation and replacement 
Tenure D Estate unpopularity and low housing demand In Aigan meant 
tenure diversity could dispose of unneeded stock and provide different image and 
population. Programme devised for disposal and conversion of an additional group of 
unpopular maisonettes, supplemented by developments on land freed up by towers. 
What Happened? 
Main difference from original proposals is extent of private sector involvement. 
Local firm in conjunction with a local housing association did "renovation" of flats-, 
in fact involved complete rebuilding except for foundations and ground floor Internal 
walls (had to remain to fulfil terms of renovation package). These converted, 
resulting in 35 owner occupied and 88 housing association homes. 
ftents: Total transformation of estate, with 
, housing type and design; extensive 
eating and insulation, roofs, security and 
; sful scheme employing up to 
Box 117: Summary of Outcomes 
Towers presented difficulties, as cost of demolition was high because of asbestos 
problems. Following discussions with then Junior DOE Minister (David Trippier) 
package agreed including use of City Grant and adjacent land, by which developer 
used cleared land for 60 new semi-detached owner occupied homes. There 
immediately started problem of demarkation: residents of new properties insisted 
on construction of large wall to separate them from rest of estate, causing much 
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annoyance. 
Impact was reduction of council stock 
by 40%, to 950, and production of 
mixed council, housing association and 
private homes, at lower density, with 
extensive environmental works 
including demolition of 120 garages, 
and 50 store sheds. Right to buy 
applications up. 
Housing Related Cost: E2.98 
million 
Cost per estate home: E3,160 
Estate Action Contribution: 
E1.49 million 
Landscaping by Community 
Refurbishment Scheme, as planned, 
Other Contributions: 
Newbuilding carried out by 
consortium of private 
developer and housing 
association; demolition of 
towers and rebuilding of new 
homes carried out by private 
developer with City Grant 
community Refurbishment 
although became Employment Scheme: E1.3 million 
Training. Difficulty recruiting labour 
from estate - rates of pay (benefit + 
Box 118: Summary of Expenditure 
f 10) not attractive. New entrances to flats worked well; now clear sense of owned 
space, with carpets and plants on landings, and all clean and well maintained. Rear 
garden areas successful, with extensive planting and tending of flowers and shrLIbS. 
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allocations rule that only over 25 year olds allocated flats in maisonettes: high 
turnover been halted. Demolition activity, and repairs restored attractiveness: at the 
point of one visit there were no voids at all. Turnover rate now very low, people 
were content with improvements. Arrears also reducing. Local repairs depot 
operates well. 
Comments and Assessment by Main Agents 
Happy Coincidence of Wigan's and Estate Action Aims:. Council had found after had 
formulated plans, Estate Action arrived with similar aims. Worsley Mesnes was 
excess stock, unpopular dwellings, and opportunities presented by attracting private 
sector provided an ideal vehicle to carry out a programme. This would not be 
possible with current Estate Action priorities - e. g. EMBs. Estate Action not 
stimulus to authority; rather provided means to execute plans. 
Scope offered by excess housing stoc : Solutions adopted possible because of excess 
of stock in Wigan at time of improvements. This would not be possible now as 
housing stress greater. Estate problems resolved by fundamental restructuring and 
massive reduction in accommodation. 
Comprehensive approach: Importance given to comprehensive approach. excellent 
relations with the many users of local office. Tenants encouraged to come to office 
to discuss any type of problem. 
Good relations with tenants: Atmosphere in office excellent, with welcoming 
reception area and courteous staff. Local staff members, when on estate, had 
excellent rapport with tenants. 
Stable Community: Large changes due to works and demolitions, with influx of 
housing association tenants and owner occupiers produced new spirit of stability. The 
remaining residents were, almost totally, now people who had opted positivelý' to 
stay. Lead to new community spirit though sometimes stated negatively as having 
got rid of trouble-makers. 
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: 0.1% (Nil on one of the days I visited) 
Arrears: 42% reduction in numbers in arrears in last 2 
vP Ar C. 
Turnover: 2% 
Participation: Good in local groups 
Box 120: State of Main Indicators Now 
Total improvement and transformation .- 
from abandoned declining area to vibrant 
and growing neighbourhood. Improvements excellent, quality of local service good, 
and feeling of residents was positive. 
Summary and Evaluation 
Problems at start severe for Wigan, but not c. f. elsewhere. ignificant problenis of 
voids, crime, image, letablility, arrears. 
Transformation from unpopular backwater to growing community of mixed tenures, 
achieved by 40% reduction in stock; by actively retain only tenants who wish to live 
on the estate; and by active intervention of the private sector. The improvement in 
management also significant, and have considerably contributed to success. 
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